ADVOCACY AND ACADEME:

THE CASE OF U.S. SOCIAL SCIENCE

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Meta Spencer has raised a question that any of us who are concerned with peace and social justice, whether on a village or a global scale, must confront: why aren't all citizens activists; or, what are the social constraints we face when we try to mobilize our energies for peace? Mark Egit has asked the same question, except he has explored the psychological constraints binding our activism rather than the sociological ones. I too will address this question, but from the perspective of a social scientist in the academy: why don't social scientists such as ourselves use our expert knowledge and institutional positions to advocate peace?

Edward Silva and I first asked this question during the Viet Nam War. To frame an answer took us ten years. The results of our inquiry appear in a book we co-authored, Serving Power: The Making of the American Social Science Expert, 1865-1921. In this book we look at the ways in which social science professors initially deployed their expertise in the wider society. What we discovered was that many of the concepts which shape our professional lives were specifically constructed at the turn of the century by social scientists who were intent on winning a place for themselves in the new graduate university. The notions that social knowledge is the province of professionals, that a scientist's view of society is objective, that our approach to our subject matter is value free -- all these ideas emerged as social scientists struggled with numerous contending groups to establish a monopoly of social knowledge.

Although some of these concepts have been de-valued and others seriously questioned, they continue to influence our attitudes toward academic advocacy. It may be necessary for us to begin a collective process of re-evaluating our attitudes about advocacy so we can free ourselves of ideas that are no longer appropriate and better grasp the possibilities of the present. Certainly, if we are going to use knowledge in socially constructive ways, we must learn to understand the limits and exploit the opportunities built into our role as academic social scientists.
Social Scientists' Role Past and Present

Let us briefly review our role. It is tripartite: teaching, research and service.\textsuperscript{2} Teaching was central to the medieval university, and spins a sturdy thread of continuity between past and present. Research was first widely incorporated into the university in nineteenth century Germany, and became dominant in the twentieth. Service received clear expression at the turn of the century in the U.S., where the utility of knowledge to industrial society was stressed. Service was characterized by the development of professional expertise. Professors functioned as experts when they put their specialized knowledge to social use or brought the fruits of their research to interested publics.

In terms of role theory, teaching and research are self-evident. Teaching was developed in complementarity with students, research in complementarity with learned colleagues or peers. The service facet of the professors tripartite role, however, was developed in complementarity with groups outside the university. In essence, finding role partners for service meant negotiating over the ways in which expert or specialized knowledge was used. Would academics be able to make alliances with groups and organizations that used expert knowledge in ways that supported the status quo, or would they find ways to use their skills in complementarity with associations and individuals who were advocates of social change?

While experts now seem necessary to the smooth functioning of a complex industrial society, initially social scientists' claims to expertise were questioned. Even credentials from German research universities were not enough. The questions raised about the legitimacy of academic expertise turned on the basis on which expertise was claimed, the ends to which expertise might be put, the problems expertise might create for an egalitarian society, the sources of social and material support needed to maintain experts. Until university trained social scientists were able to answer these questions satisfactorily and publicly, they had difficulty making credible claims to expertise.
How did academic social scientists deal with these questions? How were they able to convince critical segments of society of the value of their expertise? University social scientists addressed these issues collectively, through their professional associations. They developed a collective, occupational strategy for building bridges between academe and the wider society. We studied this phenomena through an examination of the career histories of the leadership of four of the major social science associations active in the period 1885-1921 -- the American Economic Association (AEA), American Political Science Association (APSA), and the American Sociology Society (ASS). We reconstructed the biographies of 171 leaders of these organizations, paying special attention to their work histories as well as the concrete ways in which they used their expertise outside the university. Specifically, we were concerned with the question of whether they used their specialized knowledge to make the status quo more palatable or to advocate social change. We looked at their expert service to government, corporations, quasi-public bodies such as foundations, and community groups.

In this paper, however, we will limit our consideration of social science expertise to its uses in war and peace. The particular case we will present is the service rendered to society by social scientists during the Spanish American War. After reviewing this case, we will explore the question of whether social scientists are still constrained by the social forces that shaped their choices at the turn of the century, or whether they are now able to use their expertise to advocate social change that might bring about peace and justice.

