Birth of a Coordinating Agency:
Agenda Building and the
Establishment of the
Ohio Board of Regents

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ABSTRACT

Birth of a Coordinating Agency:
The Establishment of the Ohio Board of Regents

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The Ohio Board of Regents was established as a mechanism to coordinate the growth of higher education institutions in Ohio during the period when enrollments in K-12 school systems suggested large increases in college attendance. During the 1960's, twenty-three states took similar actions to centralize state authority to coordinate or govern higher education. Ohio legislators were influenced by internal, political circumstances as well as by external (federal and regional) considerations; these included inter-institutional rivalries, a gubernatorial election campaign, consultants’ recommendations, and federal educational program directions. The Agenda Building model makes clearer the diverse activities spread over 10 years.
If the agenda building perspective has any hidden assumption, it is that policy formation is a cumulative, non-linear, evolutionary process. The model is a graphic attempt to inject order into an essentially fluid set of circumstances. Similarly, if any characteristic marks the establishment of the Ohio Board of Regents, it is the accretionary and evolutionary appearance of events that led to coordination of Ohio's public higher education in 1963. Diagramming these central and peripheral events in the agenda-building format appears to order and to codify activities that may or may not have been causal of one another, that may have been random or spontaneous, or that may have been isolated in long periods of time. Nonetheless, the Cobb and Elder model, if used as a conceptual tool or schematic device, can be utilized to determine an issue's movement, however random or incremental, to policy (or an issue's demise in the event of non-enactment). In this sense, the ten year progress of state action as an agenda item in Ohio's public higher education can be charted and, to a surprisingly useful degree, understood. This paper details the elements leading to the establishment of the Ohio Board of Regents in the language of the agenda-building process.

This process is particularly useful in the examination of seven major issues in the establishment of the Ohio Board of Regents: the 1939 founding of the Inter-University Council, a voluntary council of the public colleges and universities; the Ohio College Association's 1955 initiatives to study higher education in Ohio; the 1957 appointment of the Ohio Commission on Education beyond the High School; the 1959 creation of an Interim Commission on Education beyond the High School; the 1961 confrontation between state officials and IUC members; the 1962 report by the Ohio Legislative Service Commission; and the 1962 campaign and election of James Rhodes. Each of these issues, as well as the pattern of events surrounding each issue,
is examined by means of the Cobb and Elder rubric.

ISSUE CREATION (INITIATION AND SPECIFICATION)

According to Cobb and Elder, an issue "is a conflict between two or more identifiable groups over procedural or substantive matters relating to the distribution of positions or resources:"

Groups who seek to define and create an issue fall into four categories, which vary according to degree of self-interest: readjusters, exploiters, reactors, and do-gooders. Cobb and Elder describe "readjusters" as parties "who perceive an unfavorable bias in the distribution of positions or resources." From various accounts of the foundation of the Inter-University Council (IUC) in 1939, it appears that this group of university officials, representing the public higher education institutions, banded together to avoid controls and to protect their interests within the Ohio legislature. Driver has noted that there had been several abortive efforts at organizing the autonomous Boards of Trustees into a single higher education board and that in an effort to maintain the relative degree of institutional autonomy enjoyed by each institution, it was decided to establish the IUC. Joseph Tucker has provided a similar explanation: "The major motivating force in the formation of the IUC was the potentially harmful consequences the existing laissez-faire approach in higher education might produce."

Cobb and Elder note that the categories of issue initiators "are not mutually exclusive, as an individual or group may have more than one motive for a particular action." While the main motivation for the establishment of the IUC appears to be that of readjustment, subsequent IUC actions indicated elements of Cobb and Elder's "exploitation." Seen in this light, the IUC, at times, appeared to be a "group who manufacture[d] an issue for their own gain." Such a self-interested motivation is perhaps
most apparent in the development of branch campuses. By 1940, the state
institutions were operating a total of four extension centers affiliated
with two institutions; by 1964, branch campuses were being operated in sev-
ten sites by the then six public colleges and universities. 7 This growth in
branch campuses came at the expense of a coordinated system of two year
community colleges, a system encouraged by a task force of the American
Council on Education. The IUC reacted to this proposal in a 1940 meeting:
"The [ACE] proposal to encourage the establishment of junior colleges in
larger communities, to be supported in part out of the general revenues of
the state, is dangerous to the future welfare of state-supported institutions
of higher learning." 8 The members of the IUC, in the verdict of later ob-
servers, were, in the issue of branch campus expansion, acting in "exploiter"
fashion, precluding the establishment of competitive institutions. 9

Both elements of Issue Initiation, readjustment and exploitation, are
compatible with the Cobb, Ross, and Ross "Inside Access Model," wherein
"policy originates within a government agency, or within a group which
has easy and frequent access to political decision makers. 10
The IUC members, respected educators and acknowledged leaders in Ohio, appear
to fit the mold of Cobb, Ross, and Ross' inside group initiators: "Because
of their privileged positions, inside groups tend to be closer knit in
background, mores and goals; such congruence is an asset in attempts to
attract support." 11 This stereotyped elite is not a demographic or
statistical concept, but rather an inexact measure of influence. College
and university presidents occupy a status position, while their share of state
funds makes their institutions a significant portion of a state budget.
This "privileged position" may also be because, as Millett has wryly noted,
legislators did not want to deal with the complex internal financial issues
of higher education, and so they deferred to the IUC's judgment over distri-
bution of higher education resources.

It may be asked why Ohio Governors and legislators were willing to accept the distribution of the available higher education appropriation as proposed by the Inter-University Council. The explanation is simple. The alternative was for the Governor or the General Assembly to determine the relative entitlement or needs of each state university, and any such determination could not fail but to precipitate a bitter political battle.\(^2\)

The IUC (initiator in Cobb and Elder's framework) maintained its uneasy truce through the mid 1950's in relative harmony. Minutes of the meetings reveal dissent over many items and much lively debate over issues, particularly issues that involved money or jurisdiction.\(^4\) In one issue, however, there appears to have been unanimous consent: the institutions wanted the state of Ohio to increase appropriations for higher education.

John Millett, who joined the IUC in 1953 as the new president of Miami University, recalls his surprise at the low level of state support for colleges, "Ohio as a state was simply not disposed to support its public higher education in generous terms."\(^5\)

Millett's joining the IUC (he had previously been a faculty member at Columbia) can be seen, in Cobb and Elder's scheme, as a triggering device, a mechanism that was to shape later issues. Cobb and Elder distinguish "internal and external events that correspond to the domestic and foreign spheres."\(^6\)

Trigger mechanisms, with respect to this study of Ohio's system of public higher education, will be adapted slightly to include internal activities (existing organizational practices of the IUC, existing appropriations processes, internal institutional financial issues, existing personnel practices) and external activities that will be interpreted as growth and other demographic changes in Ohio population, other organizational activities that impinged upon the internal considerations of the IUC, and governmental practices that occurred outside public higher education. While these internal/external classifications vary slightly from Cobb and
Elder's typology, they more closely resemble the IUC practices with regard to agenda building.

Internally, there was considerable dissatisfaction within the IUC about the level of state expenditures for public higher education. It is apparent that much of this dissatisfaction was justified when Ohio's expenditures on public higher education are compared with other states', even with those states that rank well below Ohio in terms of wealth and tax collections (see Appendix A). Ohio has traditionally had a low tax rate in comparison to that of other states. Hence, Ohio legislators, pointing to the smaller pie, have been relatively stingy with support to higher education both in operating funds and capital plant financing.

In 1949, Ohio ranked 32 (of 48 states) in State Tax Collections, per capita and as a percentage of Income Payments and 27 in State and Local Tax Collections, per capita and as a Percentage of Income Payments. By 1957, the Ohio state taxes, and state and local taxes in relation to personal income ranked the state 43rd in state tax revenues and 46th in state and local taxes. This low rate of taxation, given Ohio's much higher tax capacity, provided comparably less revenue for all Ohio's governmental expenditures, including those for education. In 1958, total state and local government expenditures for all education ranked the state 39; state and local government expenditures on public higher education ranked the state 41-44; public higher education adjusted expenditures per student ranked Ohio 39. From 1952-1958, the combined average of personal income spent for public higher education in Ohio was 3.5%, which ranked the state 41st.

These figures, seen in comparison with other states' comparative figures, gave Ohio a poor report card with regard to higher education. These poor levels of support do not even include facilities bonds or other long-term debt for higher education plants. In fact, as was the case in the afore-
mentioned operating figures, higher education plant needs had also been underfinanced. Ohio's constitution prohibited the legislature from incurring any debt except for minor purposes; this required that institutions use their annual appropriations for operating expenditures (and with occasional supplemental appropriations for plant, usually for medical or professional facilities), capital plant needs were extremely urgent, even for accommodation of present enrollments.

While it is evident that all public institutions of higher education in Ohio were underfunded, in comparison to other states, in their physical plant needs, those funds allocated from 1946-1963 to the colleges and universities were largely designated for The Ohio State University. The post-World War II plant investment in Ohio's public colleges and universities was approximately $129 million, of which $70 million, or 54%, went to Ohio State. The total underfunding of plant and operating budgets, as well as Ohio State's prominent position in the distribution of these scarce resources, served to create a climate within the Inter-University Council in which members, bound by rules of action that required unanimous consent, grew more weary of fighting for the precious dollars. It was into this situation that John Millett stepped when he became President of Miami University in 1953.

