STATUS POLITICS IN CANADIAN HIGHER EDUCATION:
THE SYMONS REPORT AS SYMBOLIC CONSOLIDATION

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STATUS POLITICS IN CANADIAN HIGHER EDUCATION:
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Thomas H.B. Symons' To Know Ourselves: The Report of the Commission on Canadian Studies is a rightly renowned landmark enroute to a clarified understanding of the role of Canada's higher education in the creation of a fuller national consciousness. Without in any way demeaning that report or its author, it is possible to see the commission's work in other ways. One other way of seeing it involves putting the report in another context, that of the politics of culture.

Of course, students of higher education have long been aware of such a politic (e.g. Collins, 1979), while for observers of Canadian education, the seeming continuous controversy surrounding Quebec's recent educational legislation underscores an ever-present francophone politics of culture operating in that Province's schooling (see, for example, Posgate and McRoberts, 1976:110-112, 121-122, 178-179). Yet, a similar essentially anglophone cultural politics in Canadian higher education is seldom observed, rarely addressed, and therefore widely unappreciated. To bring this cultural politic into sharper relief, our analysis begins with a brief generalization of "status politics" theory, and then views the Symons Report's social origins, its internal logic, and the responses to it from this theoretical perspective. In this way, we hope "to know ourselves" even more fully.

WHAT IS STATUS POLITICS?

Joseph Gusfield (1963) developed Max Weber's notion of status politics to explain the dynamics of the American alcohol prohibition movement.¹
In general, Gusfield's position is that there are two types of political struggle, which sometimes overlap and intermingle. One is a conventional material politics: the more or less continuous fight among better or worst organized interest groups or social classes, each seeking to use the state and all other means to maximize its own ends.

Status politics, the other form, while parallel to material politics, is less conventional, essentially flowing from cultural differences. It involves the more or less continuous struggle among better and worst organized status groups seeking to use all the means at their disposal to maximize their social honor in the wider community. Status groups are populations sharing a common culture and therefore have the potential to give rise to expressive associations rooted in reality defining symbols. For example, status expressive associations—like the WCTU and other alcohol prohibition organizations—arise out of culturally defined differences in region, ethnicity, religion, and the like.

Status political struggles are likely to intensify in times of rapid social change since status group positions in the community hierarchy of prestige are likely to be changing. At such times, declining (or rising) status groups may give rise to expressive associations which may mount ameliorative (or coercive) symbolic crusades. Such crusades can be lost or won. And if won, victory can be consolidated (or not) when they (or their opponents) follow up their expressive gains.²

In this paper, we explore the fruitfulness of this generalization by offering its application to the cultural politics surrounding the Symons Report. Generally we will see the Report as a successful substantive interest group response to a diffuse coercive symbolic crusade. During the
1970s both the public sector in general and higher education in particular grew rapidly. A rising wave of nationalism fostered an expressive campaign against foreigners--especially U.S. citizens--hired to staff the expanding Anglophone university system. This campaign against immigrant academics tacitly criticized those managing Canada's higher learning and threatened to undermine their authority.

Accordingly, the university managers' association appointed a commission in response to this broad coercive symbolic crusade. The commission's report affirmed the nationalists' symbolic claims against the immigrant scholars. However, in declaring the nationalists victorious, the report advanced ameliorative rather than coercive recommendations. The report also ignored the matter of managerial responsibility for hiring non-resident faculty. In so doing, the report defused a tacit symbolic threat and consolidated its creators' collective authority.

Ironically, rapidly contracting state budgets in the 1980s seem to guarantee that neither the nationalists' symbolic victory nor the managers' substantive consolidation will yield many fruits of victory. Indeed, the possibility exists that these budget contractions may be sufficiently deep and rapid enough to set off another wave of social change with newer forms of expressive crusades and consolidations.

IN THE BEGINNING

The Symons Report originated in a proposal made at the 1970 annual meeting of the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC). Founded in 1911 as the Conference of Canadian Universities (Pilkington, 1974), the AUCC brings together the top management of Canada's higher
educational institutions to confront problems and issues of common concern. Thus, a commission "to study, report and make recommendations upon the state of teaching and research in various fields of study relating to Canada at Canadian Universities" (Symons, 1975:1) was only one of several ongoing AUCC inquiries into such things as projected enrollments, financing, libraries, student housing, the government-university interface and international studies at Canadian universities.

The issue addressed by the Symons Report was somewhat less routine and more politicized than these others. During the 1960s, both the Canadian public sector in general, and schooling in particular, expanded very rapidly (Armstrong, 1979). The proportion of GNP spent on education was 4.4% in 1960. In 1970, it was 9.0% (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1975). This doubling of educational expenditures in a decade produced strains at all levels. One of the most pronounced involved post-secondary personnel. A significantly expanded higher educational system required a matching enlarged professoriate. Two possibilities existed. This enlargement could be made by hiring academics on "temporary" contractually limited appointments to set up and staff, for a short while, both the expanding colleges and Ph.D. production apparatus necessary to run the expanded system. Alternatively, one could rely on the dynamics of the international academic labour market, hiring as best one could the brightest available professors to staff on a more permanent basis the growing graduate and undergraduate facilities.

Historically, the second option had been chosen. Given Canada's higher education development, its managers had long relied on other university systems to supply staff. They particularly welcomed promising
British-born, British-trained academics. With Sir Robert Falconer, President of the University of Toronto and leading light in the AUCC's forerunner, the National Conference of Canadian Universities, they thought Canadian institutions renewed their vigor with "continuing additions of English scholars and men of science to the staffs of their universities" (1928:44).