**The Problem of the Social Uses of Expertise**

In the years following the Civil War, American society faced the many problems that come with industrialization. Rapid, uneven and unscrupulous development created great wealth for a very few and extreme poverty for the many, raising issues of economic and social justice. Constant, often violent conflict between capital and labor
generated class tension and threatened social chaos. Urbanization threw up magnificent new cities but also spawned malignant slums that begged for municipal reform. One way to avoid the social and economic costs of these problems was to turn popular attention elsewhere and open new markets through imperial expansion, so pressures for a "grand little war" grew along with the problems of industrialization.

Academic social scientists wanted to treat these problems with skills developed in the German university. They saw themselves as advocates for social change, builders of a humane capitalism or even a Christian socialism. Indeed, as part of its formative process, the AEA developed a document that outlined the way in which political economists should interact with the wider society to bring about change. This Declaration of Principles presented a vision of the future where science, government and church would work together, intervening to mitigate suffering caused by unrestrained market forces.4

However, these credentialed social scientists often had difficulty making their voices heard. The Ph.D. was not a widely understood or valued credential in the U.S. at the turn of the century. Americans were still strongly egalitarian, and their suspicion of elites included educational elites, especially practitioners of the traditional professions — such as doctors and lawyers — who put a very high price on dubious knowledge.5 Although the graduate school began to emerge as an institution in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the college was still the central post-secondary institution, and it was ill-attended, generally not well regarded. When the reading public sought social knowledge, it more readily turned to the works of reformers, populists, even socialists, than the learned disquisitions of academics. Best sellers in the area of political economy were Henry Demarest Lloyd's Wealth Against Commonwealth, Henry George's Progress and Poverty, Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward, Ida Tarbell's work on Standard Oil. Controversy and conflict were part of
the cultural and intellectual politics of the day, and credentials were no guarantee of
an audience.

German trained Ph.D.s tried to enter this milieu as scientists and advocates at
one and the same time. They were convinced the raison de etre of social science was
the formation of social policy. They reasoned that if they were able to demonstrate
the utility of social knowledge through successful reform, they would be better placed
to influence policy development. The specific policy issue with which many young
economists active in the formation of the AEA were concerned was finding and
umerating principles for the just mediation of the bloody conflict between capital
and labor that characterized the last quarter of the nineteenth century. They sought
to bring industrial peace through science.

But when these young professors advocated any social change that questioned
the unrestricted right of capital to set labor policy, the robber barrons and politically
powerful trustees who funded and governed their universities fired them. Among the
more well known academic freedom cases of the 1880s and 1890s involving social
scientists who publicly addressed the labor question were: Henry Carter Adams, fired
from Cornell; Edward W. Bernis, fired from the University of Chicago; John Rogers
Commons, from Syracuse and Indiana; Richard T. Ely, from the University of Wisconsin;
and Edward A. Ross from Stanford.6

Social scientists were in a difficult position. Their training was not well regarded
or widely understood. They had yet to demonstrate that their science offered knowledge
more effective than that possessed by educated elites or popular reformers. They
couldn't even guarantee jobs to those certified with the Ph.D. in German or American
graduate schools. Indeed, until about 1900, social science professorships at emerging
research universities were more likely to be awarded to well known cultural workers --
journalists, authors, government figures -- than to aspiring Ph.D. holders. Academic
social scientists were institutionally dependent intellectuals, in danger of dismissal if
they spoke out too forthrightly, in danger of irrelevance if they didn’t speak out at all. Academic social scientists, then, had a long way to go to achieve a successful monopoly of knowledge.

What did they do? They were extremely resourceful. They used their professional associations to develop a collective, occupation-based strategy to gain policy making influence. Each year, for approximately fifteen years, association leaders devised and debated this strategy in their annual meeting. The strategy they developed still shapes the ways we think about academic advocacy. These young professors realized a Ph.D. didn’t give them a monopoly on truth, morality, ethics -- those principles that had long guided debate over social issues. Instead, they emphasized their grasp of Science. They stressed training, method and specialization, equating their degrees with the process by which great discoveries were being made in the physical sciences.

As an association, they sought to avoid overt controversy by refusing to take positions on partisan political issues. However, they were still concerned with the body politic. After much discussion, they targeted as an arena for their expertise the rapidly expanding administrative branch of the federal government. The administrative branch was their chosen arena for several reasons. First, it was out of the public eye, enabling them to avoid the limelight together with the wrath of donors and trustees. Second, it was increasingly governed by civil service regulations, and was thus guided by professionalism and permanence rather than the fortunes of a particular party. Third, its influence was national, sometimes even international, providing appropriate scope for their social science expertise.

