The Policy and Regulation of 529 Plan Fee Disclosure

IHELG Monograph

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The Policy and Regulation of 529 Plan Fee Disclosure

Mercer E. Bullard¹

Abstract

It is widely recognized that fees must be transparent and accessible for retail markets to work efficiently, yet fee disclosure for 529 plans is obscure and difficult to understand. Congress has a general interest in promoting competition in the securities markets and a special interest in ensuring that 529 plan fees are reasonable in order to accomplish its policy goal of promoting greater investment in education. In contrast, the states that sponsor 529 plans have an inherent conflict of interest, in that they have incentives to benefit elected officials, state institutions and non-participant state residents to the detriment of plan participants, and to benefit in-state plan participants to the detriment of out-of-state plan participants. Congress should authorize the Securities and Exchange Commission to adopt rules governing the disclosure of 529 plan fees. These rules should be prominently disclosed in a standardized format for ease of comparison and include separate disclosure of fees received by plan beneficiaries’ brokers and advisers to highlight potential conflicts of interest.

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I. Introduction

Americans have increasingly turned to 529 plans to save for their children’s higher education. During 2002 and 2003, assets in 529 plans increased from $2.5 billion to $46 billion, a 1,840% increase.\(^2\) Assets in 529 plans are expected to reach $85 billion by 2006.\(^3\) These plans have enjoyed enormous appeal in part because they offer a unique combination of federal and state tax benefits, high contribution limits, matching state contributions, donor control, automatic rebalancing and, in many cases, low costs.

These plans have also been subject to criticism, however, on the ground that the high fees charged by many 529 plans have reduced the potential tax benefits of the plans.\(^4\) Although no comprehensive study has been conducted to determine whether 529 plan fees are higher than for similar investments, a cursory review suggests that fees charged by 529 plans generally reflect fees charged by tax-deferred investments in mutual funds, with the possible exception that low-cost 529 plans may be more expensive than the lowest-cost tax-deferred accounts.\(^5\) At the high end, 529 plan fees, albeit


\(^3\) The Potential for Inclusion, id. at 4.

\(^4\) See, e.g., Austan Goolsbee, The “529” Ripoff, Slate.com (Aug. 23, 2002) (“The long-run potential of [529] plans has been seriously compromised by excessive ‘management’ fees that states have added to these plans.”) available at http://www.slate.com/id/2070062 (site last visited May 29, 2004); Penelope Wang, The Trouble With 529 Plans, Money Magazine (Oct. 7, 2003) (“as revenue-hungry states compete for 529 assets -- more than $20 billion is stashed in these plans -- they’re layering on marketing gimmicks, restrictive tax rules, and higher fees. As a result, many 529 plans are beginning to resemble high-priced insurance products rather than 401(k)s.”) (quoted in Potential for Inclusion, supra note 2, at 10).

\(^5\) A $10,000 Vanguard IRA invested in a Vanguard index fund can cost as little as 0.18% annually. This is significantly lower than the fees charged by the Nebraska and Utah 529 plans, for example, which are two plans often cited as having low fees. The fees charged by low-cost 529 plans do not appear to be higher than low-cost variable annuities, however. For example, a Vanguard variable annuity can cost about 0.60% annually.
arguably excessive, do not appear to be outside of the range charged by some mutual fund providers.  

Determining whether a particular fee is too high or too low, based solely on the amount of the fee, is a difficult and uncertain exercise. The best arbiter of the fairness of fees is generally the marketplace, and in the absence of evidence that the market for 529 plans is inefficient or unworkable, Congress and regulators should exercise restraint before imposing additional regulatory burdens that are designed to reduce 529 plan fees. In the case of 529 plans, however, the indirect evidence of market failure is substantial.