Some sense of these "continuing additions" is gained by Falconer's 1928 count of the permanent staff at six leading Anglo-Canadian schools. Of 518 professors at Dalhousie, McGill, Queen's, Toronto, Western Ontario and Saskatchewan, 164 (31.7%) were British born and British trained. Another 66 (12.7%) were American with U.S. degrees. The other 288 (or 55.6%) were Canadian born, who trained either in the U.K. or U.S. Thus, the managers had traditionally used the international academic labour market to supply a quite large proportion of staff at its leading Anglo-Canadian universities. And given the much larger scale of U.S. Ph.D. production relative to that of the U.K., Canadian academic managers apparently preferred bright Britons over accomplished Americans.

The second option of importing "continuing additions" was selected once again by those who managed the Canadian higher education apparatus in 1960s. As a result, Canada soon found its academic new-hire lists filled with foreigners, albeit with more Americans than usual. As such hiring accelerated, two questions emerged. First, and most important in mobilizing broad-based popular support, could these expatriate professors adequately instruct their students in the details of Anglo-Canadian cultural discourse? Second, and no less important for being less widely explored, if foreigners held permanent posts, where would newly minted
Canadian Ph.Ds work once the expansion reached its limits? The apparent assumption was that these newly degreed Canadians would find work somewhere else outside the academy or the country (or both) via the same impersonal international labor market forces that traditionally had brought academic immigrants to and from Canada (Evans, 1976). Responding to these questions, English Canadian nationalists successfully mobilized much of the English language media in a campaign to save "Canadian culture" from the immigrant--particularly American--professorate taking up the new university posts (Resnick, 1977).

The substance of the nationalists' concern is seen in the citizenship of the 20,952 full time staff at 111 Canadian universities and colleges in 1970. Some 61.5% were Canadian. Another 15.3% were American, 10.1% were from the United Kingdom, 2.8% were French, 2.1% were Pakistani and Indian, with an additional 8.2% from other countries. The Canadian presence in six broad academic specializations--humanities, languages, the pure, biological, physical and social sciences--was relatively constant: at roughly the six-out-of-ten proportion in the overall sample. For its part, the American presence was above its overall 15.3% average in three cases: languages, humanities and social sciences. And faculty from the United Kingdom were underrepresented in both the humanities and the social sciences. Finally, in faculty administration, Canadian citizens are found in overwhelming numbers, 87.8% (University Affairs, 1971).

From these figures, three broad generalizations can be drawn. First, in 1970 the proportion of American citizens in Canadian universities was relatively small. It was 15.3% over all and about 40% of the total non-Canadian faculty. Americans were the largest non-national grouping,
but they were not a majority of the non-Canadian staff. Second, in two areas of critical symbolic concern, American faculty were relatively over-represented while United Kingdom staff were relatively under-represented. These were the humanities, which communicate most directly the appreciation of high and mainly upper class culture, and the social sciences, which instruct most fully in the practise of inequality, its justification and reform. Third, if the rapidly expanding university of the 1960s had hired scores of non-nationals to the distress of many Canadians, clearly these non-nationals had been hired by managers themselves overwhelmingly Canadian. From these generalizations, we see some of the roots of the expressive anti-Americanism that surfaced frequently during the debate about staffing the expanding higher educational system. And we also see the vulnerability of the system's managers to claims of mismanagement on the basis of symbolically unacceptable hirings.

In the midst of the staffing debate, the AUCC came under increasing pressure to investigate the matter. Pressure came from university faculty via the Canadian Association of University Teachers and through various educational and scholarly bodies; from students in undergraduate and graduate organizations; and from the public-at-large at meetings stimulated by an out-pouring of articles and books arguing "the need for more attention to Canadian circumstances in the curriculum of the country's universities" (Symons, 1975:2).

With the rise of such pressures, the authority of the university managers themselves tacitly came into question. Having been given considerable public resources to expand higher education, had they handled
that expansion well? Were there too many foreigners hired, especially Americans whose republican, even populist, traditions were antithetical to Anglo-Canadian ideas of hierarchy and elitism? Further, whoever had been hired, how well were they teaching about Canadian things? Finally, where would graduates with advanced degrees work, if not in their country's higher educational apparatus? On such questions, the stewardship of university managers was necessarily the heart of the matter and the mounting public pressure implicitly called on them to give an accounting of their actions.

The AUCC's essential response to these pressures is suggested by Commission's identification of the route it took.

"While some people clearly felt that the Commission should begin its activities with the ceremonial burning of the American flag on the steps of the Parliament Buildings, others...denied the need to give any serious attention at all to the question....However, most members of the academic community and of the general public who spoke out on the subject indicated their wish for a thoughtful and thorough inquiry into these questions, rather than an exercise in either flag-waving or in cultural amnesia, and this is the path the Commission has endeavoured to follow throughout its work. (p. 2)

To chart this middle way between flag-burning and cultural amnesia, the AUCC chose one of its own. Thomas H.B. Symons, after attending elite schools and holding a series of managerial posts at the University of Toronto, became founding President (1960-1972) at Trent University, one of the Ontario expansion institutions. He also helped found the Council of Ontario Universities (the provincial parallel to the AUCC) and was an active executive in the Association of Commonwealth University (the British multinational counterpart to the AUCC). He also lent his considerable energies to a wide range of educational, cultural and civil libertarian and political projects (Canadian Who's Who, 1980:959).
In 1972, funded at $250,000, by the MacDonald Steward Foundation, the Messecar Foundation, the Canada Council and the Science Council of Canada, Symons as a one-member Commission hired a research co-ordinator, three consultants, four research associates and 11 research assistants. The Commission staff was advised by a panel of 35 Canadian Studies experts from across the land and assisted by "liaison persons" at 63 Canadian universities and colleges. In its work, the Commission received nearly 30,000 letters, and met 2500 members of the public and representatives of some 200 academic, education and other interested associations.