Given the structure of American politics, social scientists’ strategy meant they had to join forces with groups able to manipulate state policy. To do this, association leaders developed a carefully constructed set of alliances with groups outside the universities. These groups usually exhibited the following characteristics: they were not committed to a political party, they did not advocate extreme political positions,
their leaders were almost always socially concerned, wealthy business-men who stood for moderate, rational reform — indeed, they saw social science and scientists as possible allies in their quest for social order. Examples of these groups are the National Civic Federation, the National Municipal League, the American Association of Labor Legislation. Groups such as these very often pushed policies that called for expansion of the state and the use of experts. Through such alliances, social scientists were able to avoid the perils of partisan political arena and nonetheless merchandise their expertise.

**The Case of the Spanish-American War**

Perhaps the best way to illustrate this strategy is to present a concrete case. The Spanish American War suggests itself because it is the first instance in which significant numbers of social scientists were able to act as experts for the federal government. The Spanish American War also commends itself because it casts light on the deployment of social science expertise on questions of war and peace.

At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the AEA's president, Arthur T. Hadley, soon to be president of Yale, spoke to economists at their annual meeting about what the war meant for them. Although he regretted the War and imperial expansion as a policy, Hadley could not overlook the chance it offered experts. Imperialism would create a need for a strong central administration at the national level. As he saw it, imperialism:

- brings new problems of administration upon us as a nation... the need of an efficient army will of itself make it necessary to give more independence to the administration and more opportunity to its expert advisors...
- with no colonies and a small army we could do what we pleased with our revenue bills. With larger possessions and larger necessities for defence, they must be framed by a responsible administration on a sound economic basis.7
Imperialism, by strengthening and centralizing the administration, provided economic experts with their point of access. Regardless of his reservations about imperial policy, Hadley urged his colleagues to take advantage of a conjunction of political and economic circumstances that would increase their influence. Said Hadley, "Here is the opportunity for the younger economists of the country."8

In response to Hadley's speech, the AEA's executive and nominating committees acted on his view of the expert by creating a special committee charged with organizing a volume on colonial finance.9 This volume allowed AEA writers to show how the new social science could serve the interests of those who made imperialism a national policy by offering technical solutions to the immediate fiscal problems of colonies as well as providing ideological justifications for acquiring them.

The special committee's composition revealed policy-making know-how. Its five members were very active in businessmen's policy circles. The AEA's selection of these men articulated their endorsement of American imperial policy, their own willingness to place their knowledge in its service, and an understanding of the part played by members of elite policy circles in shaping the state position on issues of the day. So did the volume the committee produced.

Essays offered the special committee's own recommendations, based on a comparative historical analysis of European colonial policy. In principle, the committee held against colonial exploitation and for aiding the conquered territories toward autonomous industrial development. In practice, the specific recommendations were aimed at creating an American version of comprehensive economic dominance.

Thus, the committee recommended that each colony be self-supporting with sources of revenue determined by the colony's function within the imperial scheme. If the colony were to be a hub of trade and transshipment, then import duties would pay colonial expenses. If the colony were totally underdeveloped, internal revenue taxes
might be levied. All such arrangements were designed to relieve the metropole of paying direct colonial costs.

As conceived by AEA leaders, the colonial role of the imperial state was three-fold. First, it built and maintained economic infra-structure (railroads, canals, communication systems). Second, it administered fiscal systems so that "in the last resort the desires of the U.S. government, expressed by the proper authority, are to be paramount and its desires final." Third, the state offset inefficiencies in the local labor market by importing metropolitan labor. Blue-collar imports were foreseen in instances where "it is difficult to secure an adequate supply of efficient native labor," and white-collar imports when "imhabitants are not capable of managing important public works" or performing "absolutely essential" civil services, which must be "beyond question" in "ability and honesty." Such labor imports clearly imply that the colonies of the new American empire were to be stratified by race: skilled, imported white versus incompetent native non-whites.

In sum, the recommendations made by the AEA special committee served the colonizer rather than the colonized, urging as it did an oppressive system of imperialism. The report also implied a role for the experts in the emerging American empire. The committee's fiscal recommendations strongly intimated that trained economists were necessary for a successful empire. It was they who must make a thorough study of local conditions to determine the correct fiscal system, gather data, create the appropriate administrative design and perhaps even implement it. In this way, the committee seconded Hadley's views in seeing imperialism as an opportunity for economists by identifying a large number of professional positions best filled by themselves.