One of the most important indicia of efficient markets is standardized, transparent disclosure of fees. It is generally accepted that standardized, transparent fee disclosure promotes competition and reduces prices. The disclosure of 529 plan fees, however, is generally incoherent and obscure, and 529 plans would likely be forced to pay lower fees if adequate fee disclosure were provided. The disclosure of 529 plan fees is specifically

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6 One article cites, as an extreme example, a 529 plan in which fees consumed more than 10% of plan balances each year for two years. See Brooke A. Masters, College Savings Get Closer Study; With Little Oversight, State-Sponsored 529 Plans Vary in Expenses, Benefits, Washington Post (Apr. 14, 2004). But there are mutual funds whose expense ratios alone exceed 10% annually. According to Morningstar, Inc., for example, the Frontier Equity Fund charges annual fees of 42.36% plus a 4.50% front-end load, the Ameritor Investment Fund charges annual fees of 21.57%, APEX Mid Cap Growth Fund charges annual fees of 9.19% plus a 5.75% front-end load; the Alger Socially Responsible Fund and American Heritage Growth Fund both charge annual fees of 10.00%.


8 As an example of the potential competitive benefits of full disclosure, some firms may have decided to reduce their fees in response to reports that Morningstar, Inc. had publicly cited those plans as a being among the worst offered partly because of the fees that they charge. See Karen Damato, NASD Investigates College-Savings Fund Sales, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 19, 2004) (discussing Morningstar, Inc. ratings and apparently contemporaneous fee reductions in certain 529 plans).
discussed in Part II of this paper. In addition, as discussed in Part III, the argument for improved fee disclosure in the context of 529 plans is especially compelling because a number of special factors applicable to 529 plans may further inhibit competition and result in higher fees. It therefore is imperative that Congress takes steps to ensure that 529 plans are required to provide standardized, transparent, prominent fee disclosure.

Fee disclosure for 529 plans, at a minimum, should be:

- Standardized, both in the way in which the fees are calculated and the terms used to describe the fees;
- Prominently disclosed relative to other information about the plan;
- Presented both as a percentage of assets and a dollar amount, and on an illustrative and individualized basis;
- Inclusive of a total expense ratio for each investment option that includes all fees incurred in connection with an investment in the plan, to include, among other things, portfolio transaction costs, distribution costs, operating costs and administrative fees, whether charged by the state, plan manager, investment manager, or other person;
- Inclusive of a pie chart that illustrates the components of the total expense ratio according to standardized categories of fees, such as investment management, administrative services, and marketing and distribution;
- Inclusive of information on fees charged by other 529 plans both in a disclosure document and in an easily accessible format on the Internet; and
- Inclusive of separate disclosure of all payments received by intermediaries for executing the transactions in plan interests, both as a dollar amount and percentage of assets, whether or not the payment is made directly by the participant.

In addition, Congress should ensure that fee disclosure requirements for 529 plans are promulgated and enforced by an independent, objective government entity, as discussed in Part V.B of this paper. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission" of "SEC") has greater experience and expertise in this area than any other government entity, and it would bring greater independence and objectivity to the creation and enforcement of 529 plan fee disclosure requirements. The states, as the
issuers of interests in 529 plans, lack the independence and objectivity to regulate their own plans and to enforce any rules they might devise. Congress should specifically authorize the Commission to establish comprehensive rules governing the 529 plan fee disclosure, and consider expanding this responsibility to all aspects of 529 plans operations.

Before implementing these policies, Congress should pause and first develop the analytical framework within which 529 plans should be regulated. This necessitates identifying exactly what the role of the government should be in regulating these plans. Does the fact that 529 plans are created and sold by states militate for greater or lesser regulatory oversight than in other contexts? Once the nature of the governmental interest has been established, Congress should direct the Commission to collect and analyze information on 529 plans. Finally, the development of policies for 529 plans should consider how unique structural issues relate to regulatory goals. These issues are discussed in Part IV of this paper. Part V sets forth specific recommendations regarding 529 plan fees.

II. Fee Disclosure in 529 Plans

The impact of the cost of investing has long been recognized. As stated by the Commission, “fund fees can have a dramatic effect on an investor’s return. A 1% annual fee, for example, will reduce an ending account balance by 18% on an investment held for 20 years.” Nonetheless, investors do not necessarily consider fees to be a significant

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factor when choosing mutual funds. Consequently, "the degree to which investors understand mutual fund fees and expenses remains a significant source of concern" to regulators.