It has been suggested here that Millett's entry into the state system and the traditional underfunding of this system served as internal trigger devices, in the Cobb and Elder model. These events, before and including 1953, were followed by what appear to have been external trigger devices in the following years. These issues in the IUC's environment included a major report on enrollment projections, an Ohio College Association plan for study to accommodate the projected growth, and organizational precedents in educational structures in Ohio and in other states.
Enrollment fluctuations in Ohio's public institutions had been accommodated in several fashions. As mentioned, branch, or extension, campuses were initiated. The institutions stretched existing facilities to the limits. Temporary quarters were utilized. In 1953, private and municipal institutions enrolled nearly 64% of all students in the state of Ohio. A major report, however, issued in 1954, seemed to indicate that the 1954 provisions for Ohio's higher education--state, private, and municipal--would be woefully inadequate for the years to come. Ronald B. Thompson, Registrar of The Ohio State University, issued two national reports that projected enormous increases in the numbers of the college-age population: in 1953, he published *Estimating College Age Population Trends, 1940-1970* and in 1954, *The Impending Tidal Wave of Students*. By citing the increased birth rate of the 1940's and 1950's, Thompson noted that the college-aged population would increase at an unprecedented rate. He estimated that Ohio's college-aged population, even if the rate of attendance remained constant, would nearly double by 1970. Of course, if the rate of college-going increased, the numbers would increase even faster.

Armed with these statistics, and fearful that the poor level of funding would not enable their institutions to absorb the increasing enrollments, the presidents sought to anticipate and plan for the inevitable student bodies. In 1955, the Ohio College Association, an organization of private and public institutions, convened an ad hoc Committee on the Expanding Student Population to analyze the implications of Thompson's enrollment projections for their institutions. The person chosen to direct this survey, the first such comprehensive survey in Ohio's history, was John Dale Russell. Russell was no stranger to statewide surveys and governance, as he had written several such studies, including a 1950 Illinois survey; he was, in 1955, serving as Executive Secretary of the New Mexico Board of Educational Finance, the coordinating agency for that state's public higher education.
The formation of the Committee on the Expanding Student Population, which included two IUC members (one of whom was Millett), and the hiring of John Dale Russell as a consultant were two external trigger devices that ratified the existence of student enrollment as an issue. Another such external trigger device, one which established an historical precedent in Ohio, was the reorganization of the Ohio Department of Education in the early 1950's. While the Department of Education administered all elementary, secondary, and vocational education programs in Ohio, the reorganization of the Department in 1955 established a State Board of Education, a concept that was to be applied to higher education in 1963 with the establishment of the Ohio Board of Regents.

Cobb and Elder note, "In a system perspective, the inputs consist of the initiator and the event, or triggering mechanism that transform the problem into an issue." In the Ohio system of public higher education, there were initiators who (in the Cobb, Ross, Ross sense) had "inside access" to decision makers. These college presidents initiated a voluntary organization to divide state appropriations and to fend off state controls. In several issues, particularly branch campus expansion, the IUC reacted as well as re-adjusted. The trigger devices included the addition of John Millett to the group of presidents and the inherent dissatisfaction with the low levels of operating and capital funding from the state. External devices included the Thompson reports on the large number of students who were going to be requiring college programs in the next 10 years, the Ohio College Association's actions to study the enrollment projections and their effect upon Ohio's system of higher education, and the precedent set by the legislative reorganization of the Ohio Department of Education. The agenda building model charts the quickening of an issue from separate strands in the environment: "The formation of an issue is dependent upon the dynamic interplay between
the initiator and the trigger device.\textsuperscript{26} It appears clear that by 1955, the impending "tidal wave" of students constituted an issue to those persons responsible for providing instruction and services to college students.

According to the Cobb and Elder model, the way in which an issue becomes identified to participants plays a key role in issue clarification and definition: "How an issue is defined, explicitly or implicitly, will have important bearing on the nature and eventual outcome of a conflict."\textsuperscript{27} The issues of underfunding and enrollment projections carried a number of issue characteristics, including specificity, social significance, extent of temporal relevance, complexity, and categorical precedence. These characteristics became loosely tied to issues over the years, as participants probed and explored ways to rectify what was essentially an attempt to pry funds loose from the legislature.

Specificity was avoided by the IUC presidents. Their appeals over the years had been to higher education as a general good.\textsuperscript{28} In short, the IUC had for years exercised near-exclusive autonomy over how the appropriations were divided; lack of specificity over the money's use worked to the presidents' advantage. It was difficult to reverse this course and to convince legislators of the need to increase appropriations based upon specific, or concrete, needs. The IUC feared that to do so would invite additional controls over their appropriations process.

Social significance of an issue is exceedingly difficult to measure. One possible measure of higher education's social significance, or impact, in Ohio would be levels of funding, for percentages of expenditures are a measurable, and comparative, method of gauging legislative support and priority. It has been noted that Ohio's legislative support, as measured in appropriations, was consistently lower than the state's ability to support education. Another measure of social significance is the rate of
citizen participation in post-secondary education; in terms of population per resident student in college anywhere, or the comprehensive measure of Ohio student enrollment in all states, Ohio ranked 30th of the 48 states in 1958. Thus, in two available measures, legislative support for higher education appropriations and citizen participation in higher education, Ohio ranked low in comparison within national averages. Of course, it may be suggested that one statistic caused the other, i.e., that low appropriations (and hence, high student charges) discouraged college attendance or, conversely, that low rates of college attendance discouraged higher appropriations. In either case, it would have been difficult for disputants to expand the issues by means of an appeal to social significance.

Temporal relevance is a measure of immediacy and "denotes the extent to which an issue has short range, circumstantial relevance or more enduring fundamental relevance." The immediacy of the issue of prospective student enrollments, in ironic fashion, was employed as a symbol from the very first, in Thompson's 1954 report, The Impending Tidal Wave of Students; this more emphatic title revised his more mundane Estimating College Age Population Trends, 1940-1970 issued the year before. The irony is that the Ohio College Association (not the IUC) took until late in 1955, after the Ohio General Assembly declined to enact study legislation, to begin a formal study on the issue. Although there was apparent lead time until the tidal wave was to strike (Thompson predicted steady increases until 1970, with major increases beginning in 1963), there is little evidence in IUC minutes or in the pattern of activities to indicate that IUC members utilized this symbolic issue to increase the level of appropriations, to alter the nature of the appropriations process, or to warn legislators of the strain such enrollment increases would place upon existing programs and facilities.
Complexity, like the other issue characteristics, is crucial to the manner in which an issue becomes defined. It has been noted that IUC members and legislators (and governors) generally were pleased with the IUC’s means of distributing appropriations and that the complexity of the individual institutions discouraged careful legislative scrutiny. This situation closely resembles Cobb, Ross, and Ross’ Inside Access Model in which policy actors attempt to define issues and to limit consideration of an issue because of the technical complexity of the issue. “Bureaucrats are...often afraid that the public [or in this case, the representatives of the public], will misunderstand a technical problem if it becomes a matter for public debate.”32

This fear of public (or legislative or gubernatorial) misunderstanding is central to many definitions of "institutional autonomy." One author has noted, for example, that the task of educational leaders is to develop personal relationships which make it possible for us to make clear to men in government the nature of our enterprise, the role we ourselves play, the portion of our institutional life and development which is not within the bailiwick of anyone else to prescribe or control or even touch, and most of all, the heavy responsibility resting upon them as well as upon us in fulfilling the education of our youth and, indeed the total citizenry (italics in the original).33

M.M. Chambers, perhaps the most prolific advocate of institutional autonomy, wrote in 1965, "whether we think of institutions or of persons, the greatest mistake we can make is to believe that because we are becoming more numerous, we must inevitably lose some of our freedom. The opposite is true."34

Whatever one's perspective on autonomy, it appears that the IUC used complexity as a device to prevent legislative scrutiny into internal institutional management and that Ohio elected officials approved this arrangement, at least until 1963, when the Ohio Board of Regents was established.
Categorical precedence in a governmental context frequently means a reorganization that presages another such reorganization. In the context of the 1950's, categorical precedence in Ohio's public higher education translated into the additional extent to which the state government had become involved in internal operations, governance, and appropriations process then in use. There was, in other states, an increasing tendency towards formal state action to coordinate or govern institutions. Further, there was increasing policy study by governmental and research organizations, and by Ohio educators (e.g., the Russell study commissioned in 1955 and its successors), nearly all of which recommended increased state involvement. There was also the 1953-1955 reorganization of the Ohio Department of Education into the State Board of Education, which centralized elementary and secondary education to a significant extent.

Issue definition strategies require different tools for different purposes, most notably the manipulation of key symbols. Cobb, Ross, and Ross note, "there is a set of linkages between the type of language that is used to define an issue to outsiders and the ultimate size of the audience that will become involved in the issue." This relationship between issue creation and issue expansion, particularly if there is considerable public attention to an issue or if large public support is necessary, requires employment of symbolic language as a device for persuasion.

In the case of the IUC's efforts to increase appropriations and the OCA's efforts to study projected enrollment increases, relatively few symbolic devices were utilized by participants. Thompson's revised title, as has been noted, did draw considerable attention, but to a relatively small public -- higher education administrators; levels of funding in Ohio during the 1950's indicate that the "impending Tidal Wave" motif held little salience for legislators. Because the developing issues of strategies for increasing funds
and accommodating growth were technical, complex topics being discussed in limited forums, the issues were being initiated and specified in a terminology not designed for public effect or consumption. In terms of the Inside Access Model, "in order to give their issue a higher priority, its initial advocates seek limited issue expansion."

One observer has noted, "The IUC never wanted to 'go public' with its processes or persuasions because it knew that, as poorly as the Ohio Legislature treated it, the people of Ohio, particularly in southern Ohio or Cleveland, would have treated it even worse." Although there were few symbols employed to expand the issue of higher education coordination to the public's attention, there were several internal occasions for symbolic use, most notably efforts to establish historical precedence, credibility, and urgency portent.

