Understanding the Role of Exogenous Factors in State Higher Education Governance and Coordination

IHELG Monograph

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Understanding the Role of Exogenous Factors in State Higher Education Governance and Coordination

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Introduction to the study

This manuscript provides an analysis of the role exogenous factors may play in the function of states’ higher education systems. Exogenous factors are defined here as those that operate within specific states but outside the state’s governance or coordination scheme. The analysis is done via a comprehensive review of recent empirical research on statewide coordination of higher education. The role these factors play or don’t play within this research is then discussed. In the process, several questions are examined:

- Within the body of recent empirical research on state higher education governance and coordination, what exogenous factors have been identified and evaluated?
- What does this body of research suggest about the role these factors play and how future research on their role in higher education governance should be conducted?

Higher education restructuring in vogue

The current poor state of the relationship between public colleges and universities and their state governments is well documented. A quick search of the recent archives of The Chronicle of Higher Education provides many examples. In New York State, members of the State University of New York’s Board of Trustees have argued publicly with the system’s chancellor, thereby raising questions about the structure and policies of that system as they relate to the role of the chief executive (de Russy, 2005). In Connecticut, the state police and governor’s office have investigated whether the
University of Connecticut mishandled the increased autonomy recently granted it by the legislature (Fischer, 2005b). In Texas, the legislature – after granting public universities increased authority to determine their own tuition rates – recently threatened public universities that raise tuition too quickly with a financial penalty equal to the amount of money raised by the new tuition rate (Fischer, 2005a). The 1997 report produced by the South Carolina Commission on Higher Education and authored by McGuinness and Novak documents that agency’s continuing struggle to identify policies and structures that will make its coordination more effective (South Carolina Commission on Higher Education, 1997). In a May 15, 1994 editorial that is illustrative of many other calls for restructuring, the Rocky Mountain News argues that “the time is at hand to consider some fundamental changes in the structure and governance of the university [of Colorado]” and “the single bold step that is needed most is to disassemble the four-campus system and establish autonomy and responsibility to each of the four unrelated institutions.”

At the heart of many of these disagreements and recurrent attempts at restructuring are basic questions (and assumptions) regarding the manner by which higher education is best coordinated or governed. Often these questions revolve around structural or policy dimensions. For example, should a single governing board have authority over all public colleges and universities in the state, or does this kind of approach lead to a one-size-fits-all solution that doesn’t allow for flexibility? Or, how much power should a coordinating board have and should that authority include program approval? Who should have responsibility for setting tuition rates and determining what programs are offered at each campus? Should a state’s higher education board be appointed by the governor, or elected by the citizens of the state? Is performance funding
an effective means of ensuring accountability across the public higher education system? Or, on the most practical level, how can we provide our public universities with the autonomy to “compete with the growing number of out-of-state universities offering degrees through...Internet coursework” while ensuring the necessary checks on “the ambitions of faculty members and campuses that otherwise might be driven to ‘keep up with the Joneses’” (Argetsinger, 1999, B8).

It is important to understand that these are not new questions. The question of how states can best govern their public higher education institutions has been debated by policymakers since the end of the 19th century when states began to organize what were then unstructured public higher education systems. Since then, the argument has often been decided with the establishment or restructuring of a state higher education board, beginning with the South Dakota Board of Regents, which was created by the state’s constitution in 1889 (Cummins, 1975).

The period between 1950 and 1980 featured a series of debates between scholars arguing for either a larger or a more diminished state role in higher education governance. The discussion during this period often focused on whether it was appropriate for states to assert greater control over their public universities in the form of statewide boards (see, e.g., Glenny, 1959, Moos and Rourke, 1959; Berdahl, 1971; Chambers, 1961; 1965). Much of the work on state higher education systems focused on the appropriate role of the state given the need for institutional autonomy in higher education or, as Moos and Rourke would put it in their work (which, incidentally, was supported by several of the leading organizations of public universities):
The central concern of this volume is, in fact, with the impact of state administrative controls upon the management of state colleges and universities. Do state controls tend to have a suffocating effect upon educational policy under certain conditions? (1959, p. v)

The question Moos and Rourke (1959) asked then may have not been answered to their satisfaction, but policymakers at the state level made it clear how they felt about the question of state governance. The decade immediately following the publication of Moos and Rourke’s text saw the number of states with statewide boards increase from twenty-six to forty-six (Berdahl, 1971; ECS, 1997). Not surprisingly, this growth in statewide boards coincided with growth in student and institution numbers, as depicted below in Figure 1.