For three years, Symons and staff sifted and winnowed its harvest of letters, briefs, and minutes, "Essentially...looking for...sensitivity to the Canadian context or perspective" (p. 5) in the nation's higher learning. In 1975, the Commission issued its first two volumes packed into a densely printed 350 page book. The report began with a multifaceted rationale for an academic sensitivity of things Canadian. Perhaps the most central was its titular theme that greater self-knowledge is necessary for more effective societal problem solving. Then, the report inventoried the Canadian content that fosters such self-awareness in five areas: (1) the university curriculum, particularly in 21 social-cultural disciplines ranging from art history to women's studies; (2) university teaching and research in science and technology; (3) professional education programmes in 10 areas from agriculture and veterinary medicine to social work; (4) Canadian studies at community colleges and abroad; and (5) the infrastructure that supported a sensitivity to things Canadian: archives, audio-visual media, and private donors.
With overwhelming regularity, the Commission found a substantial and deplorable insensitivity to Canadian materials in all these areas. In this way, the Symons Report upheld the symbolic claims made by the English-Canadian nationalists. But it did so by de-emphasizing both managerial responsibility and coercive reforms, as we will see by examining the internal logic of the Report itself.

THE REPORT'S INTERNAL LOGIC: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

While the Report offered impressive rhetorical support for the English Canadians' symbolic crusade, methodological problems flawed its internal logic. The Commission's judgement of massive insensitivity to Canadian content was based on specialist's briefs and discipline data that were necessarily neither systematic nor conclusive. The report's usual method of establishing scholarly neglect was, first, asserting the need for a Canadian perspective, say in a discipline, and then, marshalling negative evidence: often quotations from briefs by subject-matter specialists along with some descriptive statistics, such as the proportion non-Canadian teaching or (even studying) the subject.

Such evidence is problematic. The brief quotations did have the authentic flavour of insider-reportage. But if they were representative quotations, then they came from documents rather self-serving and one-sided. And, perhaps that was acceptable, if the point of a brief was to advance an argument, not offer systematic or scientific proof. Further, it would seem that the proportions of non-Canadians involved in higher education were not direct evidence for a lack of sensitivity to Canadian content or context. In fact, the Commission offered little solid
documentation of the thesis that non-Canadians were substantially different from Canadians in their teaching or research. Such may have been the case, but without systematic data showing such a correlation between faculty citizenship and Canadian content, the issue seemed open to uncertainty. Indeed, some subject-matter specialists—for example, sociologist Bernard Blishen (1977)—have offered detailed objections to the Commission's findings of Canadian insensitivity within their disciplines. Moreover, some Canadians probably did not study Canadian issues. As a result of such methodological matters, it was impossible to estimate the precise amount of self-awareness present (or absent) in the many areas inspected. And without such precision, the Commission's judgement remained much more rhetorical rather than rational.

Indeed, the Report's unsystematic methodology made clear its essentially rhetorical posture. Half-way between flag-burning and cultural amnesia, the Symons Report repeatedly upheld a symbolic correlation between citizenship and curriculum, between nationality and instruction. Here it responded rather clearly to the pressures that caused its creation. Interestingly, the Report did not reflect upon the possibility that these foreign faculty were hired by administrations with a significantly higher proportion of Canadians than the staff at large. In stressing the rhetorical correlation between content and citizenship while neglecting the analytic link between administration and hiring, the Report symbolically supported the stewardship of higher education's top management: the very group mounting the Commission itself. In this way, the Symons Report served the vested collective interests of its sponsoring association's membership. It defended the decisions made by constituted authority in the teeth of the nationalists coercive symbolic crusade.
THE REPORT'S INTERNAL LOGIC: ANALYTICAL ISSUES

Beyond such methodological problems were some serious analytical ones. First, moving from the methodologically flawed correlation between nationality and instruction, the Report went on to a questionable analytical correlation between instruction and learning. Next, the Report did not analyze how such learning "about ourselves" will effect societal decision-making asking neither how much learning is enough nor how that learning will make itself felt. Let us touch briefly on these three problems.

First, the report seemed to assume an "absorption" theory of instruction: roughly, that students soak up the content that teachers pour upon them. This overlooked the usual reasons that compel students to endure higher education in advanced industrial societies: status affirmation and labour market certification (Collins:1979). In this situation, it is not at all clear that increasing the Canadian content of instruction will lead to a more self-knowledgeable public.

Second, nowhere in the two volumes are found an explicit understanding of how much "more Canadian" higher educational apparatus will be necessary to perfect national decision-making, the rational object of the Commission's work. The apparent model was that the universities heighten the Canadian consciousness of those attending higher education, who then crystalize public opinion to guide governments towards better "more informed" public policy positions. Within this model, one crucial question is: How much Canadian content is enough to increase national awareness to a level sufficient for the most effective societal problem-solving? On this matter, the report was silent. Further, given that only a small proportion
of the Canadian population attends post-secondary schooling, it is clear that a very long time will be required to increase national awareness very much in this way.