The Commission has expressed similar concern regarding the impact and investors' understanding of 529 plan fees. The Commission has estimated, for example, that $10,000 invested in each of the Utah and Rhode Island 529 plans over an 18-year period, assuming the same investment performance for each plan, could leave the Utah investor with a balance that was 20.7% larger than the Rhode Island investor's balance.

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10 See Shareholder Reports, id. (citing a joint report of the Commission and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency that "found that fewer than one in five fund investors could give any estimate of expenses for their largest mutual fund and fewer than one in six fund investors understood that higher expenses can lead to lower returns"); Testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, before the Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous Materials, Committee on Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (Sep. 29, 1998) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/1998/tsty1398.htm (site last visited on May 29, 2004) ("Our own research shows that fewer than one in five fund investors could give any estimate of expenses for their largest mutual fund and fewer than one in six fund investors understood that higher expenses can lead to lower returns. Another recent study found that 40% of fund investors surveyed incorrectly thought that a fund's annual operating expenses have no effect on the gains they earn." (footnotes omitted) (citing, respectively, Report of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency/Securities and Exchange Commission Survey of Mutual Fund Investors (1996), and Ruth Simon, We Put Investors to the Test -- and, Boy, Did They Ever Flunk, Money Magazine (Mar. 1, 1998)); Shareholder Assessment of Risk Disclosure Methods, Investment Company Institute at 11 (Spring 1996) (survey of 657 shareholders who had purchased a fund in the preceding 5 years found that only 43% cited fees and expenses, and only 27% cited the sales charge or load, as factors they considered before investing) available at http://www.ici.org/shareholders/dec/rpt_riskdiscsl.pdf (site last visited May 29, 2004); compare Understanding Shareholders' Use of Information and Advisers, Investment Company Institute at 21 (Spring 1997) (survey of 1,000 recent mutual fund investors found that 76% considered annual fees, and 73% considered sales charges, before investing) available at http://www.ici.org/stats/res/rpt_undstnd_share.pdf (site last visited May 29, 2004).

11 See Levitt Testimony, id. ("The Commission is very concerned, though, that many fund investors are not paying attention to the available information about fees."); Disclosure of Mutual Fund Expense Ratios In Performance Advertising, NASD (Jan. 23, 2004) ("Congress, regulators, and investors increasingly have expressed concerns over the need for improved disclosure of fund expenses. . . . The focus on fund fees is important because fees can have a dramatic impact on an investor's return.") (proposing to require inclusion of fund expense ratios in fund performance advertisements) available at http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/0377ntm.pdf (site last visited May 29, 2004); Testimony of Paul F. Roye, Director, Division of Investment Management, Securities and Exchange Commission, before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives at 2 – 4 (June 18, 2003) ("the degree to which investors understand mutual fund fees and expenses remains a significant source of concern").

12 See Memorandum from Annette L. Nazareth, Director, Division of Market Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission, to William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission at A-3
Chairman Donaldson recently expressed his “concern regarding the ability of parents to understand the operation of [529] plans and the economic implications that high fees may have on families as they save for their children’s higher education.”  

Chairman Donaldson has good reason to be particularly concerned about the ability of investors to make informed decisions about 529 plans. Unlike mutual funds, which provide a useful comparison to 529 plans because their structure and fees closely resemble those of 529 plans, such plans generally are not subject to the federal securities laws. Interests in 529 plans are municipal securities that are exempt from registration under the federal securities laws, and the states that issue these securities are exempt for registration under the federal securities laws as brokers and investment advisers. States are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, and it is possible that a failure to disclose fees could be actionable as a violation of those provisions, but this risk is unlikely to provide a sufficient incentive for states to adequately reform the disclosure of 529 plan fees.