*Figure 1. Enrollment and Institutional Growth, 1879 – 1970. Reported as percentage growth over ten-year periods. With total number of statewide boards.*
The current state of dissatisfaction with state higher education governance schemes reflects a fundamental level of disagreement not very different from that characterized by Moos and Rourke. The result of this disagreement is not surprising. In attempting to identify a solution to their perceived higher education flaws, states are involved in a continuous process of second-guessing and restructuring. Alongside the newspaper and trade articles noting the tension between the state and higher education, are other articles describing a perceived need to restructure the state's higher education system to allow for better coordination and/or governance. In Florida, for example, members of the legislature have recently proposed to augment the current statewide governance scheme – for the third time since 2002 – as a result of disagreement over which legislative or administrative body should have tuition-setting authority (Kaczor, 2008). Restructuring proposals to limit or expand the authority of existing boards have been introduced in Colorado, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Kansas and other states since 1995. Each state seems to be searching for a kind of “magic bullet” – the “best” structure for governing its higher education system. This quest, however, is complicated by the – often unaddressed – fact that every state is different, with unique demographics, economic needs, and higher education contexts. So, what works for Texas may or may not work for Massachusetts and vice versa. As a result, it’s impossible to assess whether one type of higher education coordination scheme is better than another.

An optimist might describe the current relationship between many states and their higher education systems as “confused,” “fluid,” or “uncertain,” given the tendency of states to review – annually, it seems – the status of their coordination or governance schemes. States like Kansas which, prior to restructuring its higher education system in
1999, conducted twenty-five studies of the system during the preceding twenty-five year period (Sopcich, 2005), might be more reasonably described as schizophrenic. While the tendency toward restructuring is obvious, the reasons for restructuring are less transparent. There is very little consistency to these restructuring proposals and their arguments. Depending on the state and the year, the arguments made by proponents of restructuring will vary. Interestingly, advocates of both greater or less centralized statewide governance lay equal claim to this mantle. Depending on the perspective, it is argued that coordinating boards, governing boards, or planning agencies are the best devices to ensure greater accountability of a state’s higher education institutions. Put another way, restructuring is in vogue, but there is very little consistency to the current fashion. Or, as Dennis Jones of the National Center for Higher Education Management puts it, “The knee-jerk reaction is to reorganize because it’s the one thing that can be done in the short term” (Selingo, 2003, p. A33).

**The reality of state higher education governance – one size does not fit all**

Most recently, states have embraced decentralizing governance proposals that include granting public universities greater autonomy in procedural autonomy (what Berdahl (2002) refers to as the “how” in higher education governance), linked to the marketization of higher education. Examples of this can be found in states like Virginia, Colorado, Kansas and Oregon, where public institutions have been encouraged to pursue alternative means of raising revenue to further their mission.

The reality is that state systems of higher education are truly unique in their behavior and performance not because of structural features or policy environments only, but because of exclusive attributes that are products of distinctive state realities. These
attributes may be a function of geography, funding, or the relative power of the governor, to name but a few possibilities, but they have important real consequences for the performance of a state’s higher education system. To better understand how features beyond structure and policy intervene in the relationship between state and higher education, consider Iowa and Oregon.

Both Iowa and Oregon are relatively rural states with a large portion of their economies tied to agricultural commodities. Both states would be accurately described as primarily rural. In 2006, Oregon had 3.7 million residents and roughly 36 persons per square mile while Iowa had 3 million residents and roughly 52 persons per square mile (United States Census Bureau, 2006). Each state has a long-standing consolidated governing board with broad regulatory authority. Iowa’s Board of Regents was created in 1909 while Oregon’s State Board of Higher Education dates to 1929. Both boards are gubernatorially-appointed, have substantial and comprehensive authority over their public four-year institutions, including the power to review and terminate degree programs, appoint campus presidents, regulate admission standards, set tuition levels, and determine personnel policies. Neither state board has coordination or governance authority for community or technical colleges (Oregon Revised Statutes, 2003; Iowa Board of Regents Policies, 2005).