The AEA sought sponsorship for the rapidly assembled volume, looking for a token of support for their effort to take advantage of the opportunity Hadley had so forcefully pointed out. Essays was their first concentrated, organizational attempt to
develop pragmatic policy for immediate implementation. Since they undertook the project without any assurance that the expertise they mobilized would be used to inform federal policy or gain access to state service, support from authoritative figures in the business world was important: it served notice that their expertise was taken seriously by resource holders.

The five men found to act as financial patrons for *Essays* were wealthy businessmen, all leading members of the emerging economic center. They were well known for their interest in civic affairs, and some had an economic stake in overseas expansion. William E. Dodge, Theodore Marburg, Isaac Seligman, Stuart Wood, and Thomas Shearman. These five patrons put up two-fifths the cost of publishing *Essays*: $125.10 More importantly, they symbolically endorsed the new social scientists' usefulness as advisors to businessmen seeking to use the expanding bureaucracy of the central government to shape federal policy, creating, in Kolkos's phrase, a "political capitalism."11

And experts did demonstrate their competence as administrators in the new American empire. The national crisis provided access to state service for nine later social science leaders.12 The majority of those entering imperial service between 1899 and 1904 continued to supply American expertise in Third World countries throughout their careers. Hadley was correct when he predicted that the executive branch of the federal government would need experts to administer its colonial acquisitions.

Thus, J. W. Jenks of Cornell, an AEA leader and chairman of the special committee, was recruited by the War Department in 1901 as a special commissioner to visit English and Dutch colonies in the Far East and gather information relevant to Philippine legislation. This endeavor in foreign service led to others. For example, in 1903 he was named as the U.S. Commission of International Exchange's expert in charge of Chinese currency reform. Ever mindful of his profession's constant need for resources, he wrote to Roosevelt from China suggesting that the indemnity for the
Boxer Rebellion be used to fund exchange professorships for a 30-year period. In the area of foreign policy, Jenks would go on to advise the Mexican government, serve under Wilson as a member of the Nicaraguan High Commission, and continue his long-run oriental interests by heading the Far Eastern Bureau.

W. F. Willcox, also of Cornell, and Roland P. Faulkner, chief of the Division of Documents of the Library of Congress -- worked in Cuba and Puerto Rico. In 1900 Willcox conducted the first census on both islands, while Faulkner in 1903 was appointed commissioner of education in Puerto Rico. Willcox did not continue in foreign service, although he had an active expert career as a domestic statistician. Faulkner, however, went on to chair the U.S. Commission to the Republic of Liberia in 1909 and also served as a member of the U.S. and China's Joint Land Commission.

Other social scientists became involved in the day-to-day administration of the colonies. In the Pacific theater Carl C. Plehn of California was chief statistician of the Philippine Commission in 1900-1901. Like Willcox, he would become more involved with domestic statistics via the Census Bureau than with foreign affairs. But APSA leader Bernard Moses, another Californian, continued to be active in the imperial arena after his 1901-1903 membership on the second Philippine Commission. He went on to serve as an expert in Latin American affairs, participating in the series of Pan American Conferences held before the First World War. Another APSA leader, David Barrows, also served in the Philippines. He was superintendent of the Manila schools and director of education, staying in the islands from 1901 to 1909. While his later service was not primarily in foreign affairs, his Philippine experience stimulated a strong interest in the military, and in 1934, while a professor at Berkeley and a general in the California National Guard, he led the troops that helped break the San Francisco longshoremen's strike. His interest in military matters endured until the end of his career; during the Second World War he served the War Department and the Office of Strategic Services
by participating in the forced relocation of Japanese citizens and aliens on the West Coast.

Social scientists also served in the Caribbean. In 1900 AEA leader J. H. Hollander of Johns Hopkins was appointed by Secretary of War Elihu Root as a special commissioner to revise Puerto Rico's tax laws. His service was so effective that McKinley named him treasurer of the island in 1901. Roosevelt called him back to serve as special commissioner to Santo Domingo to report on the public debt. Married to the daughter of Abraham Hutzler, a prominent Baltimore merchant, Hollander was well acquainted with leaders of the international financial community, and used his connections to place Santo Domingan bonds with Kuhn, Koeb and Company. He rescued the island from financial panic but was investigated by a congressional committee for accepting $100,000 from the Santo Domingan government as a finder's fee while serving as an agent of the U.S. government. Although he was never prosecuted, Hollander's activities raised questions about expert ethics.