The inability of the IUC to manipulate these occasions to their advantage became a major factor in the establishment of the Ohio Board of Regents in 1963. One such loss of credibility was the failure of the IUC to coordinate the growth of doctoral programs and graduate education during the 1950's.

Historically, the doctorate is higher education's most prestigious award, and the development of graduate programs confers credibility on institutions. Through a 1939 agreement within the IUC, Ohio State University was the sole doctorate-granting public university in Ohio. In 1956, the IUC presidents (including the OSU president) agreed to disregard the IUC constitution and its designation of Ohio State University as the sole grantor of the Ph.D.

Lending credence to the view that these institutions rushed to offer the doctorate for reasons of prestige was the view of one member of the IUC who noted, "formally for the minutes that his institution "entered into this area reluctantly but in self-defense.""
An observer of this period corroborates this view:

We got into this [Ph.D.] business because the best universities offered the Ph.D. There was post-Sputnik federal money available for starting up such programs and we saw the graduate programs as a way of increasing the quality of our institutions. Don't forget also that Ohio State got more money each year because of its graduate and professional programs. We didn't want to become another Ohio State, but we did think we could improve [our institution] if we offered the Ph.D.42

A state study later was critical of the academic merit of the doctoral program expansion:

The University Council has not been successful in developing coordinated plans for several important areas affecting public higher education. For example, the Council's effort to exercise some control over the granting of the Ph.D. degree at state universities has largely met with failure.43

Tucker saw the issue in similar fashion, noting the problems inherent in competition for prestige: "As long as the interests of the several institutions coincided, as they usually did on financial matters, the Council was effective. When their interests conflicted, as in the case of Ph.D. programs, each institution could go its own way."44

Thus, the Ph.D. degree, the most prestigious degree offered by a university, played more than a symbolic or passing role in the growing recognition that the IUC was incapable of resolving its internal disagreements. It may be inferred that the hodgepodge nature of the newly-authorized doctoral programs hardly increased observers' perceptions of program quality at the universities. One person has noted,

The universities, who were always talking about delivering excellent instruction, proposed to go into the research game. To me, it smelled much like the branch campus explosion, when instruction was being given in high school basements.45

If the development of Ph.D. programs was laden with symbolic meaning for the ambitious state universities, it may be advanced that to increase
research activities was in the national interest. Harold Orlans, Alice Rivlin, and others noted the urgency of such development, employing the space race as a symbolic rallying point for increased federal support of research. Thus, at least within limited arenas of academic programs and defense policy, some urgency portent was being employed to increase spending in a particular, narrow direction. Ohio, however, did not respond to the symbol, in that engineering and scientific enrollments, facilities, and other research indicators evidenced below-average commitment by the state in these areas. It appears that any national, symbolic urgency portent with regard to Sputnik of the need to increase Ohio's programs in science and research education failed to increase such funding or to increase significantly Ohio's standing in terms of the available indices of accomplishment. This relative scientific under-accomplishment is consistent with the already-noted inadequacies of Ohio's system of education funding and capital plant expenditures. A controversy over scientific research facilities will be seen in 1961 to trigger a major, perhaps fatal, disagreement between the IUC and a political figure, precipitating a growing dissatisfaction with the voluntary organization's modus operandi.

Cobb and Elder note the "dynamic interplay between symbol usage and the techniques that groups utilize to gain and direct supportive public attention. The mass media plays a pivotal role in highlighting this interplay and in determining the success of an issue." The media, so influential in determining agenda items and in informing public opinion, are rendered less important in Inside Access agenda building. Cobb, Ross, and Ross explicate ways in which the inside, initiating group seeks to avoid expanding issues that would call public attention to the issue: "Expansion strategies are aimed at bringing in identification and attention groups which can be crucial in assuming support for the program, and at the same time, avoiding expansion to the attentive and mass public." Only rarely did the IUC use
the media to reach the public in an organized fashion, and then usually to advertise institutional accomplishments. 50

One area in which the public had to be consulted and convinced was bond issues and constitutional revisions for acquiring state debt. In 1955, for example, Proposition One, authorizing a $150 million bond issue, was vigorously promoted by the IUC presidents. Millett has recounted his and others' efforts to convince Ohio voters that such expenditures were justified and overdue. 51 Another participant has recalled, "My people and I put on a regular tour show, talking to civic and alumni groups. I hit talk shows, news programs, and political rallies. But we really needed that money, and I made some fine contacts on the road." 52

Higher education's share of this bond issue was disbursed from 1956 through 1959, yet there were no additional state facilities bond issue put to a vote until November, 1963, by which time the disbursement agent was the Ohio Board of Regents, established in September, 1963.

Cooptation of the media, particularly when an initiating group wishes to remain low-key, is vital to the eventual success of the group's proposed policy. By the late 1950's when several groups were seeking to influence the direction of Ohio's public education, relatively little public use of the media was made, for all the groups (Ohio College Association, Inter-University Council, ad hoc commissions, Cleveland Commission on Higher Education) were keeping a deliberately low profile, seeking direct legislative liaison when higher education issues arose. There is evidence that the press in Cleveland, in particular, was helpful in promoting only a positive public image. 53 When a public issue arose, as in the case of bond issues, the groups closed ranks and united to support the issue. However, once the need for such public unanimity had passed, business-as-usual, or seeking to limit issue expansion, was again pursued.
Two additional characteristics, the speed of issue development and the speed of conversion into emotional issues, seem to have been negative factors in the issue creation stage of agenda building. In this stage, nothing had emerged as an appropriate strategy for accommodating the students of the 1960's; no single group had convincingly proffered a course of action to legislators; the voluntary coordinating organization, the IUC, had ignored its own by-laws in doctoral program administration and branch campus expansion; Ohio's largest population center, Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), had no public postsecondary institution for its citizens; Ohio continued to underfund its public higher education programs in terms of operating and capital appropriations; there was serious dissension within the IUC over the low level of appropriations and the method of disbursement to institutions. No one solution appeared comprehensive enough to deal with the complex issues at stake. One participant has recalled that "by 1955, we were too concerned with surviving on starvation diets to realize that our entire food supply would soon run out." 34

ISSUE (CONFLICT) EXPANSION

From this incoherent search for strategies, some guidelines for action slowly emerged, beginning with John Dale Russell's 1956 report to the OCA Committee on the Expanding Student Population, in which he outlined several key areas for study. These included expanded opportunities for access, including community colleges and technical education facilities; graduate studies and research, including faculty salaries; professional studies, including medical, dental, and veterinary preparation programs; and the larger issues of Ohio's record of support, educational attainment, and patterns of governance.
The issuance of the Russell report can be viewed, in retrospect, as the first step in the expansion of the issue concerning what general or specific actions could be taken to accommodate the impending number of students predicted by Thompson’s 1953 report. The report, commissioned by a non-governmental organization (the Ohio College Association) and partially funded by private foundations, formally recommended an expansion to governmental agencies, particularly concerning the governance of community colleges. By describing the alternatives available to higher education leaders, this report began to define possible methods of issue expansion.

Cobb, Ross, and Ross note, in the Inside Access Model of agenda-building, “limited issue expansion means that the policy initiators might seek to involve an identification group and selected attention groups, both of which may help create the feeling of urgency and importance necessary to attain a quick and favorable response from decision rulers.” Because at this time (1956) there were only emerging policy discussions, there was apparent no single policy-initiating group. The various publics though, were becoming identified. Schattschneider’s definition of conflict participants should be recalled: “Every fight consists of two parts: (1) a few individuals who are actively engaged at the center and (2) the audience that is irresistibly attracted to the scene. The latter are an integral part of the overall situation.”

Cobb and Elder delineated four components of the larger public, approximating the combatants in Schattschneider’s “fight.” These members include specific publics (identification groups and attention groups) and mass publics (the attentive public and the general public). If the report precipitating the issue of governmental involvement in higher education is viewed as the initiating force, the four publics become clearer, especially if they are seen in a systemic sense, in which one sector impacts upon the next, larger, sector. The IUC, voluntary yet formalized coordinating orga-
nization, is the identification group, for its members (with their boards of trustees) were legally charged with internal governance of their institutions. The OCA, a consortium of Ohio's private and public institutions and the formal accreditation agency for the state, is the attention group. Its membership overlapped the IUC's public membership; the OCA-appointed Commission on the Expanding Student Population, for example, included the presidents of The Ohio State University and Miami University (as well as the Superintendent of Columbus Public Schools, Novice Fawcett, who was to be the next president of OSU).

These two groups constituted the specific-interest organizations that included nearly all the state's public and private colleges and universities. The mass public included members of Ohio's voting public. The governor and the Ohio General Assembly, who determined and appropriated funds for public higher education, were, in this setting, an attentive public. The legislators can be seen as an expanded public rather than as a specific public because institutional policy originated within the institution's own boards of trustees. Further, other financial and legislative matters crowded the General Assembly and gubernatorial dockets, so that higher education was only one of many items on the agenda, albeit a major expenditure by the state. The general public, as has been noted, was avoided unless specific voter approval was required, as in the case of bond issues.

This sequence of public expansion, though not employed by a single initiating agent, approximates the specific-through-general process through which Ohio's educational issues were filtered from interest groups to the citizenry. This entire process was utilized only on those rare occasions, such as 1955, when the presidents convinced the governor and legislators that a bond issue was necessary for plant financing. Indeed, Millett recalls that Governor Lausche initiated the 1955 bond issue on the general election ballot. Therefore, the sequence in the agenda
building model would have been: attentive public (governor)→ identification
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group (IUC)→ attentive public (legislature)→ general public (voters).