Neither state uses, on a large-scale, market-based funding methods such as merit-based student scholarships or substantial aid to private higher education, preferring instead to fund their public higher education systems nearly exclusively through institutional appropriations. Both Iowa and Oregon provide small tuition grants to in-state students attending private colleges and universities within their states (Oregon Blue Book, 2003;
College Student Aid Commission, 2008). In form, these states’ systems and policies are nearly identical and would appear so in any quantitative model that considered structure, policies, state population and other typical predictive variables but, in fact, their performance may be dictated by exogenous factors. In function, important differences exist. These differences are almost certainly a product of how exogenous factors governance structures and policies are mitigated outside these governance systems that mitigate and intervene in the function of these higher education systems, but differences are often overlooked by scholars of state higher education systems.

**Geography.** While Iowa and Oregon have approximately the same number of residents, Oregon’s population is spread over an area that is approximately 80% larger than Iowa. Across the fifty U.S. states, these kinds of geographical differences often produce unique realities for states and their higher education systems. In Oregon, for example, more than half the state’s population is located in the metropolitan area surrounding Portland, the state’s largest city. And, while the state maintains four public universities in the Willamette Valley area near Portland (University of Oregon, Portland State, Oregon State University, Oregon Health and Science University), the residents of southern, eastern and central Oregon have postsecondary educational needs as well. As a result, Oregon supports eight public four-year institutions (and more satellite campuses) throughout the state. Four of these campuses enroll 5000 students or fewer, even though one of them has an enrollment area as large as the State of Pennsylvania. These eight universities and their satellite campuses enrolled 67,703 FTE undergraduates and graduates in fall 2007 (Oregon University System, 2007). Iowa’s four-year postsecondary system, on the other hand, consists of three universities, two of which are located near the state’s two largest cities.
The smallest of the three, the University of Northern Iowa, enrolls 13,000 students, nearly the same number enrolled at the three smallest Oregon universities. Together, the Iowa universities enrolled 63,287 FTE undergraduate and graduate students in fall 2007 (Iowa Board of Regents, 2007).

**Funding effort.** Funding for higher education can differ substantially by state. Grapevine <http://www.coe.ilstu.edu/grapevine/> data maintained by the Center for the Study of Education Policy at Illinois State University ranks the fifty states by several measures, including state tax appropriations for higher education per $1000 personal income. This measure is typically used to describe a state’s effort at funding its higher education system. Using this measure for FY08, New Mexico is the highest ranked state, spending $15.65 per $1000 of personal income toward higher education appropriations while its alphabetical neighbor, New Hampshire, is ranked dead last at $2.45 per $1000 of personal income. In comparison, Oregon appropriates $5.55 per $1000 of personal income (ranking #40) while Iowa appropriates $8.42 per $1000 (ranking #15). Oregon’s effort in funding higher education is substantially less than Iowa’s. These substantial differences in the level of funding are likely to interact with governance policies and structures to produce different behaviors and performances by higher education systems.

**Private higher education.** The existence of a substantial, varied, and popular private higher education community can significantly alter the relationship between a state and its public colleges and universities. States dominated by private higher education institutions tend to exert less spending effort on higher education and charge higher tuition as a result (Grapevine, 2008). Just as importantly, states with robust private higher education systems can and do use these colleges and universities to
complement their public system. In those states where private colleges and universities are plentiful, they can be funded directly or can be used to produce graduates in specific degree programs, where the state needs skilled laborers. This is done in states such as Florida, Michigan and Maryland, where the state has the luxury of a relatively large number of private colleges and universities and public institutions that cannot (or do not) provide enough graduates in specific programmatic areas (Richardson et al, 1999).

Unfortunately, the policy hands of states without considerable private higher education resources are tied: while these states can still leverage market-based or consumer choice models that fund students directly, their ability to use private colleges and universities as a tool of the market is extremely limited. Here, too, we can see differences in the Oregon and Iowa examples. While both states have nationally known private institutions in Grinnell and Drake (Iowa), as well as Reed and the University of Portland (Oregon), Iowa has 10 more (35 vs. 25) private not-for-profit colleges and universities than does Oregon, even though Iowa is much smaller geographically and has nearly 25% fewer residents. Iowa’s private colleges and universities enroll nearly 57,000 students while Oregon’s private postsecondary institutions enroll only 31,000 students (Chronicle of Higher Education, 2005). As a result, though Oregon and Iowa both award financial aid to residents who attend private, not-for-profit in-state colleges and universities, Iowa’s program provides the state and its students with greater flexibility.