One result of the exemption enjoyed by 529 plans is that they are not subject to fee disclosure requirements that apply to similar investment products. In some cases, 529 plan fees are relatively clear, but in many cases 529 plan fees are difficult to find and understand. After a preliminary review, the Commission concluded that:

“the wide variations in disclosure among the various state 529 tuition savings plans we reviewed, as well as the absence of significance securities law protections, makes it difficult for investors to fully understand the options that are available to them with respect to these tax-advantaged college savings plans.”


14 Nazareth Memorandum at A-2, supra note 12; see also Donaldson Letter, supra note 13, (“the current state of affairs with respect to 529 plans is complicated and likely difficult for parents to understand.”).
If anything, the Commission’s preliminary conclusion understates the inadequacy of fee disclosure for many 529 plans. Fee disclosure for 529 plans is often obtuse and buried in long disclosure documents. The information typically presents a multiplicity of fees that do not follow standardized terminology and frustrate comparison across different plans. These fees include, among others, program fees, annual fees, enrollment fees, administration fees, investment fees, transfer fees, service fees, and sales charges; they may be charged at the opening of the account, on a periodic basis, or upon the closing of the account; and they may be presented as a percentage of assets, a one-time, flat payment, or a series of payments that depend on a variety of account characteristics, such as the residency of the participant and the value of the account. The complexity and nonstandardized nature of 529 plan fees make it unlikely that an investor who is not already financially sophisticated about fees will be able to make an informed investment decision regarding 529 plans.

15 For example, the Program Description for Maine’s NextGen College Investing Plan is 88 pages, fees are not discussed until page 43, and the discussion of fees is extremely difficult to understand. The Program Description is available at: https://www.enroll529.com/pdf/NEXTGEN_100792RR.pdf (site last visited May 27, 2004). Similarly, the Plan Description for Texas’s Tomorrow’s College Investment Plan is 31 pages and fees are not discussed until page 18 (although the discussion of fees is relatively clear). The Plan Description is available at http://www.enterprise529.com/downloads/529PLANDES_CA5_04.pdf (site last visited May 30, 2004). The Plan Disclosure Document for Alaska’s Manulife College Savings Plan is 61 pages, fees are not discussed until page 45, and the discussion of fees is difficult to understand. The Plan Disclosure Document is available at http://www.manulifecollegesavings.com/files/common/pdf/DisclosureDoc.pdf (site last visited May 30, 2004). These examples, as with other examples in this paper that are derived from actual 529 plans, are not based on a comprehensive review of all 529 plans.

It should also be noted that some 529 plans provide accessible, clear (albeit nonstandardized) fee disclosure. For example, the main page of the web site for the Delaware College Investment Plan provides a table of “Fast Facts,” including the following statement regarding the Plan’s expenses:

“Annual maintenance fee of $30 is waived for accounts with automatic bank transfer, direct deposit, or balance over $25,000. Expenses of underlying investments are approximately 0.65% to 0.81% (portfolio weighted average). Annual asset-based program management fee is approximately 0.3%.”

Disclosure rules that apply to mutual funds provide a good illustration of how 529 plan fee disclosure could be improved. Mutual funds must include, near the front of the prospectus, standardized information about expenses in an easy-to-read fee table, as well as the estimated dollar amount of expenses on a $10,000 account over 1-, 3-, 5- and 10-year periods. This disclosure enables investors to easily compare mutual fund fees and thereby promotes competition and reduces costs.\textsuperscript{16} Although mutual funds that are used as investment vehicles in 529 plans are subject to these disclosure requirements, and plan participants therefore can access that information, the states are not required to provide mutual fund disclosure documents to plan participants.

Even mutual fund disclosure is inadequate in several respects, however, as has been recognized by the Commission in recent rulemaking initiatives\textsuperscript{17} and widely discussed in Congress over the last year, beginning with hearings before the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises in March 2003.\textsuperscript{18} For example, the mutual fund expense ratio does not include portfolio transaction costs, which can be a fund’s (and a 529 plan’s) single largest expense.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} See Haaga Testimony, supra note 7.