Cobb and Elder note that four methods of conflict containment include
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direct and indirect means and group-or issue-oriented strategies.
Group-oriented strategies would have been difficult to employ,
for no one group was advocating specific issues or remedies; therefore, direct
actions to discredit a group or members of a group did not occur. There were
instances of indirect group-oriented strategies employed, including not
undermining, but cooptation. Already discussed were the instances in which
the Cleveland Commission coopted members of the Cleveland print and other
media.

A more obvious, and group-directed attempt at cooptation was evident
during the Michael DiSalle administration (1959-63). Governor DiSalle, a
Democrat, and the first Ohio governor to hold a four-year term, in 1959 pro-
posed a modest change in the Ohio tax structure. Although the tax modifi-
cations were minor, and although Ohio was considerably undertaxed in pro-
portion to other states, the tax proposals required considerable political
activity by DiSalle, despite the newly-elected Democratic majority in the
legislature. The tax proposals, approved in August, 1959, triggered several
events that, surprisingly, had considerable impact upon higher education.
One of these, a branch campus that became a political issue, will be seen in
the discussion of interest group resources. Another, the need to promote a
tax package already enacted, indicated the political resources at a governor's
disposal, and the vulnerability of public higher education leaders to
cooptation.

As a result of the 1959 tax increase, the additional tax revenues ac-
counted for a higher appropriation to the state's colleges and universities.
The tax increase, however, became a campaign issue in the 1960 elections as
the Republicans chose to campaign upon fiscal management themes. Democrat Governor DiSalle chose to call in the political markers in exchange for the increased higher education appropriations. He initiated a series of seminars, to be hosted by IUC college presidents at their respective campuses, to explain the state's fiscal situation and the need for higher levels of tax revenue; John Millett was asked to host the first seminar at Oxford, and to act as representative for the IUC, even though Ohio University President John Baker was at the time chairing the IUC. He ruefully recalls,

Before I knew what was happening I found myself involved in the political campaign of 1960. And before I extricated myself I was strongly identified with Governor DiSalle and the Democratic Party. No one seemed to care that I was a registered Republican. 63

Richard Nixon carried Ohio over John F. Kennedy by a substantial margin, while the Ohio legislature swung to Republican control. Democrat DiSalle, in another attempt to utilize the political resources at his command, presented two budgets in the January 1961 executive budget session, and had chief department heads and educators at his side in the session. The two budgets projected revenues and DiSalle's recommendations for the expenditures based upon his perception of necessary programs. In short, he attempted to tie expenditures to the need for increased revenues, and he did so by coopting the educators and political appointees. When the legislators drafted their version of expenditure bills, based upon no new taxes, IUC members were utilized to lobby for increased higher education appropriations.

These extraordinary seminars and budget presentations were designed to authenticate DiSalle's political actions, a cooptation that, if it results in increased education appropriations, serves the purpose of both parties. The risks were considerable, though, for the groups coopted had no reassurance of any quid pro quo. 64
Issue-oriented strategies include the direct defusing of an issue or the indirect blurring of an issue. At the state level, where the issues were becoming more clarified (by virtue of the 1956 Russell report), new organisational units, a device noted by Cobb and Elder, were created to study the issues. To determine whether an ad hoc group is a stalling ploy or a necessary planning mechanism is difficult, for motivations in creating such groups are often mixed. It appears clear that considerable planning was called for in order to accommodate the large numbers of students; the IUC and OCA were active proponents of the Committee on the Expanding Student Population, particularly since their membership dominated the various subsequent ad hoc groups. "Blue ribbon panels" are common administrative devices to study problems and recommend solutions; in the Cobb and Elder rubric, they are direct issue-oriented conflict containment strategies.

Within this climate of study commissions, a number of forces were coming into play: the state was the authorizer of the Ohio Commission on Education Beyond the High School; diverse interest groups within the state were organizing along regional interests (as the Cleveland Commission and a Dayton study group); federal money was being disbursed through Titles VIII (Vocational Education) and X (to develop policies "which will strengthen the educational programs and objectives of the institutions of higher education") and was being used by the State Board of Education to develop post-secondary technical institutes; municipal institutions (the Universities of Akron, Cincinnati, and Toledo) had begun to lobby for state funds; members of the IUC, eager to convince legislators of the need for increased levels of appropriations, began to study comparative cost data for various levels of instruction and employed an outside consultant from the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education for this purpose.
In short, legislators and educators were beginning to take seriously the enrollment boom predicted by Thompson in 1953. The Baker Report, Ohio's Future in Education Beyond the High School, was issued in December, 1958. Its most important finding, in light of conflict containment strategy, was the recommendation that yet another state-sponsored commission be created. To this end, the Interim Commission on Education Beyond the High School was created by H.B. 583 in 1959. Despite its important mandate, the Interim Commission was assigned no staff and only was able to muster two unimposing reports, "A Proposed Policy for the State of Ohio for Community Colleges and University Branches" (February 1961) and a study of medical education needs (December 1962).

Both the Ohio Commission and the Interim Commission must be judged as failures if specific policy recommendations and plans for action are the criteria for judging success. A 1963 state report takes this point of view when it notes,

Two very limited formal coordination agencies have produced some studies, but they have been largely ineffective because they had limited assignments and lacked the staff necessary to do the extensive research needed for comprehensive planning.

That the studies became more technical, more specialized, might be seen as a subtle shift from conflict containment to a more genuine planning function. It should be noted that comprehensive community college legislation was drawn up and enacted under the aegis of the Interim Commission, and later figured prominently in the political climate leading to the establishment of the Ohio Board of Regents in 1963. In sum, from 1955-1957, several ad hoc commissions were created, involving the state for the first time in formal study efforts. These organizational units, dominated by professional educators, did initiate a public forum for issues and, though they were patchwork, did lead to enactment of pieces of
higher education legislation. Further, the items under consideration by the various study groups served to outline general areas of concern later dealt with by the Ohio Board of Regents. Millett has noted, "the agenda of recommendations proposed by the Baker Commission in effect became the agenda of action for the Ohio Board of Regents after 1963."  

As has been suggested, there were no apparent initiating groups or individuals at this point (approximately 1959-60), for no one group, including legislators, educators, or interest organizations, had mapped specific strategies for proposing or implementing policies. Indeed, the groups in a position to take public leadership (IUC, GCHR) were deliberately maintaining low profiles. The environment was clogged with tentative state involvement, with disintegrating professional leadership within existing organizations, and with the increasingly-held perception that something needed to be done. One observer has noted, 

By 1961, we all knew that the IUC was inadequate to deal with statewide planning or comprehensive action. In this vacuum, it was clear that Big Brother [i.e., the state] would take over.  

Cobb and Elder note four entrance patterns in their agenda-building perspective, correlatives of the "publics" typologies: identification group, attention groups, attentive public, and mass public. Identification groups, such as the IUC, must resort to disruption if they are not able to expand the issue to an agenda: "When conflicts are confined to identification groups, formal agenda status is most likely to be attained only when disputants threaten to disrupt the system."  

Although the IUC's strategies more resembled those inherent in the Inside Access Model of Cobb, Ross, and Ross, those of low profile tactics and proximity to decision makers, at times the issues were posed for legislators in terms of disruption -- the apocalyptic figures concerning enrollments, for example, or newspaper stories that hinted at possible school closings due to inadequate heating
facilities. Millett recalls that the Thompson report "suddenly made the world aware that there might be a 'tidal wave of students' threatening to inundate our colleges and universities by 1964." 76

The prominent attention groups, the Ohio College Association and the Cleveland Commission on Higher Education, could gain attention, in the Cobb and Elder view, by a threat or resorting to more organized protest: "conflicts that are confined to attention publics are most likely to be brought to the agenda by threats of imminent sanctions." 77 The OCA did not resort to such threats but the CCHE frequently used its political leverage both in Cuyahoga County and at the state level. Miller has noted the considerable political influence exercised by the Commission, particularly in its attempts to keep a public baccalaureate institution out of Cleveland. An example of economic influence and the use of imminent sanctions was CCHE's "Receptacle Fund," to which business leaders were urged to contribute; they were giving, the CCHE alleged, to keep "free enterprise" operating in Cleveland. 78

For an issue to expand beyond the attentive public, more conventional strategies need be employed: "conflict that are confined to the attentive public are likely to attain the formal agenda through a brokerage channel." 79 As such, political sponsorship and patronage are common devices, as are attempts to incorporate issues into political platforms. Cobb, Ross, and Ross corroborate this agenda entrance pattern in their Inside Access Model, The preferred strategies for attaining entrance are through direct access or through brokers. Institutional sanctions may be used against individuals resisting the program although what is more likely is the use of special favors and the payment of money to those who cooperate. 80

Although there was little evidence of money exchanging hands or of payments to political campaigns, there were evident considerable examples of
brokerage channels being utilized. The most common use was by groups to get legislation introduced by area legislators. The CCHE, who had the attention of the state's largest delegation of legislators (i.e., Cuyahoga County), cultivated contacts with at least three members of the General Assembly who were willing to "co-sponsor a suitable bill and keep CCHE informed."81

On the other hand, the members of the IUC appeared to cultivate similar advocacy and sponsorship with Ross Pepple, Republican Senator from Lima.

It is important to note the eventual outcome of this battle over brokerage channels in providing public higher education for Cleveland, as the outcome was a classic case of political tradeoffs and use of political leverage. The CCHE, in an attempt to protect the interests of Cleveland's private educational institutions, was concentrating its efforts upon establishing a state community college, with terminal technical programs and transfer-track academic work for the first two years. Pepple, whose district (Lima) contained a branch of OSU and who was critical of the private colleges and the CCHE, was urging establishment of branch campuses and extension centers. Governor DiSalle, a Democrat, was also convinced that a branch campus was called for.