This brief comparison between only two states illustrates several realities about the role of exogenous factors in state higher education performance. Geography plays a major role in how these state higher education systems can and do perform. Because of
Oregon’s vast size, the state has chosen to spend its finite higher education monies over eight public four-year universities that serve approximately the same number of students Iowa serves with its three four-year universities. Likewise, the effort the state exerts in funding higher education is not a function of its governance structure or policies, but has real consequences, particularly when interacting with the state’s needs to fund eight universities. Southern Oregon University’s recent decision to “go off the grid” and attempt to attain fully private status reflects its constituents’ dissatisfaction with the performance of the state’s higher education system that may be more directly linked to funding than to structure or policy (Darling, 2008). The reality of a highly competitive private higher education system in Iowa certainly mitigates any linkage between the state’s governance structure and important outcomes. Oregon’s centralized governance structure may, in fact, be incompatible with the state’s realities: relatively few students spread over a large distance, a weak funding effort toward higher education, and a small private higher education market. Without Iowa’s private higher education institutions enrolling a sizeable share of the state’s residents, its consolidated governance model might be more or less effective. Any study of these state’s higher education performance that ignored these exogenous factors would fail to understand the larger picture in the performance of these state’s systems.

**Literature on state governance that ignores exogenous factors**

While the importance of factors beyond a state’s governance or coordination structures and policies may seem obvious, the literature on state higher education systems is littered with studies that purport to examine system performance, but include only those factors linked directly to structure and/or policy. These include studies conducted
with both qualitative and quantitative methods. Kezar (2006), for example, interviewed a large number of higher education experts, including those within and outside state higher education boards. Her study suggests that external relations and communications with key external stakeholders are key to the effectiveness of state boards. These findings beg several questions regarding the role of exogenous factors. For example, is the importance of external relations equally true for states with very different populations or funding mechanisms?

The work of the California Higher Education Policy Center in the late 1990s provides an example of how case studies can identify exogenous factors but fail to acknowledge their importance when describing the effects of governance structures and policies (California Higher Education Policy Center, 1997). The Center’s work in the 1990s resulted in a book (Richardson et al, 1999) that provided case studies of six large states (California, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, New York and Texas). Just as in the case studies conducted by the Center, this research provided substantial details on the workings of the state’s economy and unique attributes related to geography or, for example, particularly weak gubernatorial leadership. In their comparative case study on the governance in these six states, for example, Michigan was described as follows:

After years of fiscal crisis due to downsizing in the auto industry, Michigan is now experiencing relatively stable economic growth but growing budgetary pressures from corrections and Medicaid. The state faces only moderate growth in higher education enrollments. The most unsettling contextual change was the imposition of term limits, which some believe with create a more activist Legislature with greater interest in obtaining information about how
appropriations are being spent….Stable resources and declining numbers of high school graduates appear to insulate Michigan higher education from the need for significant change. (p. 30).

The Center’s work (1997; Richardson et al, 1999) provides incredibly useful details relevant to understanding how similar governance structures and policies operate very differently in states, depending on exogenous factors related to the economy, role of the governor, size of the private sector, budgetary considerations, geographic realities and historical funding patterns. Yet, these studies seem to go out of their way to ignore these factors. In their conclusions about Michigan following their case study of that state, the Center’s summary made almost no mention of factors exogenous to Michigan’s governance structure and policies.

When studies have included variables that control for factors such as state and local levels of support, they have ignored other important state variables. For example, Lowry’s (2001) study on the relationship between state governance systems and tuition pricing included a statistical model with covariates that controlled for state spending and institutional type, but the model includes no measure of the role played by the private higher education market. But, how a state system sets tuition prices is probably strongly influenced by how many of the state’s residents enroll in private colleges and universities and whether these residents receive financial assistance from the state. States such as Vermont, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, for example, have adopted a high-tuition, high-aid model, even though they have organized and governed their higher education systems quite differently. Their tuition philosophy is a cultural artifact related to the reality that a large proportion of their state’s citizens have historically attended private
colleges and universities.