Third, there is a substantial Canadian intellectual tradition arguing against the Report's implicit model (Porter, 1965; Clement and Drache, 1978). It holds that the uses of citizen self-knowledge in the public policy process are structurally limited. Such would be the case where established bureaucratic and economic vested interests make critical policy input, input that preempts very meaningful citizen participation except at election times. This alternative Canadian elite-pluralist model has a damning implication for the Commission's essentially liberal-democratic position. Put in the Report's titular terms, knowing ourselves as liberal-democratic when we are not leads us to an incorrect understanding of the needs of our present situation and the possibilities of meeting them.

In sum, the Report wasn't at all clear on: (1) how increased faculty attention to Canadian content would increase Canadian consciousness among students, (2) how much of an increase in such awareness would be necessary to shape public policy, and (3) how increased awareness would enter the public policy process. Perhaps such substantive questions remained unasked since the Report's occasion required symbolic answers to convert an essentially coercive nationalist campaign into a substantive consolidation for the managers of Canada's higher education.

THE REPORT'S INTERNAL LOGIC: ITS RECOMMENDATIONS

Since the Report found a substantial and deplorable insensitivity to Canadian materials in its many areas of investigation, it urged vigorous
efforts to increase national self-awareness in Canadian higher education. Several hundred specifically enumerated recommendations were combined with perhaps 1000 passing pleas made as textual asides. For example, the report asked each university to establish a senior academic body to examine its institution's curriculum for signs of sufficient Canadian self-awareness, and urged a permanent national academic body to monitor the state of such sensitivity. In short, the Commission asked Canadian universities and colleges to re-focus their efforts, putting more Canadian content into both their teaching and research. And the several governments were tacitly asked to supply the wherewithal to mount much of this re-tooling.

The common thread running through the Report's recommendations was that Canadian content and context are acceptable and legitimate—if particularistic—facets of the arts and sciences that made up the nation's higher learning. In every discipline, university professors were asked to honor local aspects and applications in their specialties. And the overall dimensions of the Report's recommendations supported the plausibility of broadly multidisciplinary programmes centering themselves on an academic concern for things Canadian. In these recommendations detailing an overwhelming support for Canadian studies within and across the disciplines, the Symons report clearly upheld the banner carried by the English-Canadian nationalists in their symbolic crusade against the immigrant academics, newly hired to staff the expanding university system.

But the Report's recommendations did not urge any coercive action against these foreigners staffing Canada's higher learning. It did not suggest, for example, that these recently landed immigrants be required to take out Canadian citizenship as a condition of continued academic
employment. Nor did it ask that funding agencies buy out the employment contracts of foreign tenured senior professors, or offer junior immigrant academics termination and relocation incentives. Neither did it encourage any formal monitoring of teaching and research to ensure some minimal amount of local content and context finding its way into admittedly more universally-oriented arts and sciences. Finally, the recommendations made no mention of revising the authority arrangements that gave rise to so many non-Canadians being at work in the nation's higher education.

In short, the report accepted the essential legitimacy of the university managers' decisions to staff the universities with immigrant scholars without recommending that those scholars be required to teach and research things Canadian under pain of punishment. Thus, there was nothing like a suggested plan of affirmative action or compensatory curriculum to bring Canadians and Canadian content in higher education up to some more "acceptable" standard. Rather than such coercive sticks, the Report favored ameliorative carrots--tens, hundreds of recommendations--to the professoriate, understanding that rational and well-intentioned academics will be persuaded by the reasonableness of the Report itself. In effect, the Report transformed the symbolic coercive crusade of the English-Canadian nationalists into an ameliorative consolidation of the university managers tacitly threatened authority.

THE RESPONSES TO THE SYMONS REPORT

Three levels of responses to the Report can be identified. Each level has its own meaning as part of the cultural politics surrounding the Commission's work. First, and most commonly, those who mounted the English
Canadian nationalist crusade against the newly immigrant university teachers proclaimed the Report as detailing their claims and acclaiming their crusade's correctness. And joined by competent observers, they seemed to accept graciously the transforming ameliorative thrust of the Report's recommendations. Second, a few withheld their full support from the Report. Some correctly noted that it remained silent on the university managers' responsibilities for whatever was awry in Canada's higher learning, thereby pointing to the managers' substantive consolidation. Others decried the Report's ameliorative stance, backing away from the coercive measures necessary to get rid of immigrant academics necessarily ill-equipped for their tasks. Third, many—whatever their position on the Report—noted that massive resources were necessary to accomplish its recommendations and raised the specter of the crusade's victory losing its substance by underfunding. Let us trace out each of these levels.

The Report's publication and findings were widely discussed and acclaimed by the nation's mass communications networks. Here, particularly in the English language media that had been mobilized by the nationalists campaign to save "Canadian culture" from the newly hired immigrant professoriate, the Report successfully capped an enormous outpouring of nationalist energy and sentiment. Here, too, nationalists indicated acceptance of ameliorative rather than coercive solutions. As the Canadian Forum (Vol. 56, June-July 1976, p. 15) correctly noted: "Newspaper, radio and television commentaries...generally expressed shock and surprise at the Report's account of the state of Canadian Studies, and sympathy for the Report's positive recommendations..."."^4
Academics, without unseemly populism, also found much to support in the Report. The Canadian Association of University Teachers, which had been in the forefront of the movement seeking a Commission, used its official journal to endorse the Report, its Commissioner, and its recommendations (Masleck, 1976; Horn, 1976). Here the professors accepted both the managers' substantive consolidation of their authority and the symbolic victory of the nationalists in its more acceptable ameliorative (and non-coercive) form.