T. S. Adams, another AEA leader, served as Hollander's assistant treasurer in Puerto Rico. Although he found his work "congenial, important enough to satisfy my self-respect, and very instructive," this Harvard professor's later service to the state was in the area of agricultural economics. Leo S. Rowe, an APSA leader from the University of Pennsylvania, was appointed by McKinley as a member of the Commission to Revise and Compile the Laws of Puerto Rico, and later as chairman of the Insular Code Commission. His expert service in Puerto Rico turned his academic interests from municipal reform to Latin American affairs. After extensive service with the state department and in private policy-making forums concerned with foreign affairs, he gave up his professorship on his appointment to the Pan American Union, an agency he headed from 1920 to 1946. Another APSA leader, W. F. Willoughby, took charge of Puerto Rico's treasury department after Hollander left. Willoughby would move between government service, academy and the private sector throughout his career.
His interest in foreign affairs continued, and he served briefly as an expert in China in 1916. However, his major work was domestic -- he headed the Institute for Government Research, later known as the Brookings Institution, from 1916 to 1932.

In the case of the Spanish-American War, we see the complex and successful strategy social scientists used to create a role through which they could interact with the wider society. Credentialed association leaders were able to make common cause with businessmen in America's imperial venture. Together they were able to manipulate the state, facilitating the expansion of Departments of War and State so social scientists could act as experts administering the new American empire.

Such alliances with groups outside the university were skillfully initiated and expanded by academics throughout the Progressive era. If social scientists were to influence policy as experts they had to depend at least in part on the support of groups who could predictably deliver political and economic resources to create a climate where the use of expertise was possible. While the groups with whom social scientists made such alliances were quite diverse, they were most often led by powerful businessmen who stood for moderate, rational reform aimed at creating a stable national and international environment for the growth of capitalism.

Social scientists identified the state as a site for expertise and were successful in expanding placements in the federal bureaucracies. Their work for the departments of State and War in the Third World was their first instance where social scientists entered government agencies in significant numbers, but they were quickly called to serve elsewhere. For example, they acted as experts in the Department of Labor, Commerce, the Bureau of Corporations, and the Interstate Commerce Commission, usually while continuing to hold academic positions. Through their work in the federal government, they were able to exercise some national policy making influence, although they were rarely in positions where they could independently and unequivocally advance a particular position.
When these social scientists acted as experts, they used the language of science and presented themselves as rational, judicious, objective experts. *Essays on Colonial Finance* is a case in point. Comparative methodologies and descriptive statistics were used to lend legitimacy and an air of inevitability to a system of neo-colonial exploitation. To some degree, then, objectivity was socially constructed to help professors negotiate the pitfalls of public policy making.

Through their service as experts, social scientists also began to assert the legitimacy of credentialed expertise at the expense of other kinds of knowledge. Although their call to service depended a great deal on their ability to make common cause with powerful groups outside the university, they seemed to attribute their success to their training rather than their political astuteness. Thus, they subtly de-valued the work of competing groups, focusing public attention of credentials rather than competence. For example, credentialed social scientists implied the position advanced by educated elites who led the Anti-Imperialist League was romantic, idealistic, and unscientific.

Historians of social science usually see these social science leaders as misguided reformers who finally abandoned their efforts to act as advocates for social change and learned instead to approach social issues scientifically.\(^{13}\) Professor Silva and myself see them as continuing as advocates. However, they no longer acted as advocates for social change but as advocates of the existing order. The lesson learned was not taught so much by science as expedience.

**New Developments in the Use of Expertise**

We have looked at early social scientists efforts to construct a role for themselves that would allow them to use their knowledge to shape social policy. We have seen some of the constraints that shaped their efforts to act as advocates. Now we must ask
if these same constraints still bind us or whether we are able to use our knowledge and institutional positions to advocate social change.

I think the past 75 years have wrought a number of significant developments that allow us to more freely use our expertise to bring about progressive social change. I can think of at least eight developments that have increased this capacity, although there well may be more. They are as follows. First is the development of occupational associations devoted to protecting and expanding our rights as professors, associations like the AAUP in the U.S. and CAUT in Canada. Second is the winning of tenure. Third is the increasing centrality of science and the university. Fourth is the expansion of the university. Fifth are some changes that have taken place in the class composition of the professoriate. Sixth is the debate about advocacy vs. objectivity that wracked the university in the 1960s. Seventh is the development of religious and intellectual centers for advocacy outside the university. Eighth are the current pressures for greater utility of knowledge.