Several studies highlight the weaknesses of state governance research that ignore that role of factors outside the structure – policy continuum. Payne & Roberts’s (2003) work to assess the relationship between the level of centralization at the state level and the quantity and quality of research outputs at public universities attempts to make direct linkages where only indirect linkages exist. Their findings suggest that governance has a predictive effect on the measurable outputs of system institutions, even though the model does not include variables that take into account factors that would mediate between governance effects and quality of outputs. The authors suggest, in their concluding remarks that student performance might also be related to level of centralization, though they propose no conceptual framework that would link these two seemingly unrelated variables. Similarly, the work of Huisman and Morphew (1998) ignores the “why” of centralization in state higher education governance even as the “so what” is being investigated. They posit a empirically-identifiable link between governance type and duplicative levels in academic programs at the state level. Huisman and Morphew’s research, at least, benefits from the historical fact that nearly all highly centralized boards have identified program duplication as a key governance problem, which suggests why board type might be related to this outcome.

**Literature on state governance that includes exogenous factors**

Historically, most of the research on state higher education governance has ignored exogenous factors and focused on only those factors directly linked to specific structures or policies. More recently, however, several studies have included an examination or dealt primarily with the role of exogenous factors.
Toma (1990), in the study of the relationship between board structures and university output, argues that the structure of the boards of trustees of state universities influences the provision of higher education. Her work examines whether state universities under decentralized boards produce outputs – in this case, tuition revenues; tenured faculty; and student-teacher ratios – relatively similar to those of privates universities. Using data from the 1980s, the quantitative model includes several exogenous factors among the covariates, including the education and age of the state’s population and the ratio of private to public universities. Toma’s research supports the hypothesis that institutional governing boards are correlated with private university-like performance in terms of the outputs measured.

Knott and Payne (2004) used quantitative data to research the linkages between governance structures and resource allocation at the institutional level. Their model included several political and funding models, but ignored other exogenous factors that might influence funding levels, such as the number of public colleges and universities in the state (which might be a function of a segregated history or a relatively large state in area). Their study found little predictive power in governance structure, after institutional and state characteristics were controlled for, strongly suggesting that these characteristics are at least as important in predicting outcomes as are governance structures. They summarize their findings by stating “The strengths and weaknesses of different higher education governance structures are mediated by historical and geographical factors” (p. 27), yet their model includes only a gross “regional” variable that does not isolate which factors might play a role in this covariates predictive power.

A series of recent studies by Michael McLendon and his colleagues have dealt
with higher education policy antecedents, including an analysis of whether economic, political and geographic variables predicted the adoption of innovative higher education policies (McLendon, Heller & Young, 2005); a similar study incorporated the role of political parties in the policy innovation process (McLendon, Hearn & Deaton, 2006); and the most recent study focused on the role of a single political science theory in predicting governance reform in higher education (McLendon, Deaton & Hearn, 2007). These studies are less about the outcomes associated with different higher education governance structures and policies, but they illustrate the possibilities associated with empirical models that incorporate political theory variables that are tied to exogenous realities.

Beyond these quantitative studies, qualitative researchers have attempted to identify the origins of policy changes in state higher education governance. A recent study by Mills (2007), for example, focused on the reorganization of higher education governance in Florida. Mills’ findings complement those of Sopcich (2005) in that both studies argue that the reorganization of states’ higher education systems can be explained only by multiple public policy and organizational theories that incorporate both resource-related realities and serendipity. Particularly relevant to these studies’ findings were the role of previous reorganization attempts and the political culture in states considering reorganization.

Several studies have shone their spotlight on specific exogenous factors, in an attempt to identify how these features are related to outcomes other researchers have linked to governance and policy variables. Berdahl’s (2004) recent work on the effect of “strong governors” on the enactment of state higher education policies is one example.
His findings suggest that the role of strong executives cannot be ignored in the study of state higher education governance, particularly given the growing strength of governors in many states and the typically strong role governors play in the appointment process (e.g., gubernatorial appointments, higher education as a cabinet-level agency).

Fred Volkwein's work (1986; 1997) on the relationship between governance structures and policy-relevant outcomes may come the closest to a model of how to incorporate exogenous factors into models. His 1997 (with Malik) study on the relationship between administrative flexibility at the institutional level and governance structures at the state level incorporated measures of income, mobility, and population density. His research found modest predictive effects for such state characteristics. Volkwein's earlier work (1986) examined the relationship between campus autonomy and quality measures. His analysis included paying attention to the role played by state financial variables and found considerable evidence that state funding patterns more important than state governance features in explaining quality outcomes.