Outside the CAUT, academic opinion was also overwhelmingly in support of the Report. Some carefully situated the Report into the Anglo-nationalists' on-going efforts to Canadianize lower and higher education (McDougall, 1976; Gibson, 1977; Sullivan, 1976). Here the Report was taken as a very substantial victory in a continuing struggle to establish and legitimize a viable Canadian studies curriculum (on which, more generally, see Stamp, 1974; Downey, 1976; and Morrison et al., 1977). And a principal organ of English Canadian nationalist analysis published two lengthy sets of generally favourable academic responses to the Report and its ameliorative recommendations (Journal of Canadian Studies, 1976, 1977).

However, a small segment of academic opinion was critical of the Report for avoiding the question of managerial responsibility in whatever problems were being experienced in Canada's higher education. While willing enough to accept the nationalists' victory and Symons' ameliorative recommendations, some refused the managers' consolidation of authority. As one professor pointedly entitled his comments: "And what about university administrators, Tom?" (Miller, 1977). Or as another scholar styled the
responsibilities of those managing Canada's higher education: "...if Canadian academics are inferior...it is because our universities have made them so..." (Evans, 1976). These writers clearly held that the AUCC sponsors of the Symons Report were, after all, the managerial authors of the policies under attack. And both noted the Report's failure to notice that authorship.

The theme of managerial responsibility was even more fully expressed and explored in a symposium published by Canadian Forum (1976). In the sharpest and most critical collection of comments on the Report, the AUCC's managerial interests were forcefully delineated and roundly condemned. The essential theme tying together the Forum's symposium is that the Report was a smoke-screen, shielding higher education's top management from a dishonouring of their collective authority, and allowing the consolidation of the non-Canadian--particularly American--cultural forces occupying the nation's houses of culture and intellect. In its traditionally raucous, left-of-center, culturally elitist, Anglo-Canadian manner (Mills, 1978-9), the Forum was not interested in expressive victories with ameliorative recommendations--indeed, its writers suggest all manner of coercive remedies instead. In these pages, we find a rather complete rejection of the Report's achievements: an upholding of Anglo-Canadian nationalists symbolic claims coupled with ameliorative recommendations affirming the authority of those responsibilities for the nation's higher learning.5

If the Forum's raucous elitism marked a thinly populated intellectual limit to the Report's symbolic achievements, other writers noted material problems much more central to the attainment of the Report's recommendations. Many sympathizers were acutely sensitive to the
possibility that the Report's symbolic victory—its full expression of nationalistic logic and demand—could be transformed into an ephemeral symbolic victory. For example, this might occur, as Robin Harris (1977) noted, since the very breadth of recommendations made it difficult to know where best to invest the always scarce available resources.

These broadly understood questions of resources-for-recommendations are, of course, critical to ensure that Anglo-Canadian nationalists are able to move from their expressive achievements in the Symons Report to those of substantive consolidation. It is here that the Forum's reminder of the Anglo-Canada's anti-American nationalism offers some clues to the Report's curious avoidance of the issue of anti-Americanism. Having sided with the nationalists on other symbolic claims, the Report stops short of burning Old Glory, for to do so would have delegitimated a substantial portion of the theoretical and material foundations underpinning university expansion itself.

Since the end of World War II, Canada's massive investment in education was increasingly guided by a diffuse commitment to "human capital" theories assuming that a more educated labour force facilitated higher levels of economic production and consumption. Such spending aimed at creating an education system of more equal opportunity across the nation. And it did succeed in some measure (Harvey and Lennards, 1973; Lennards, 1980).

But the theory of human capital is ideologically and practically based on the educational experience of the U.S.A. The use of this theory in Canada by university decision-makers signals a broadening in their traditionally British self-experience towards a more Anglo-American one.
This shift is, of course, rooted in larger social dynamics, especially the accelerating twentieth-century interpenetration of the Canadian and U.S. economies (Schacter, 1979; Silva, 1980a,b).

Resistance to this accelerating interpenetration of U.S. and Canadian economies, is one nub of the anti-Americanism heard in the nationalistic criticisms of staff hirings during university expansion (Resnick, 1977). And while Canada's university managers can offer the nationalists some support on other expressive matters, on the American connection they can not, for, beyond ideology, it was integration into the booming North American economy that allowed Canadian governments to fund university expansion at all. Further, this economic integration also implied entering the wider North American academic market-place to staff expanding Canadian universities with a higher proportion of U.S. born-and-trained professors that had previously been thought decent.

Still, what the Report did not discuss remains an issue. Indeed, some former educational managers have used the Report to focus their second-thoughts about the post-war cultural broadening towards the U.S.A. (see, for example, Bissell, 1977). In such rethinking, we can see Canada's higher educational elite beginning to confront their next challenge. Having expanded higher education on the strength of the booming North American economy, the contraction of Canada's post-secondary sector must now be managed in the wake of stagflation. And what, we may ask, are the implications of this contraction for the Report's recommendations and the nationalists' ability to move from expressive achievement to substantive consolidation?
RESOURCES AND THE REPORT'S RECOMMENDATIONS

While it is too soon to issue a final assessment, it appears that despite contracting resources, efforts along the lines of Symons' recommendations have resulted more in a symbolic consolidation rather than a symbolically ephemeral crusade.