Let us begin by considering occupational associations. As an American, I will confine my remarks to the AAUP, and leave explication of the Canadian situation to my colleagues from the North. The AAUP was organized in 1915. Leaders of social science associations played a major part, since their subject matter caused them to plunge frequently into the seas of social controversy, and they feared for their jobs.

One of the major mechanisms developed by the AAUP to protect social scientists, and indeed all academics engaged in advocacy, was a distinction between the professor as specialist and as citizen. This distinction first began to appear in the Progressive era. Progressive reformers and professors, often acting together, expressed a distrust of the sort of machine politics characterized by blind loyalty to party. For them, partisan politics became synonymous with suspension of critical or independent judgment and, as such, incompatible with a scientific or expert approach to policy making. More
concretely, professors housed in rapidly growing state universities were afraid if they endorsed one party and another won, their jobs might be forfeit.

Although the distinction between specialist and citizen began to emerge in the Progressive era, it did not become a canon of AAUP doctrine, a position to be defended by the Association in academic freedom cases, until the 1930s. During the 1930s, a number of professors, especially social scientists, went to Washington to act as experts or specialists for New Deal agencies. Many more, from all fields, became involved in politics, often with radical parties. Strategists for the profession decided it was easier to defend the smaller number of specialists on the basis of their training, credentials and esoteric knowledge than to defend all professors involved in parties that covered the political spectrum, from Conklinites to Socialists and even Communists.

The distinction between specialist or expert and citizen still holds. We cannot speak as members of the academy on subjects unrelated to our field and expect to escape reprimand. It is unlikely that we would be fired in the first, or even the second instance, but repeated violations might cause real problems.

However, lack of credentials in a field need not limit advocacy; it only means we cannot speak as experts. In practise, if professors want to address an area outside their specialty, they can do so as a citizen. While it is possible to speak without offering any occupational identification, standard procedure is for professors to make clear to their audience or client that they are not speaking as specialists and in no way represent the point of view of their department or university. For example, if a physicist were advocating civil rights while addressing a town meeting, she would announce that she spoke as a citizen, representing her own views, not those of her university. Once she made such a disclaimer, first amendment rights would be obtained, and she would have the same freedom of speech as any other citizen.

When academics speak as specialists they are able to address the public directly as professionals. As experts, they have great scope. While professorial experts are
not expected to endorse parties, they are able to evaluate policy positions and even specific items of a party platform. Academics speaking on policy topics related to their specialty can advocate positions or express views or engage in any line of research for which a scientific case can be made. On the one hand, this means university professors can openly support Pentagon policy and perform weapons research. On the other, it means they can publicly criticize the department of defense and work on alternative programs such as conversion or jobs for peace. The role experts have played in defense research is well known. But professors also have a long and strong tradition of acting for peace. Examples are . . .

Social scientists present a particular problem when it comes to differentiating specialist from citizen. Their concerns as citizens are often the same as their concerns as experts. However, a review of academic freedom cases occurring between 1970-1980 indicates that social scientists are able to address controversial topics as experts and advocates so long as they adhere to a few simple guidelines. They should present their positions using the language of science or reason, and refrain from rhetorical excesses, such as referring repeatedly to the nation's president as a "running dog of imperialism." Nor should social scientists advocate action, even on the basis of the laws of dialectical materialism, that would result in the immediate breakage of law, in violence, or the destruction of property. Nor should social scientists, in the name of science, publicly break the law or engage in violence, even if they see themselves as agents of inevitable social change. In other words, social scientists can advocate change and organize people to bring about change in their professional capacity so long as they avoid rather obvious excesses. Although the guidelines suggested may seem self-evident, some few social scientists did find themselves advocating these sort of actions cited in the 1960s. Very often they found themselves summarily dismissed.
Presently, we are unlikely to find ourselves in such a situation. In part, this is because we do not have a large and vital student movement, nor an easily identified mass constituency to address in such terms. In part, we do not need to resort to the rhetoric of revolution because we have great scope to act as advocates within the limits of our role as experts. A recent case indicates this scope. Professors Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward studied popular social movements to see how change occurred. They used the expertise they developed through their academic work to identify possible new coalitions that, if developed, might shift the prevailing balance of power. They also used their expertise to develop a strategy for action that centered on bringing new groups into the political process. Then, in the 1984 U.S. Presidential election, they, together with other activists, successfully initiated a program whereby social workers register their clients to vote. They are well aware that most so registered will sign up as Democrats and vote from a poor persons perspective. Yet they have not advocated helping Democrats, nor have they endorsed any Democratic candidates. In this instance, we see a creative unity of expertise and advocacy by social scientists.