Finally, Fisher's (1988) work on the apparent – but unproven – role of the activist legislature supported Berdahl's (2004) findings that governors are playing an increasingly important role in state higher education governance, but suggests that legislatures have been no more active in the past several decades than historically and that their interventions are best described as random.

**Suggestions for future research on higher education governance**

If a primary goal of research on state higher education governance is to inform policymakers as they tussle to discern the relative effectiveness of their state's system, research on state higher education governance must produce findings relevant to this
struggle. Much of the research on state higher education governance leaves out many of the factors that policymakers cite as they debate the merits of their governance structures and policies. Calls for reform or restructuring state higher education systems commonly refer to unique state factors as the impetus for new governance structures and policies. As such, it is important that these factors be included in an analysis of the effectiveness of state systems.

An analysis of the research cited here suggests several fruitful avenues for future research.

- **Unpack regional variables.** Several of the studies discussed above have incorporated regional variables in models designed to predict outcomes linked to governance structures and policies. Study authors have hypothesized why these variables play a statistically significant role, but the roles played by specific regional factors (e.g., role of privates, geographic size of state, etc.) are largely unknown. Research that provides a more precise use of these factors would be useful for discerning how these factors act in concert or competition with each other. Research like Knott and Payne's (2004) may mask or overemphasize the function of hypothesized but untested factors in their aggregated "regional" variables. Toma’s (1990) measure of the ratio of private to public institutions may be marginally better, but doesn’t control for who attends these institutions or their relative enrollment size.

- **Use mixed-methods to identify and explore the role of exogenous factors.** Studies on state higher education governance tend to be quantitative or qualitative; few use both types of methods. Yet, to understand how factors outside the governance structure are mediating its performance, it may be useful to employ both types of methods.
This is likely because quantitative models tend to lump together disparate types of factors under a single variable umbrella. For example, quantitative methods that explore, on a state or national level, the role of private colleges in models that assess the performance of different types of state higher education may indicate that the existence of these kinds of postsecondary institutions may have an influence on system behavior. But, given the variance among private colleges and universities, it will likely require qualitative analysis, at the state or regional level, to discern whether the effects of elite privates is similar to or different from the effects of less elite privates.

- *Evaluate de jure versus de facto authority.* Robert Berdahl (1971) proposed several decades ago that evaluating state higher education governance structures is a tricky thing, made more so by the reality that the de jure authority granted to governing and coordinating agencies doesn’t always result in de facto authority. That is, some state higher education agencies are considerably stronger or weaker than a reading of the state’s higher education statutes (or constitution) would suggest. Observers of state higher education governance are well aware of this. De jure authority, for example, can be undermined by an activist state legislature or a tradition of weak gubernatorial appointments. Much of the research cited above uses simplistic markers (e.g., coordinating board, governing board) as proxy for the types of higher education governance structures employed by states. More complex models describing higher education governance structures exist (Berdahl, 1971; McGuinness, 1997) and can be used or modified to ensure that de facto realities are being modeled. Qualitative
research that underscores the real workings of state higher education agencies may be useful as an exploratory tool in this regard.

- Conduct research consistent with states that face dramatic changes in enrollment.

The most recent projections on high school graduates produced by the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education (WICHE) forecast dramatic changes in postsecondary enrollment for a large number of states. Some of these states are forecasted to experience enrollment growth beyond 20% between 2008 and 2022. Other states should expect stagnant or considerable enrollment declines, some beyond 10% (WICHE, 2008). These varied projects worry many state policymakers and beg questions about the ability of the state’s higher education system to absorb this kind of change. Research that examines questions central to these changing conditions would be particularly useful. Such research might focus on governance models that promote flexibility in responding to enrollment growth or decline, or the relationship between limited funding and governance structures and policies.

Research on state higher education governance is messy business, made more sloppy by unique states and their demographic, political, economic, historical, cultural, and geographic realities. Yet, these factors are exactly what makes this research both useful and interesting. Higher education researchers that presume to make their work relevant for policymakers engaged in the trenches of (seemingly endless restructuring) can’t afford to underestimate the importance of exogenous factors in the relationship between governance structures and policies, and important higher education outcomes.