\textsuperscript{19} See Opening Statement of Congressman Paul E. Gillmor, before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 12, 2003) (fund portfolio transaction costs “can be very significant and even exceed the amount of the fund’s expense ratio; yet, these costs are not clearly presented to consumers”) available at
Furthermore, funds are not required to inform shareholders about the dollar amount of their individual fees or provide them with comparative information about fees charged by other funds.  

III. The Special Importance of Fee Disclosure in the 529 Plan Context

The lack of transparent, prominent, standardized disclosure of 529 plan fees is exacerbated by factors in the 529 plan context that make fee disclosure even more important. In effect, certain governmental entities have been granted an exclusive monopoly to sell a particular tax-deferred investment product in competition with private providers of other tax-deferred investment products. This intrusion of the government into the private sector may distort many functions of the financial services markets, including the setting of fees.

For example, investors may lower their guard when evaluating 529 plans on the assumption that a public-minded governmental entity would sell only a high-quality, low-cost investment product. In fact, states’ interests may not be aligned with plan participants’ interests with respect to negotiating fees and choosing investment options, and investors’ trust in states’ motivations and interests may be misplaced.

States may have incentives to offer plans that charge high fees. States may charge high fees as a means of increasing their general revenues, or charge higher fees to out-


20 Id. at 15 – 16.

21 Id. at 16.

22 See Closer Study, supra note 6 ("Regulators and industry experts warn that investors should not assume that the government-sponsored nature of these plans means they have consumer interests at heart").

23 See Restrictions Lessen Benefits of State College Savings Plans, USA Today (Dec. 1, 2003) (states may seek to add new accounts "because they can keep a portion of the investment fees"); Avrum D. Lank, Tax
of-state residents as a way to subsidize services provided to in-state participants.\(^{24}\)
Political considerations also may influence the selection of money managers and cause states to be less diligent when negotiating fees. For example, states may favor in-state money managers\(^{25}\) or managers that have contributed to the election campaigns of state officials.\(^{26}\) State officials may even use 529 plan assets for self-promotion.\(^{27}\)

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\(^{24}\) See Closer Study, supra note 6 ("state officials acknowledge that they want to attract out-of-state participants and may even charge them more to cut costs for their own residents"); see, e.g., Texas Plan Description, supra note 15 (waiving annual account fee for accounts with Texas owners or beneficiaries); Rhode Island Plan Description, supra note 34 at 11 (same for Rhode Island owners).

\(^{25}\) For example, the Maryland College Investment Plan is managed by Baltimore-based T. Rowe Price, and Wisconsin’s EdVest College Savings Program is managed by Menomonee Falls-based Strong Capital Management, Inc. See Restrictions Lessen Benefits, supra note 23 (“Massachusetts, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin have rewarded politically powerful companies based in their states with exclusive contracts to manage” the state’s 529 plan); see also Avrum D. Lank, State Seeks New Options for EdVest (Nov. 22, 2003) ("I want to find some way to keep the mutual fund business strong in Wisconsin, I don't want the (Strong) company to be decimated. I want to make certain that whatever liability there is that we don't kill the company," quoting Wisconsin state treasurer Jack C. Voight); Elliot Blair Smith, Fund Scandal Worries Tuition Plan Investors, USA Today (Nov. 19, 2003) (describing campaign contributions by Richard Strong to Wisconsin politician indirectly responsible for choosing Strong to manage the state’s 529 plan).


\(^{27}\) See College Savings Get Closer Study, supra note 6 (state treasurer used millions of dollars of 529 plan assets to pay for commercials about the plan that prominently featured the treasurer, who was running for reelection).
Participants in 529 plans typically do not receive any state tax deduction for contributions to out-of-state plans,\textsuperscript{28} which may create incentives to pay higher fees. Investors may opt for a higher-cost, in-state plan specifically in order to receive the tax benefits of the in-state plan,\textsuperscript{29} or may miss out on the in-state tax benefit offered by a low-cost in-state plan because brokers recommend out-of-state plans that pay higher compensation to the broker.\textsuperscript{30} This has the effect of reducing price competition among 529 plans because in-state plans can exploit their monopoly on in-state tax benefits to offset their higher fees. This is essentially a kind of bundling, not dissimilar to a private company that has a government-granted monopoly over one product (state tax deductions) to help it sell another, possibly inferior product (the 529 plan).\textsuperscript{31} Congress should consider mandating that any state tax deductions for 529 plan contributions or distributions be reciprocal across all qualified 529 plans.