Eventually, three bills were enacted in 1961, indicating a number of political considerations: one bill enabled counties to create community colleges, under the aegis of a new statewide community college board. This was the legislation desired by the CCHE; in fact, Ralph Besse, chair of the CCHE, was appointed to chair the new State Community College Board. In its governance and approval powers over community colleges (powers later transferred to the Ohio Board of Regents), the SCCB was a precursor to the Board of Regents. This bill, in its original form, had included the Interim Commission's recommendations for statewide involvement in two-year colleges (Pepple had been a member of the Interim Commission). Bills were also enacted
to enable school districts to establish technical institutes and to enable counties to establish financing procedures for university branches. Thus, by November 1961, provisions had been made for expansion of higher education programs, at least in terms of two-year college programs.

Of course, these examples of access to brokerage channels required financial approval of the general public -- the voters. All the authorizing legislation would be useless if voters could not be convinced of the need to pass bond issues or to approve operating levies. Therefore, the automatic entrance pattern had to be evoked in each instance voter approval was required. Each such effort required educators to "get out the vote" for the particular issue. This was to become a more widely-used device as the voters of each community college, technical institute, or university branch district would need to be consulted before the programs could be initiated.

This lengthy examination of entrance patterns has been necessary to depict the four Cobb and Elder patterns and the ways in which the various groups employed these patterns to gain agenda attention. Examples of the efforts by an identification group (IUC), attention groups (OCA and CCHE), the attentive public (legislators), and the general public indicated attempts to disrupt, to employ imminent sanctions, to utilize legislative brokerage channels, and to resort to public votes when essential. Cobb and Elder hypothesize that "the channel by which an issue is brought before decision-makers depends upon the extent to which a conflict is made visible to various publics. The wider the audience, the greater the chance that the dispute will reach the docket of problems confronting decision-makers."83

The issue of the creation of the Ohio Board of Regents is a case of all channels being used by different organizations, each of which had different goals in mind as they lobbied for organizational interests. By 1961, however, one thread was common to each organizational fabric: the state of Ohio was
certain to become increasingly involved in the financing and governance of public higher education.

The state had, by 1961, incrementally become more involved in the operations, if not the governance, of the IUC institutions and had laid the groundwork for increasing involvement in the chartering and operations of future institutions; this involvement included control of capital expenditures, financial assistance, two-year institutions, and planning (e.g., the Commission and Interim Commission). While several of these areas had always been under informal or formal state control, it was becoming increasingly evident that the key to expansion of opportunity for Ohio's impending student population lay not with the formal or voluntary coordinating organizations, but with the state legislature and the governor, who determined higher education appropriations.

These programs, initiated over several years (1955 through 1961), were concurrent with the increasing planning role of the state, beginning with the 1957 governor-appointed Ohio Commission on Education Beyond High School. Thus, in piecemeal fashion, a model of state involvement in planning and operations had developed. A place on the agenda was assumed not only by the biennial appropriations bills enacted by the legislature (and allocated by the IUC), but by this growing array of ad hoc and continuing programs. This growth is consistent with Cobb and Elder's notion of Issue Durability. They note,

Most issues, upon gaining a position on the docket, have a 'built-in life' that assures their existence over a number of years regardless of how they are resolved. Even if the issue is 'solved,' there is continuous debate over how the program is going to be administered, who is going to be serviced, etc.

Likewise, elements of Cobb, Ross and Ross' Inside-Access Model appear to have ensured that higher education issues would regularly appear on the legislative agenda. The need to appeal to voters for bond issues, involving
public relations and media coverage, appeared to be the rare occasions of expansion to the mass public. As the Inside Access Model denotes, " ordinarily, those trying to reach a formal agenda through inside channels will not fare as well if the issue becomes public, regardless of the symbolic ploys at their disposal." 

Although no single group was advocating the establishment of an agency such as the Ohio Board of Regents, a general practice of increased state involvement had evolved by 1961. There were influential groups and persons within groups who had begun to exert pressure for more formal and coordinated state involvement in Ohio's public higher education. These persons wielded considerable influence and had at their disposal significant political resources, allowing them to gain what Cobb and Elder define as "differential responsiveness"; in the agenda building model, this influence is noted as interest group variables, including group legitimacy, strategic and esteem resources of the group, and identification of decision-makers with the group. These intangible interest group variables include:

First, the decision-maker may be indebted to a particular group or identify himself as a member of that group. Second, some groups have more resources than others or are better able to mobilize their resources. Third, some groups are located so strategically in the social or economic structure of society that their interests cannot be ignored (for example, big business and agriculture). Fourth, some groups (such as doctors, lawyers and church leaders) are held in greater esteem by the public than others and thus can command greater access to decision-makers.

The IUC, the OCA, and the CCHE had the requisite group legitimacy, for each had a clearly-delineated and acknowledged sphere of influence that provided resources, strategic importance, and opportunities to exert leadership on relevant issues. The IUC served for nearly 25 years as the council of presidents to make statewide policy for public higher education, to represent the state institutions in a variety of contexts, and to distribute the biennial
appropriations. The OCA served as the state accreditation agency for public and private institutions; its committees studied many issues concerning post-secondary education in the state, including planning reports (e.g., the Russell report in 1956). The Cleveland Commission had established itself as the group representing higher education interests in Cuyahoga County. Its membership included business, civic, and educational leadership in the city.

That members of influential groups become identified with decision-makers has also been noted, as in the cooptation of state university presidents in Governor DiSalle's 1960 pre-election seminars and his January 1961 budget message. Millett, president of Miami University, the smallest of the state universities, was becoming known as the most visible of the IUC presidents, a sometimes-dubious recognition in a state where gubernatorial terms lasted only two years (until 1959, when the term was extended to four years). An observer of this period has noted,

He became identified with leaders, Rhodes in particular. But in [the 1950's], he gained credibility by becoming the informal leader of the [IUC], by pushing for formulas, and by lobbying for increased state-involvement. Such identification had happened before as legislators befriended IUC members and sponsored legislation. President Baker of Ohio University was known to be a personal friend of Governor O'Neill, and was appointed by him to head the Ohio Commission on Education Beyond the High School and by his successor, DiSalle, to chair the Interim Commission. Senator Ross Pepple, (R-Lima), who had earlier negotiated an OSU branch campus for his district, came to become identified with the IUC's efforts to establish university branches in Cuyahoga County; his bills in the 1961 General Assembly eventually became the legislation creating the State Community College Board. Senator Pepple engaged in conflict with the Cleveland press and members of the CCBHE on behalf of the IUC perspectives of public higher education in Cleveland.
However, enthusiastic sponsorship for IUC positions on controversial issues was rare, and with few exceptions, legislative matters were discussed and legislators lobbied in a low key. This is consistent with Cobb and Elder's notion of "the dynamic interplay between the initiator and the trigger devices," in which decision groups determine the degree of publicity accorded issues; it is likewise consistent with Cobb, Ross, and Ross' Inside Access Model, which details the methods by which private decisions are sought.

While the IUC attempted to maintain a low profile, there were several strategies of influence utilized by the state institution presidents, several of which were accomplished by means seemingly contrary to the Cobb and Elder emphasis upon symbolism and media coverage. The agenda building model stresses these two elements:

The key to success in each case is to put the appeal in a symbolic context that will have a maximum impact on followers, potential supporters, the opposition, or the decision-makers. Each strategy is dependent to some extent on the amount of attention that is provided by the mass media. Symbolic crusades, regardless of their form, are dependent on publicity so as to attract additional people or to give credibility to an issue commitment. Symbols and the media are two key mechanisms by which groups can channel their demands to a wider constituency and enhance their chances of success (p. 150).

These strategies, variously employed by different groups, usually took two forms, dissuasion and demonstration of commitment. Other forms available in the Cobb and Elder lexicon include arousal, provocation, and affirmation (or internal solidarity) -- strategies that required more evident use of public channels and media exposure.

Dissuasion "involves the utilization of symbols to discourage supporters of the other side from active opposition and to encourage them to switch sides. . . . Another form of dissuasion is to discredit the cause of an opponent by linking it with some distasteful symbol." While these
strategies rely heavily upon successful exploitation of media, there are variations, as those employed by the IUC, that rely more upon informal lobbying or behind-the-scene influence. Such a use was that of the state presidents to ward off a legislatively-mandated IUC in the 1961-62 General Assembly.

James Maloon, Director of the Department of Finance in the DiSalle Administration, in 1960 drafted legislation (H.B. 416, 104th General Assembly) to give the IUC formal authority as a coordinating body. Members of the IUC, who required unanimous consent for group action, decided not to support the legislation and dissuaded Maloon and members from reporting the bill out of the Senate Education Committee. Maloon, dissuaded by the balky IUC presidents, later expressed this sentiment on the stillborn bill:

While I was trying to do something that I thought was in the best interest of the universities, I was not angry with the members of the Council for taking the position they did at that time--even though I strongly felt they had misjudged the future and the best interest of higher education in Ohio.56

Maloon's bill, well-intentioned as it appeared to have been, was premature, for not only did the IUC oppose it, but few legislators were ready to reorganize statutorily the IUC into a formal device, even though the disbursement and operational functions had been formally conducted since 1939. The Maloon bill, while it did not call for a Board of Regents organization, can be seen as formal agenda entrance for the concept of a state-authorized agency. The OBR bill, introduced in March 1963 as H.B. 214, more precisely served as the first instance of formal agenda entrance for the Ohio Board of Regents. One observer has noted,

Maloon's idea, wherever it came from, was about one year too early. In fact, if [IUC] had contemplated the inevitable alternative [i.e., the Board of Regents,] [they] would have jumped to support his bill. As it was, the Regents removed [the IUC] far more from influence than would have his original proposal.37
Although the Maloon bill failed to emerge from committee, it was evident that the IUC could not continue to dissuade legislators from involving the state of Ohio in the operations of the state's public institutions. The State Community College Board, the State Board of Education's licensing authority over technical institutes, the state control over capital expenditures (and the attendant need to approve via public voting the bond issues), the state-sponsored planning commission, and the increasing concern over the increasing numbers of students pointed to certain state action. Cobb and Elder's fourth symbolic strategy, demonstration of strength of commitment, was also in evidence as the IUC began to emerge as the issue group.