The fullest review of the changes occurring in the wake from these recommendations was undertaken by James E. Page, president of the Association for Canadian Studies. His *Reflections on the Symons Report* surveys in a somewhat limited way the impact of the Symons report over the five years since its publication.

Page notes at the outset the difficulties inherent in precisely pinpointing the repercussions of "nearly 1000 general and the 295 specific recommendations....addressed broadly to 'whom it may concern'" (p. ix). Further, it is difficult to know if changes consistent with these recommendation occurred due to the Report, or would have happened anyway. Finally, Page's *Reflections* don't view the universities as fully as the way Symons did. Rather it looks mainly at the universities' overall responses and at their efforts to sustain Canadian Studies programmes. It also explores the responses of the governments and the several Canadian studies associations. Nonetheless, Page's admittedly foreshortened *Reflections* offer us a wide sampling of responses to the Symons' Report, one broad and deep enough to judge its overall impact since 1975 as something of a nationalist's symbolic consolidation in Anglo-Canadian Higher Education.

Page reviews the self-reported responses of 48 (of 63) Canadian universities to the Symons Report and offers summaries of each experience.
At some, the Report's recommendations became opportunities for reflection on the institution's mission and practice. Thus, at 18, committees were struck and 11 have completed their work. At other institutions, the Report was dealt with less formally and it is harder to grasp its impact. Overall, however, the climate for Canadianization found in these accounts seems "more positive than before" (p. 127). More professors hold Canadian citizenship and more courses seem to contain Canadian content. In sum, Canada's universities and colleges have responded positively, if slowly, to Symons' recommendations.

Page's most interesting focus is on Canadian Studies programmes. Their situation illuminates some of the problems of symbolic consolidation in a time of academic underfunding. Twenty-nine universities have some sort of formal Canadian Studies programme. Seven are new and three more are planned. All have gained succor from the Report. But few of these programmes are high-profile, well-funded, securely supported efforts; partly because few are firmly footed in the disciplines. Canadian studies is usually defined as cross-specialty course work. This contradicts the normal department boundaries that serve to channel academic careers and rewards. In effect, Canadian Studies, like most cross-discipline programmes, confronts the paradox that the higher learning as a free marketplace of ideas is rather rigidly organized into disciplinarian monopolies of knowledge.

Indeed, Canadian Studies faces this problem in a most extreme form. Cross-discipline studies succeed best when they leap the fewest boundaries. Social psychology programmes abound since they cross two boundaries; urban studies flourish since they span only a few. But the
Symons Report implies a most vigorous, pan-Canadian Studies programme: one almost without disciplinarian limits. It is therefore necessarily seen by the established academic order as profitless expansion instead of an ever-more fruitful specialization. Accordingly, as retrenchment and budget cuts continue, such pan-disciplinary programmes become less and less thinkable. They become expendable, easy victims of academic infanticide: insufficient funds hindering the development of library holdings, lectureships and learning materials necessary for academic achievement and meritocratic departmentalism. It is pan-Canadian Studies—--and the universities'--vulnerability to the period's budget constraints that cast a pall on the efforts of those who would have such efforts succeed. And, of course, pan-Canadian Studies are politically difficult in Quebec and Alberta. Sustaining such symbolic consolidation as has been achieved in Canadian Studies Programmes will tax the Symons Report's staunchest supporters. 6

These supporters have, of course, been active outside the universities. Combining their Canadianization ideas with public and private funds, they have published an abridged version of the Symons Report (Symons, 1978) and generally simulated, produced and disseminated Canadian curricular content, particularly to primary and secondary educators. 7 Here they may plant seeds that will help sustain a nationalist symbolic consolidation in the universities, for their efforts bend the intellectual demand that will help shape the academy's future course offerings. As university students become more sophisticated consumers of the disciplinarians' offerings, their choices in a contracting resource environment may help supply their wants. Thus, the necessities of course marketing in a time of budget constraints may urge academic knowledge
monopolists to produce courses somewhat more in keeping with their consumers increasingly nationalistic preferences than their own specialties transnational predelections.

However, the logic of governmental funding in the 1980's sets severe limits to the nationalists' symbolic consolidation. At the federal level, for example, in 1978 the Secretary of State announced multi-year grants to the Association of Canadian Studies ($120,000), the Canadian Studies Foundation ($500,000) and the Canadian Studies project of the Association of Canadian Community Colleges ($325,000). These monies are, of course, multiplied by the enthusiasm of volunteers. Still, this scale of federal government funding is not encouraging for sustaining, let alone expanding, the symbolic consolidation energized by the Symons Report. Thus, the Department of External Affairs promotes its overseas Canadian Studies activities at several times the level that the Secretary of State grants domestic efforts. In 1980, External Affairs spent $845,000 to develop an informed, well disposed and sustained interest in Canada among citizens of the U.S., U.K., France, Japan, Italy, Germany and Belgium. In practice, much of this federal money goes into Canadianizing foreign professors and students, rather than their domestic counter-parts.

Similarly, the provincial governments are tightening their budgets in the teeth of Ottawa's strenuous efforts to shift health, welfare and educational spending to their treasuries. Taken together, the provincial governments in the 1980's cannot afford to become serious sponsors expanding at the material level the symbolic gains achieved and elaborated by the nationalist inclined educators and associationists.

Overall, nonetheless, Page's Reflections shows us that by 1981 enough had been accomplished by the Symons Report, its recommendations and the
energies thereby released to signal the fragile consolidation of the nationalists' symbolic project. Whether this consolidation can be held in the storm of further budget-cutting will be its test.