In sum, the AAUP doctrine separating citizen from specialist may not give us all the freedom to act as advocates that we might wish for. However, it is a doctrine that has been used to inform academic freedom cases in both university board rooms and the courts and it has generally proved successful. If we are self-conscious in our choice of strategies, we should be able to advocate a wide variety of progressive policies, if not as specialists, then as citizens. The occupational associations that defend our working conditions and freedom might not be all that we want, but they have guaranteed and protected rights that we now need to extend through practice.

Second, let us consider tenure. Tenure, as we now know it, was not a common condition of employment for professors until 1940, when the AAUP formulated the seven-year "up or out" policy, followed by the presumption of continuous employment
after a positive peer review. Even after professors began to demand tenure as a necessary condition for academic work, it took some time to convince the majority of university professors that tenure was a firm right, not an uncertain privilege. Litigation over tenure was commonplace through the 1960s, but finally in the Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), tenure was upheld by virtue of right of contract.

The protection offered by tenure is not unlimited. The untenured have no presumption to tenure. The peer review process is closed and the criteria for promotion often unclear. If a university enters a state of financial exigency, tenure can be abrogated. University managers continually struggle to revoke tenure, calling for greater management flexibility, and proposing alternative schemes such as limited term contracts. However, so long as tenure remains in place, it offers those who manage to win it substantial job security. Under ordinary circumstances, it is quite difficult to fire a tenured professor. Even if professors engage in advocacy it is hard to get rid of them, especially if their behavior falls within the guidelines sketched above. We are still institutionally dependent intellectuals, but we have real safeguards when we use our expertise for advocacy. Clearly, the protection we now have is far greater than that of professors at the turn of the century.

A third factor that strengthens our ability to use our knowledge and institutional position to advocate social change is the increasing centrality of science and the university. In recent years, scientific capability seems to fuel economic growth. Both "high tech" and "high service" fields seem to depend on the university for trained manpower, and sometimes even for discovery. And whatever we may think of the social justice of educational opportunities or the value of degrees, the credentials bestowed by the university have become essential to the orderly distribution of social rewards.
Because of the increased centrality of science and the university, to attack
either with impunity has become difficult. Repression on the scale we in the academy
have experienced in the past is not so likely. For example, academic freedom cases
like those of the 1880s and 1890s are no longer possible, nor are dismissals of those
who oppose war, such as the cases that occurred during World War I. Even McCarthyism
may be difficult to repeat. Efforts were made during the campus disorders of the
1960s to initiate witch hunts, but they met with much less success than in the 1950s.
While attempts at repression continue -- as with Reagan's efforts to curb professors
academic exchanges with the "evil empire" and its client states\textsuperscript{21} -- these challenges
are being resisted and direct major attacks on the university have not been attempted.

The fourth change that allows us greater scope for advocacy is the expansion of
the university. Since World War II, the university has grown by leaps and bounds, with
peak growth being reached in the 1960s. Even after the sixties, growth continued.
The number of professors increased from 546,000 in 1969 to 830,000 in 1980.\textsuperscript{22} Sheer
increase in numbers brings several benefits. Growth in positions means there are more
slots available, that advocates are more likely to get tenured, that once tenured they
are difficult to monitor. In short, we are able to use the resources of the state, in
the coin of our positions, as a base for advocacy. Although all professors do not use
there positions to advocate progressive change and the state does not necessarily support
social change, nonetheless the great expansion of the university has opened the resources
of the state to those who want to use their jobs as a platform to work for change.

The fifth development is related to the fourth. The great expansion of the
university also brought about some changes in the class composition of the professoriate.
The social sciences are a case in point. Until the 1950s, social science professors were
more likely to come from the upper middle or middle class than any other social
location. Professors were likely to be the children of professionals. During the great
expansion of the 1950s and 1960s, however, children of lower middle class and working
class families were able to take advantage of university growth and increased scholarship and financial aid monies to become professors. Although I have not seen any research on this point, it is possible that professors whose origins are outside the comfortable classes may be more ready to act as advocates for change. At the very least, we can suggest the general leavening of the social class composition of the academy -- with regard to both students and professors -- has brought to the fore perspectives other than those usually associated with the middle class.