The agenda building model notes, "The primary objective is to demonstrate the strength of commitment of a particular group and the size of the group that is making the commitment." The ancillary tactic, disruption, appears not to have been employed. President Baker of Ohio University obviously felt this need to demonstrate commitment when he wrote, in 1960, to all his fellow presidents:

All of these divisive forces [i.e., preparation of budgets and other financial matters] many of which come from within the Council itself are appearing at a time when there is much discussion of a central controlling board for higher education in Ohio. If we cannot agree on our budgets and support them loyally as a group, the effectiveness of our system so laboriously built up will decline rapidly.

Thus, it was clear to members of the IUC that their *modus operandi* was being threatened. The same year, as noted, a bill was introduced to make their organization a state agency. In an attempt to ward off such potential state action, the members, led by John Millett, had taken steps in the late 1950's to demonstrate their strength of commitment. One such step was the preparation of cost studies that would allow more comparable program data for the appropriations process.
The IUC had always disbursed appropriations on a rough *per capita* basis, with Ohio State (due to its graduate programs) and Central State (due to its small size) receiving disproportionately large shares; of course, this meant Bowling Green, Ohio University, Kent State, and Miami received less than their *per capita* shares. Therefore, in 1958 the IUC undertook to determine what the instructional costs were at different levels of instruction, from freshman to professional student instruction. In 1959, Richard Axt, of WICHE, was hired to recommend standardization of accounting practices and to determine instructional costs at all levels. His 1960 report to the Council, while it did not immediately lead to *per-program* appropriations, did provide the early initiative for what was later to become a formula-based budgeting system under the Ohio Board of Regents.

Another attempt was made to demonstrate its strength of commitment when, in 1961, the IUC hired its first full-time staff member, William Coulter. This attempt to convince legislators of the IUC’s seriousness was too little, too late. Cobb and Elder note that employing such a tactic is a measure of desperation: "A characteristic of this tactic is that it is never used until all the others have failed or have been exhausted." 100 An observer of this period of time has noted, "Hiring Bill Coulter was a last-ditch decision to get [the IUC’s] act together. We should have done it much earlier in order to keep the legislature out of the coordination business."

Ironically, a procedural rule requiring unanimous consent for IUC action prevented group action and demonstrated to political outsiders that the voluntary council was incapable of providing leadership for the state’s needs in higher education. The IUC’s failure to demonstrate unity and strength of commitment spelled the end of voluntary coordination in Ohio. In the 1960’s several issues requiring unanimity fell short of group approval and convinced
legislators that state intervention was needed.

The lack of agreement over Ph.D. programs and branch campus expansion has been noted in the contexts of the IUC serving as a "reactor" group and in terms of historical precedence and the symbolic prestige of the doctoral degree. The major disagreement precipitating the legislative view that the IUC was inadequate occurred over capital expenditures. Capital expenditures, discussed earlier in the context of Ohio's traditional underfunding of higher education, were becoming even more inadequate in the 1960's as the "tidal wave" of students began to enroll in the colleges and institutions. The Ohio State University, though it received the lion's share of capital appropriations, was unable to compete for the increasing amount of federal research dollars due to its conspicuous lack of research and engineering facilities.

Speaker of the Ohio House Roger Cloud proposed in 1961 that a bonding tax surplus (from the 1956 cigarette tax enacted to finance capital projects) be used to establish an engineering research center at Ohio State during 1961-63. The deal, relayed to the IUC by President Millett, would provide $15 million for this purpose to OSU, with another $15 million to go to the other IUC institutions (excluding OSU) in the 1963-65 biennium. H.B. 56 was introduced and hearings were scheduled in the Elections and Federal Relations Subcommittee, where the Ohio University and Kent State University presidents testified against the bill, which died before it reached the floor.

Of course, there were many questions over the bill and the implications of the appropriations mechanism. Ohio State, already feeling the expansion in enrollment (since the Thompson report, its enrollments had risen from 102,000 to over 26,000), needed the appropriations and would have been shut out of the next biennial capital funds. There was some constitutional question over the debt liability. There was some question over the location of such a research center, as the following editorial from the Toledo Blade noted:
The fact of the matter is that the Cloud proposal to give an initial $15 million to OSU, if it succeeded in bringing any new industry in at all, would attract it not to Toledo or Youngstown, or Cincinnati, but into the Columbus area. Toledo industry could use more and better research centers, obviously. But it would be far more practical and convenient if they were to be located here or at some nearby university city such as Ann Arbor -- not at OSU.103

While the political and educational issues over the research center controversy were not clear or agreed upon, it was clear that the IUC's lack of agreement over this vital issue alienated Speaker Cloud and corroborated observers' opinions that the IUC house was not in order. Millett, who in 1961 chaired the IUC, has noted,

The [IUC] arrangement could endure only so long as all institutions worked together in a sense of mutual good will and mutual advantage. And the arrangement could endure only so long as the political leadership thought it was responsive to the needs of the state. By 1961 these prerequisites of successful operation had been lost.104

In the Cobb and Elder agenda-building parlance, "Failure of a show of strength can often mean public ridicule and a subsequent inability to mobilize sufficient support."105 After 1961, the IUC was unable to mobilize sufficient support from within or from outside itself to mobilize support against the mounting pressures for state action towards centralization of public higher education.

These mounting pressures came from what proved to be the death blow to the IUC as the coordinating agency: the appearance of an Ohio Board of Regents plank in the 1962 political platform of gubernatorial candidate James Rhodes. Cobb and Elder note the key nature of such campaign platforms within the agenda-building model,

Political parties also play an important part in translating issues into agenda items. To assure, they will often seek out and identify themselves with issues that are salient to large portions of the populace. Typically, these issues are identified in the party platform in general terms and with considerable ambiguity.106
Rhodes' platform plank on statewide coordination, however, was quite specific and unambiguous. In a campaign paper entitled "Blueprint for Brainpower," candidate Rhodes enumerated several specific reasons why he would, if elected, propose a State Board of Regents for Higher Education. Although the issue of a centralized Board's establishment failed to catch on as a burning campaign topic, Rhodes' emphasis upon an economic program for Ohio was part of a larger overall campaign strategy, emphasizing the need for research, economic development, and jobs in the state. State Auditor Rhodes frequently charged incumbent Governor DiSalle with mismanagement and inattention to industry. For example, he accused the Governor of losing 86,000 jobs to other states in unsuccessful military contracts. Therefore, his linking of statewide coordination of higher education to Ohio's economic program was a concentrated effort to discredit DiSalle and win election.

The strategy worked. Rhodes won the election and had a Republican majority in both chambers of the General Assembly. In Fall, 1961, Speaker Cloud, a close ally of Rhodes, had ordered the Ohio Legislative Service Commission to study formal coordination in other states and to make recommendations for possible state action for public higher education; this report may be seen as the legacy of Cloud's dissatisfaction over the earlier research center incident. Therefore, in November 1962, the IUC found itself in an awkward position, with a Republican governor-elect who had promised a state board, a Republican legislature headed by a Speaker who was dubious over the ability of the IUC to lead, and with considerable internal dissension over IUC procedures and practices. Within this milieu, those who wished to preserve the status quo of the voluntary system of coordination could not help but be disheartened.

FORMAL AGENDA ENTRANCE

The third and final stage of the agenda building model, formal agenda
entrance, charts the final stages of issue expansion and transition into a formal decision arena. Cobb, Ross, and Ross note, in the Inside Access Model,

Entrance means attaining formal agenda status. It does not mean that the issue is on the public agenda. Violence and threats of violence are almost never employed. The preferred strategies for attaining entrance are through direct access or through brokers.

The major elements of the Agenda Entrance stage, according to Cobb and Elder, include systemic constraints on the appropriateness of any action and the need to gather the support of key decision-makers. These elements form the "gates" to the formal agenda, defined as "the calendar of authoritative decision-making bodies such as legislatures, high courts, or regulatory agencies."

In the agenda-building rubric, even pressing and well designed (i.e., convincingly-symbolic and sufficiently-expanded) issues must be perceived by influential gatekeepers as legislative or legitimate. Elected officials often have a shrewd sense of their constituencies and are reluctant to be precocious in proposing legislation for which there is little precedence or about which there is considerable public apprehension. In discussing the systemic constraints on the legitimacy of issues, Cobb and Elder hypothesize, "Any institutional agenda will be restricted by the prevailing popular sentiment as to what constitutes appropriate matters for governmental attention."

By 1962, however, any constraints to state action in the governance of public higher education in Ohio had been eroded over the previous ten years. Although the IUC had always been at the mercy of legislative and gubernatorial appropriations decisions, the presidents and their boards of trustees had considerable autonomy in all other operating and planning aspects of governance over their institutions. Internal dissension and a national movement
towards state involvement in coordination of governance (over 25 states conducted statewide surveys of their higher education programs in the years 1957-1960), however, obviously left the IUC in a vulnerable position.

It can be said that from 1960 until the 1963 establishment of the Ohio Board of Regents, the IUC existed only to divide up appropriations handed to them in lump sum by the General Assembly, and for little else. Capital planning had been consolidated in a 1955 state board and was financed by state bond issues. Long range surveys and master plans for statewide issues were being conducted by state-authorized (or Ohio College Association-hired) consultants and commissions. Lobbying, such as it was, was done by boards of trustee members or individual institutions, and was not coherent or orchestrated by the IUC. In areas of branch campuses and graduate programs, the institutions had decided to go their own ways. Worse, the IUC failed to convince legislators that they were capable of accommodating the near enrollment increases. One observer has recalled,

[the legislature wasn't even certain [the IUC] wanted to accommodate all the new students, because it would give them a chance to be more selective about whom they admitted (emphasis added).]