THE THIRD VOLUME

Something of the problems inherent in the nationalists' symbolic consolidation—and the managers' symbolic consolidation as well—is seen in the content and reception of the Commission's third and final volume. In 1984, Symons now joined by Page, struck some old themes and broke new ground in Some Questions of Balance: Human Resources, Higher Education, and Canadian Studies. The older themes found broad support in the nation's media, while entry into the temple of social planning was met with greater skepticism.

Symons and Page, for example, reiterated the student's—and society's—need for a significantly Canadian curriculum. Further, they continued to assert that a correlation existed between faculty citizenship and what was taught and researched (eg., p. 33, 51, 55). And, they held that too many non-Canadians were being hired to fill the few posts available. Finally, they stressed that underfunding would endanger the development of a full-fledged Canadian Studies component in the nation's higher education system. Here we see the reassertion of the nationalist's symbolic consolidation, one echoed loudly in the editorial pages of the nation's English newspapers and magazines.

But the bulk of the third volume moved beyond such old themes into a surprising new area: social planning. Here the Commission explored post-secondary enrollment projections and human resource demands at the societal
level. It projected a decline of students in the 1980s, followed by an increase in the 1990s. This pointed to a potentially lost generation of highly qualified labour power in the 80s (as, for example, PhD's failed to find academic and other intellectual employment), followed by (a) another round of foreign professorial hirings as well as (b) labour shortages and foreign hires in high technology throughout society in the 1990s.

In these newer materials, the Commission obviously feared a re-run of the seemingly unplanned expansion of the 1960s, followed by its foreign hires of the 1970s; all of which gave rise to the nationalists' symbolic crusade and the Commission itself. To avoid reliving that past, the Commission recommended a national planning strategy in three parts. First, a public relations effort would regain popular and decision-maker commitment to higher education. Second, new non-traditional students would be found to firm up declining enrollments (eg., life-long learners). Three, financial supports and placement aids would be developed to ensure broader recruitment and more effective employment opportunities for degree holders. Most interestingly, while each of these parts would require considerable public funding for their design and implementation, Symons and Page saw no need to have governments participate in the actual planning itself. Public funds (but not government coercion) were thereby to support—indeed enhance—the essentially private planning perogatives of higher educational managers. Thus the social planning envisioned amounted to a continued defence (and expansion) of educational managers' authority in Canadian society.

While the technical and statistical details of the analysis have come under considerable attack (eg., Black, 1984; Lemy, 1984; Monahan, 1984), the importance of such a defence cannot be over-estimated since higher
educational management in Canada (as everywhere) is under severe attack. On the one hand, disgruntled academics have joined business and media critics in denigrating Canadian colleges and universities (e.g., Bercuson, Bothwell and Granastein, 1984), thus undermining the authority of the system's administration. On the other hand, careful students of a decade's budget decline have wondered why managers have not developed more potent political arguments for 'more' state funding (Skolnik and Rowen, 1984), implicitly raising doubts about managerial competence.

In the midst of such explicit and implicit attacks on the system's management, the Commission's treatment of planning amounts to a defusing of socially explosive criticism. Robin Mathews has stated the situation with characteristic clarity. Inasmuch as the third volume "bends over backwards and ties itself in knots to avoid attaching any degree of responsibility to anybody.... it continues to shield policies, people and pressure groups..." who were after all responsible for the unplanned expansion of the past and for its present imbalances, whatever they might be (1984:36). In this way, the third volume of the Commission's report continues to turn away symbolic attacks on those who manage the nation's higher education, encouraging an expanded consolidation of their authority.

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

We began this paper suggesting that a largely unobserved Anglo-Canadian cultural politics exists in higher education. Then, we generalized Joseph Gusfield's notion of status politics and placed the Symons Report within that framework. There we found that the Report clearly emerged in the context of a symbolic crusade with coercive
overtones. Anglo-Canadian nationalists who saw the means of their social awareness increasingly controlled by foreigners wanted more domestic content in the English speaking universities and colleges. To protect managerial interests, the ACCU moved to blunt potential criticism of its own role in staffing the nation's higher learning. It created a Commission to judge the legitimacy of the cultural nationalists' vision. After several years of deliberation, the details of the Symons Report upheld the essential citizenship-and-curriculum correlation suggested by that view. Thus, the cultural nationalists gained a victory for their symbolic crusade.

Further, to the extent that the report satisfied such expressive needs, higher learning's top management accomplished something of a substantive consolidation. Its authority was upheld once academics and the wider nationalistic public generally accepted the Report's essentially ameliorative recommendations as points of departure for future hiring and curriculum decisions.

Finally, despite the changes that have occurred in the Report's recommended direction, both the nationalists' symbolic and university managements' authority consolidations seem fragile indeed. On the one hand, contracting resources at both the federal and provincial level limit the nationalists' capacities to push pan-Canadian studies across discipline boundaries and thus institutionalize their victory in the curriculum of Anglo-Canada's universities and colleges. On the other hand, declining resources may well give rise to new questioning of managements' allocation of ever-more-scarce resources. For example, senior faculty may organize against emerging managerial re-interpretations of tenure, or against
managers views on particular cutbacks to save dollars. And, perhaps even more to the point, the rise of "Gypsy Scholars"—hordes of a younger, native-born, Phd. holders whose occupational futures seem limited to successive non-tenure-stream appointments—may well threaten the declining security of the academically tenured by fracturing the usual solidarity across academic generations. Such status tensions set into expressive motion could easily once again call educational management's collective authority into question. And, if that occurs, we may well see more commissions launched to safe-guard authority under attack.