Sixth, the 1960s brought to the expanded academy open debate on the stance of scientists with regard to social change. Was objectivity or advocacy the proper posture? This debate forced many professors to rethink positions long taken for granted or developed to win a measure of security during the McCarthy era. While the limits of advocacy remain undetermined, it is no longer possible to argue exclusively for objectivity and the notion of the neutral university, whether as necessary fiction or self-interested political strategy, has been widely questioned. Although title to our role of advocate is not free and clear, at least we are able to make broader claims in this area than previously.

Seventh, there have developed religious and intellectual centers outside the university that sustain networks for advocacy within and between universities. In a way these centers serve the same function as the foundations and think tanks that sustain expertise for the existing order. They provide social and intellectual support, resources and general policy making know-how to academics who want to use their expertise for social change. While these centers have only a fraction of the resources available of their establishment counterparts, they nonetheless constitute the rudiments of an alternative policy network.

In the main, these centers seem to have developed since the Viet Nam war, and perhaps are evidence of a lesson learned by academics and intellectuals during that war. We cannot wait until a military intervention or an atomic blast or some other
massive disaster occurs. We must monitor official policy and constantly use our expertise to present alternative policy.

We see examples of the development and circulation of alternative policy devised by professors with the support intellectual or religious centers external to the university in a number of instances. Some secular examples are the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C., North American Congress on Latin America, also in D.C., Food First, in California, and Marlene Dixon's Institute in San Francisco. A recent instance of alternative policy development is the report issued by Policy Alternatives for Central America and the Carribean (PACCA) with support from the Institute for Policy Studies. This report, Changing Course, critiques the administration sponsored Kissinger report on Central America and offers a program for lasting peace in the area that also takes social justice into consideration. The report is now being circulated as part of a packet for university professors to use during teach-ins or in classes, with hopes that such materials will influence voting behavior in the upcoming election.

Religious center, too, like those supported by the Jesuit and Mary Knoll orders, have contributed social and material support to academics and intellectuals concerned with social change. Their commitment to alternative policy development came to the fore with the 1962 Medillan Conference and has developed as the church's commitment to the gospel of the poor has grown. Examples are . . .

Together, these secular and religious centers have offered a strong stimulus to professors who want to use their expertise and institutional position to advocate social change.

Finally, in both the U.S. and Canada, there are currently strong social pressures and plentiful economic support for increasing the utility of academic knowledge. While utility has in the main been defined as using academic expertise to increase national economic growth, it can be construed in many ways. If we keep an eye on government and academic program developments, we may be able to define utility
somewhat even handedly. For example, if professors are able to take government paid research leaves to develop new products or use their administrative skills in industry, then a case can be made for taking such leaves to labor unions to develop new strategies for more effective organizations. Or, if professors are encouraged with federal monies to go to foreign countries to research new markets, other professors might be able to go to the Third World to help indigenous peoples develop appropriate technology. In short, the present push for utility need not be interpreted as a threat. If we are prepared to organize and struggle over the development of government programs aimed at increasing the utility of academic knowledge, we may be able to create new opportunities for advocates.

In conclusion, significant changes have taken place that shape our ability to act as advocates. In the main, it is easier now for us to use our knowledge and institutional position to bring about social change than in the past. However, our ability to act as advocates depends, as always, on individual initiative and collective action, especially in a professional milieu -- our departments, our learned societies, specialist networks and professional associations. Unless we can defend what we have won -- tenure, our positions, the right to use our expertise to fashion policy alternatives -- and generate useable alternative policy, we cannot expect academics to play a part in social change. We have a real role to play. Given the legitimacy conferred upon experts and professionals by society at large, broad circulation of alternative policy may be a way of making thinking people realize that the official course is not inevitable.
NOTES

1. Edward T. Silva and Sheila A. Slaughter, *Serving Power: The Making of the American Social Science Expert* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1984). In the main, the view of social science advocacy presented in this paper draws on our book, especially chapters four through six, and readers interested in full scholarly citation on to the many works and documents on which our interpretation is based are urged to turn to the end notes of those chapters.

2. For the classic statement on academic role, see Laurence Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).


8. Ibid.


21. Christina Ramirez