Further, there was precedent for the reorganization of an Ohio educational agency, the Ohio State Department of Education, which in 1953 had been constitutionally amended and in 1956, totally reorganized under a publicly elected State Board of Education. Therefore, there was no systemic constraint on major reorganizations of Ohio's educational system, at least at the K-12 level. With the new State Department receiving federal funds for postsecondary technical education, no IUC member could have been unaware of the reorganization or its possible implications for the statewide coordination of higher education. The municipal institutions had begun to lobby for state assistance in the 104th General Assembly,
establishing an additional set of claims on public higher education appropriations. Finally, federal legislation was being drafted which would require each state to designate a higher education facilities agency, with an advisory commission established in the states. By 1962, there was virtually no systemic restraint to action the state would take to intervene in the existing governance procedures of the IUC.

The final, perhaps the most crucial, element in the progression of an issue to formal agenda consideration is the access to key decision-makers. Cobb and Elder note this important role of institutional gatekeepers:

For an issue to attain agenda status, it must command the support of at least some key decision-makers, for they are the ultimate guardians of the formal agenda. Political leaders are active participants in the agenda-building process, not simply impartial arbiters of issue disputes. 13

In the series of events to the 1963 establishment of the Ohio Board of Regents, a number of institutional gatekeepers had become evident within the legislature, the Governor's Office, the power circles of the state, and the IUC itself. Gatekeepers were evident in earlier portions of the agenda-building model, most notably in the issue expansion stage, where political identity and influence were seen as crucial to gaining attention of groups and publics, to identifying with gatekeepers and convincing others of the worth of an issue, and to elevating an issue to a political platform. By 1962, the dramatic personae had evolved into several key actors, including Governor-elect James Rhodes, Speaker of the House Roger Cloud, CCHRE members (notably Ralph Besse), and IUC chairman John Millett. It was this cast of characters that, in various capacities, set in motion the final steps to formal statewide coordination.

Governor-elect Rhodes, whose successful campaign had promised jobs and governmental reorganization, has claimed credit "for originating the concept of the Ohio Board of Regents" in the form in which it was recommended to the
General Assembly and adopted in Ohio. The loose strands leading to such action were woven into the Rhodes campaign platform; Rhodes' victory and his Republican General Assembly ensured that such action could be taken, the IUC's earlier objections notwithstanding. Kent State University President Bowman noted at an IUC meeting, "It is probably fair to report that the Council takes a dim view of such a statutory board but does not seek to dispute with the Governor-elect." It is questionable whether the IUC could have again won such a dispute. Millett, for example, notes that many prominent Republicans served as trustees of the IUC institutions and would have found it difficult to oppose a Republican-initiated reorganization effort. Rhode has promised in "Blueprint for Brainpower" and in his remarks to the IUC not to abrogate the established trustees' roles in institutional governance; the outlines of the proposed agency promised a coordinating rather than a governing role. Moreover, Rhodes coupled a capital improvements bond issue to provide $175 million for higher education with the plan for reorganization. The IUC presidents could hardly afford to lobby publicly against the Rhodes plan.

In 1963, the voters of Ohio approved the massive bond issue, while in 1964 the first federal funds from the Higher Education Facilities Act became available to the state. Thus, by June 1965, over $186 million dollars were available for university plant projects. By this time, all faculty planning was being conducted by the newly-authorized statewide coordination agency, the Ohio Board of Regents. Facilities, it will be recalled, were at issue when Roger Cloud had proposed in 1961 that available capital funds be used to finance a research engineering center at Ohio State. Cloud, later that year, had gone to a convention at which coordination of higher education had been discussed; he returned to Columbus and, as Speaker of the House (Republican leader of the majority), had requested a study of such state action by the Ohio Legislative Service Commission. The report, issued in January
1963, suggested that the IUC was inadequate and ineffective and that "establishment of a formal statewide planning agency merits strong consideration as a means to improve coordination. In March, yet another research document was submitted to state officials, projecting that over $217 million would be needed for plant improvements at IUC institutions.

Cloud, then, had his earlier experience with the IUC membership, an experience that must have caused him to doubt the organization's ability to recommend plant policy for such large needs when the $30 million involved in the 1961-1963 biennium had caused such a split. The remedies imposed by other states, and that proposed by the OLSC, apparently convinced the influential Speaker, a confidant of Rhodes, that it was time for concerted state action. Millett and Driver have noted that soon after the 1962 election, Cloud and Rhodes played an intermediary role in the negotiations concerning the agency's establishment. The role of the Cleveland Commission is unclear, although the Commission's members were influential power brokers.

John Millett's role in the establishment of the Ohio Board of Regents is clearer. Millett, as noted, had played the role of informal leader while the record also indicates his role as initiator and maverick. He had lobbied for the 1958-1959 cost studies and it was Millett to whom Cloud mentioned the research center idea. When the plan fell through, Millett angrily noted for the IUC record, "I wish to emphasize again that I wish [my disappointment] to be made a matter of record of the Inter-University Council." Of the earlier cost studies, Millett had noted for the record,

The old methods of agreeing upon an individual request and then readjusting on a percentage basis when the final total is known will probably not work hereafter. Our figures will have to be on the basis of past cost, faculty and other salaries, per student cost, and improvement factors. The chips will have to fall where they may, 124
Noting several areas in need of remedy by 1962, Millett, who had been appointed to chair the Interim Commission, circulated in 1962 two documents -- one, a type-set pamphlet (Higher Education in Ohio, 1962) urging extensive state support for higher education and optimistically proclaiming, "the outlines of a master plan for higher education in Ohio have begun to emerge"; and another limited-circulation, mimeographed treatise (Higher Education and the State of Ohio, 1962) urging the formation of a state "advising and coordinating council" of the type found in several other states.

While he emphasized that the remarks were his own, Millett's stature was such that his recommendations would not go unheeded. In fact, the reports were released between the time the CCHE pamphlets (employing the term "brainpower") and the campaign papers of Rhodes, and the basic outline of Rhodes' plan had its spores in several sources, perhaps including the Millett papers. At any rate, Millett by 1962 enthusiastically supported the concept of a state board; when the legislation was introduced, he went public with his views. He had also made it clear to his IUC colleagues that, "Under no circumstances would I appear in opposition to the bill." He has recalled that members of the IUC attempted to talk him into blocking passage of the legislation. He declined to be their "sacrificial lamb." One wonders whether the members had read his earlier limited circulation 1962 report.

Systemic constraints removed, newly-elected state officials moved rapidly to draft legislation establishing the Ohio Board of Regents. Millett urged members of the Interim Commission, authorized until 1964, to submit their resignations to the incoming Governor on his inauguration day, January 14, 1963. They did so, leaving the state without a planning group for all of public higher education. House Bill 214, proposing the Board, was introduced on January 31, 1963. The House and Senate approved H.B. 214 on June 13; Governor Rhodes signed the bill into law on June 21, 1963. The Ohio
Board of Regents began its task of coordinating higher education on September 20, 1963. Ronald Thompson's 1953 report, with many intervening issues and actors, had reached formal agenda status. Informal state and voluntary coordination had been given force of law.
APPENDIX A

Twelve Crucial Variables (1957 unless otherwise noted) [OHIO]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Burden</th>
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<th>Capacity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(College Age Population [C-ap] as % of total population)</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>(per capita income per member of C-ap)</td>
<td>A</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(net state and local tax revenues per member C-ap)</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effort</td>
<td></td>
<td>(state and local taxes per $1000 personal income -- 1959)</td>
<td>E+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(total state tax revenue per capita)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(educational expenditures, state and local government, as % of personal income -- 1959)</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(higher education expenditures, state and local government, as % of personal income -- 1958)</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td></td>
<td>(total higher education enrollment as % of C-ap)</td>
<td>C+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(enrollment in public higher education as % of total higher education enrollment -- 1958)</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(adjusted $ expend., public higher education per enrollee in public higher education)</td>
<td>B+</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Supplementary</td>
<td></td>
<td>(% expenditures adjusted per student, public higher education, to per capita income -- 1957-1958)</td>
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<th>Rank of State</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 - 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 - 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 - 15</td>
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<td>16 - 20</td>
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<td>41 - 44</td>
<td>E</td>
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<tr>
<td>45 - 48</td>
<td>E</td>
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</table>

(Harris, 1972, pp. 846-50)
FOOTNOTES


5. Cobb and Elder, 84.


7. Moreover, in the March 12, 1940 IUC meeting, the members resolved that "the establishment of 'branch colleges' by the state university be discouraged." There had been considerable branch and extension education before the IUC was chartered in 1939, but these centers had, in most cases, disappeared by 1940. Driver, 6-30.

8. IUC minutes (*Fawcett Center for Tomorrow, Ohio State University, Columbus*), April 24, 1940, p. 3.


11. Ibid., 135.

12. In 1957, 58% of Ohio's legislators held college degrees, while 7% of the state's population were college graduates. H. Jacob and K. Vines, eds. *Politics in the American States* (Boston, 1971), 178.