Having generalized Gusfield so that we could move from the politics of prohibition to the cultural politics of educational policy, we may draw two further conclusions from our analysis of the Symons report. First, since a considerable and lively portion of Canadian educational history from the Manitoba School Question to the Quebec language Bill 101 has centered on expressive status group politics in the midst of rapid social change, it is clear that Gusfield's scheme as generalized has great potential use in such future analysis.

Second, our present analysis offers something of an addition to Gusfield's notions. It is not obvious in Gusfield's work that the expressive mobilizations of threatened status groupings may in turn threaten those holding established authority positions. This was the case, in our view, in the Symons Report. Further, what seems true of the Symons Report may also have been true of other AUCC sponsored reports, such as the Pike Report (on accessibility), the Bonneau-Corry Report (on the rationalization of research) and the Carrother-Trotter Report (on university planning). As Gwendoline Pilkington has noted, one of the "more puzzling
anomalies" about the AUCC is its launching of these careful investigations of serious academic issues with good intent and a subsequent failure "to follow through to insure that due attention was paid to the recommenda-
tions" (1981:xii). The question here is the extent of symbolic defense of authority involved in these (and other) reports; a question for another occasion. And, while it is possible that authority is a particularly Canadian social problematic (Friedenberg, 1980), more generally, it is likely that this will usually be the case whenever symbolic crusades involve educational policy and authoritative decision-makers.

The key here is Max Weber's well-known distinction between power per se and authority seen as the symbolically legitimated exercise of such power. Sustained symbolic movements contesting educational policy necessarily tend to defrock power from its cloak of legitimacy. Participants in sustained status group based symbolic movements eventually see decision-makers exercising naked power and not authority. It is likely therefore that this elaboration of Gusfield's argument will be of particular use in the further analysis of education policy in the 1980s as major reorganizations occur all through North America.
NOTES

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1. Gusfield argued that throughout the 19th century, temperance activities served as expressive vehicles for various social groups ranging from regional elites, such as the New England-based Federalists, to broad sections of the lower middle strata. Then, in 1896, the movement shook off a wide variety of ameliorative reform interests and sharpened into a prohibitionist project. As such, it expressed the deepening social anxieties of rural, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants as an industrializing economy drew ever-increasing waves of non-WASPish immigrants to the ever-more centralized production apparatus in America's cities.

   Correctly sensing that their secure social status—their social honour and community standing in a stable and cherished pre-industrial world—was being destroyed by irrepressible forces of industrialization, hinterland WASPs transformed their fears into loathing, channeling their energies into a crusade for coercive alcohol control. Led by the Women's Christian Temperance Union, this effort reached high watermark with the 18th Constitutional Amendment. But the prohibitionists' symbolic victory over the material interests of the brewing and distilling industries was short-lived, in large part, since they failed to monitor its enforcement. Instead, gaining their victory seemed to consummate their crusading zeal, and they
NOTES (cont'd.)

failed to consolidate their symbolic victory into an enduring triumph. Constitutional success per se paradoxically pre-empted energetic insistence that the law of the land be carried out in practical day-to-day policing. Thus, this great rural-WASP crusade was essentially a struggle over symbols not substance. Once their cultural standards were enshrined in the Constitution, and thus upheld over alternative ones, the prohibitionists' expressive needs that fueled the movement dried up. Then, after a dozen years of desultory enforcement and the great crash of 1929, national economic concerns repealed the desiccated remains of prohibition's symbolic success with the 21st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

2. It should be noted that the theory of political symbolism here is more systematic and at a higher level of abstraction than that level usually found in the analysis of educational politics. See, for example, Olivas, 1983.

3. Interestingly, professorial public service was usually not mentioned in the nationalists' expressive crusade and largely unattended in the Report's recommendations. Since the Canadian professoriate has a long and distinguished record of service and consultation to governments and private enterprises, the Report's very strong focus on teaching and research reveals how closely its recommendations were cut (no doubt tacitly) to the dimensions of the nationalist' crusade.
NOTES (cont'd.)

4. The media's rather easy acceptance of the Report, of course, involved overlooking the flawed logic mentioned above. This uncritical stance, as well as the media's bellwether role in the nationalists' expressive campaign, may well reflect some of the tensions of its own politics of culture. Although almost wholly Canadian owned, managed and staffed, the economics of the media result in a vast out-pouring of U.S. influenced cultural content (Smythe, 1981). Indeed, the nationalists' fears of U.S. cultural domination are arguably much more nearly the case in the media, especially the electronic media, than in higher education. Accordingly, media nationalism may well have found immigrant professors easier targets for sustained criticism, than native peers and managers in their own and allied industries.

5. The Forum seemed particularly insensitive to the probability that American immigrant professors were likely to be changed by their living in Canada, becoming overtime more representative of the many millions of post-war "new Canadians". On the other hand, perhaps their unexamined premise was that American immigrants remain uniquely connected to their nationalities since U.S.-based cultural products are so easily available in Canada. According to this view, the immigrant U.S. professors would thereby be uniquely unable to become "born again" Canadians.
6. The problems of Canadian Studies programmes are typical of many cross-discipline efforts. See, for example, the very fully documented struggles for Chicano Studies programmes in U.S. higher education in Rodolfo Acuna, (1980).

7. For example, the Canadian Studies Foundation, the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, the Canadian Foundation for Economic Education and many other groups contributed to a uniquely Canadian secondary school economics text (Jennings, et al., 1981).
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