14. For an analysis of IUC minutes and agenda items, see Driver 50-122.

15. Millett, 15.

16. Cobb and Elder, 84.


21. Ohio Board of Regents, Provisional Master Plan for Public Higher Education in Ohio (Columbus, 1965).

22. Ibid., 142.


25. Cobb and Elder, 85.

26. Ibid., 85.

27. Ibid., 96.

28. "Our attempts to sharply define issues worked for and against us. For years, we had pretty much control over
disbursements. We did so by claiming that education was impossible to evaluate and measure, but when we really needed the money [in the late 1950's], we were unable to muster convincing or compelling reasons why our funding should have been increased. It was tough to convince them that we needed more than prisons or highways, especially when education was the larger part of the budget each biennium" (Interview, June, 1977). All interviewees cited in this study were guaranteed anonymity.

30 Harris, 420.

31 Cobb and Elder, 98.

32 This employment of symbolic floodtides was used in private lobbying, insists one observer; "We did attempt to fashion the argument in terms of an inadequacy to meet future needs. We were, however, pressed to show past inadequacies and present needs. Besides, these [legislators] were of the mind that biennial increases should take care of incoming students" (Interview, June, 1977). Another participant, however, conceded that future projections were not widely used as evidence: "These boys [i.e., Ohio legislators] simply would not have believed us if we had said that enrollments would double in ten years. We had trouble believing the AACRO Thompson report" (Interview, May, 1977).

33 Cobb, Ross, Ross, 135.

34 M. M. Chambers, *Freedom and Repression in Higher Education* (Bloomington, 1965), 120.


36 Cobb, Ross, Ross, 135.

37 Ibid, 135.

38 Interview, June, 1977.

39 Cobb and Elder, 139-40.

40 The 1939 agreement noted that OSU would be allowed "exclusively among the five state universities to grant the Ph.D. degree." In Driver, 247. This agreement was reiterated in 1952 (Driver, 259-60). By 1955, only four Ohio schools (Case Institute, Hebrew Union, University of Cincinnati, and Western Reserve) in addition to OSU offered the doctorate. A. Cartter, ed., DC, 1964), 1264.

41 IUC Minutes, April 10, 1961.

42 Interview, May, 1977.

43 J. Furman, *Coordination of Higher Education* (Columbus, 1963), 22.

44 Tucker, 313.

An observer of this period recalled, "we never consciously or deliberately set out to use the press to our advantage... Occasionally, we'd have a 'poor-one' story, but there was no orchestrated effort at doing so. Perhaps we should have" (Interview, May, 1977). One such poor-one story appeared in the Cleveland Plain Dealer:

OXFORD, O.—A prolonged cold spell could force Miami University to send home some students because of inadequate heating facilities, Dr. John D. Millett, President of the state school said yesterday (October 25, 1961).

Interview, June, 1977. There was considerable editorial support for the issue, usually acknowledging the soon-to-increase enrollments. See, for example, the Columbus Dispatch, November 9, 1955 ("Bond Issue for Public Building").

Interview, May, 1977.

Russell suggested that state-level governance for community colleges, as an adjunct to the newly-reorganized State Board of Education, might be appropriate (Russell, 107-08).

Cobb, Ross, Ross, 135.


Cobb and Elder, 104-09.

Russell noted that the OCA membership enrolled all but 4,500 of Ohio's students. This represented 97% of the state's 1956 fall enrollments; his study, however, included the nonmember institutions as well (see p.368).

Millett, 23-4

This scheme may underestimate the extent to which IUC members convinced officials that their campuses were underfunded and inadequately maintained, the favorable "porkbarreling" effects any proposed bond issue would trigger to banking and construction interests, and other political considerations. Nonetheless, the issues were deliberately kept low in profile until public expansion was essential. Of the Cleveland Commission, Millar has noted, the CCHE "preferred to promote 'non-decision' making dominated by themselves rather than genuine popular 'consensus' decisions" (Miller, 268).
62 Cobb and Elder, 124-29.

63 Millett, 19-20.

64 Ibid., 17-21.

65 One participant noted, "We had little to gain and everything to lose by advocating DiSalle's programs. Although Ohio needed tax increases, and we needed the money, we stood to lose credibility and neutrality. This was particularly dangerous in two year [gubernatorial] term days" (Interview May, 1977).

66 Cobb and Elder, 127-29.

67 Driver (1970, p. 172) suggests that the Commission was the direct forbear of the OBR; see also Millett, 1974, p. 38.

68 Furman, 11; Ohio Board of Regents, 7, 60-2; Driver, 110-12; IUC, First Biennial Report (Columbus, 1962).

69 The medical education report was actually three papers: "Consultant's Report" (January 1962), "A Report of the Panel of Medical Educators" (April 1962), and "The Need for Additional Facilities for Medical Education in the state of Ohio" (December 1962). The report was a result of earlier legislation (S.B. 211, 103rd General Assembly, 1959) that authorized such a study; the assignment of this duty to the Interim Commission was made by Governor DiSalle in 1960 (OBR, 70-2).
An observer has recalled, "By the time the Ohio Board of Regents was established, they had a clear idea of those areas that needed attention, for these issues had percolated since Thompson, Russell, Baker, Axt, and the Interim Commission. Besides, Millett had initiated a number of topics in the IUC meetings" (Interview, May, 1977).

Interview, June, 1977.

Cobb and Elder, 151-9.

Ibid., 152-3

Millett, 37. His characterization of the awareness being "sudden" is at variance with the speed of development characterized throughout this article.

Cobb and Elder, 155.

Millar, 163.

Cobb and Elder, 156.

Cobb, Ross, Ross, 136

Millar, 172.

Cobb and Elder, 158-9.

"Under the new law [establishing a Division of Capital Planning in 1955] it would appear that the institutions of this state will be as much subject to control by state agencies in matters of capital construction as are those in [states with coordinating or governing agencies]." (Glenny, 170).

H.B. 941 (1959), establishing the Ohio Scholarship Trust Fund, had exhausted its funds, while H.B. 618 (1961), establishing the Ohio Higher Education Assistance Commission, was intended only as supplementary student financial assistance.

Cobb and Elder, 158.

Ibid., 136. A notable exception to this hypothesis seems to be the use by the Cleveland Commission of the influential reporters and publishers of the Plain Dealer and Press. Millar (267-70) has documented the many instances where the papers appear to have acted as "virtual house organs" for the CRCHE.

Cobb and Elder, 90.

Ibid., 90

Millett had also noted ways in which accepted IUC procedures were ignored for political favors, as in the instance of
branch campus control (Millett, 18-19). As noted, the branch campus issue in Cleveland was decidedly political (Millar, 210-12).

91 Interview, May, 1977. This same observer has noted that "the IUC presidents were afraid of [Millett] because of his national reputation and striking manner. [The presidents] were sometimes overwhelmed by him."

92 A Pepple - drafted "Report from the Senate Education Committee" accused the CCHD of blocking public higher education in Cleveland: "One problem in Cuyahoga County is that the Cleveland Commission has always fought any extension of tax-supported education in Cuyahoga County" (in Millar, 176; see also 171-178). See also "Confidential Report on Hearings before the Ohio Senate Committee on Health and Education on Senate Bill 358," (Cleveland, 1961).

93 Cobb and Elder, 85.

94 Ibid., 150.

95 Ibid., 147-8.

96 Quoted in Driver, 1970, p. 182. For a review of the bill and its legislative history, see Tucker, 313-14; Driver, 178-83; Millett, 44-6. Millett recalls a more angry response from Maloon, but no respondents in my interviews recalled Maloon's mood after the bill was buried.
Of course, other campus enrollments had risen in even more dramatic fashion from 1953-1961, but Ohio State’s increasing reliance upon federal funds and research grants was greater than that of the other state institutions. The increases for the other IUC institutions were Bowling Green (3193 to 6939), Central State (882 to 1884), Kent State (5129 to 10,510), Miami (5100 to 7508), and Ohio University (4458 to 9022).

“Ohio or Columbus,” Toledo Blade, June 14, 1961, quoted in Driver, 184. For additional information on this incident, see Millett, 24-26, Tucker, 313 (footnote 19).

“Blueprint for Brainpower,” (n.p., October 2, 1962). A study of symbolism in the 1962 gubernatorial campaign would certainly uncover many more instances of agenda building and symbolism. For example, the term “Brainpower,” a media-
term, had been earlier employed by the Cleveland Commission in a pamphlet entitled, "The Bold Decision for Ohio's Future," which attempted to link Ohio's gain with Cleveland's gain as seen by the CCHE. See CCHE, "The Bold Decision." (Cleveland, September, 1962).


109 Cobb, Ross, Ross, 136.

110 Cobb and Elder, 89.

111 Ibid., 93.

113 Interview, May 1977.

114 Pearson and Fuller, 964-66.

115 Cobb and Elder, 89.

116 Cited in Driver, 193.

117 IUC Minutes, January 10, 1963.

118 Millett, 49.


120 Furman, 44.


122 Driver, 197; Millett, 47-51.

123 Millar’s thesis appears to be that the idea of the Board appeared rather spontaneously in 1962, and was adopted by Rhodes for his campaign platform. It has been the thesis of this study that a multitude of educational issues, studies, people, and political considerations led to 1963. Part of the events leading to the establishment included, to be sure, the need for a resolution of what the Baker report termed “the Cleveland problem.” Rhodes most likely picked up ideas for his “Brainpower” paper and other position papers from many sources, including Republican powerbrokers in Cuyahoga
County, the largest set of voters in the state. If the CCHE perceived itself as the initiator of the Board idea, its chairman, Ralph Besse, must have been exceedingly surprised and angry when the first master plan issued by the Board recommended the establishment of a public baccalaureate institution in Cleveland (OBR, *Provisional Master Plan, 1965*), 3, 34.


125 The typeset pamphlet was in the files of the Ohio College Association; the mimeographed paper was in the State of Ohio Library.

126 See, for example, "Board of Regents Plan is Backed by University Heads," Columbus Dispatch, February 6, 1963. See also Millett, 49, 50.