The rules governing 529 plans can limit price competition by making it more costly and burdensome for plan participants to transfer their 529 plan interests, thereby reducing price competition and further elevating the importance of fee disclosure. For

\textsuperscript{28} The 529 plans for 24 states and the District of Columbia permit residents to deduct some or all of their contributions to their state’s 529 plan from their state tax return. \textit{See} Tax Break, \textit{supra} at note 23. A Wisconsin state representative has introduced a bill that would permit residents to deduct some or all of their contributions to any state’s 529 plan from their Wisconsin tax return. \textit{See} Tax Break, \textit{id}. Some states treat, or are considering treating, all 529 plan distributions equally for state law purposes. \textit{See}, e.g., 529 College Investing Programs in Maine Now Treated Equally, Finance Authority of Maine (June 23, 2003) (state law treating distributions equally for all 529 plans) link available at http://www.ici.org/issues/edu/arc-leg/03_maine_529_tax.html (site last visited May 29, 2004); Letter from Matthew Fink, President, Investment Company Institute, to Illinois State Representatives Michael J. Madigan and Barbara Flynn Currie (Apr. 24, 2003) available at http://www.ici.org/statements/cmplt/03_mainenlillinois_529_com2.html#TopOfPage (site last visited May 29, 2004) (discussing Illinois’ considering similar provision for equal treatment of distributions by all 529 plans).

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{See} Tax Break, \textit{supra} note 23 ("Zimmerman and others are concerned that the various state tax breaks stop some people from making the proper choice of plan").

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{See} NASD Investigates College-Savings Fund Sales, \textit{supra} note 8 ("overwhelming majority" of plans sold by six securities firms investigated by the NASD were out-of-state, quoting Mary Schapiro, Vice Chairman, NASD); Closer Study, \textit{supra} note 6 (citing anecdotal evidence that Washington, D.C. "investors are being steered into out-of-state plans that offer neither low fees nor a state tax break").

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{See} Closer Study, \textit{id}. ("One of the most significant things (the tax breaks) do is to make it necessary for anyone considering a 529 plan to consider their home state plan first," [said Zimmerman] ‘It sweetens the deal.’").
example, mutual fund shareholders have the right to receive their pro rata share of the fund’s net assets within seven days of a redemption request. In contrast, there is no limit on the amount of time that a state can hold a participant’s assets pending a transfer or on the amount of fees charged on the transfer. Accordingly, it is that much more important that investors be informed about 529 plan fees before choosing a plan, because it may be difficult or costly to change that decision.

Further, participants in 529 plans have limited control over fees. Mutual funds can raise advisory and 12b-1 fees only with shareholder approval, whereas states generally can raise fees at will without notice to participants, thereby making it more important that investors understand the fees charged before making an investment decision. When a mutual fund that is a 529 plan investment option seeks to raise its fees, the state has the right to vote on the fee increase, but, as noted above, it may not have the same interests to negotiate low fees as plan participants have. In some cases, states have locked themselves into long-term arrangements that may make it difficult for them to change managers or reduce fees.

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32 As a practical matter, broker regulations and certain SEC staff positions effectively require that sales of fund shares settle in no more than three days. Funds can charge redemption fees, but the SEC staff limits these fees to 2% of the redemption amount and the fee must be paid to the fund.

33 In addition, mutual funds typically must accept purchases the same business day they are received, whereas there are no limits on states’ ability to hold 529 plan contributions pending investment in the plan. For example, the Virginia Education Savings Trust holds participants’ contributions for up to 30 days before investing them in the plan. See College Savings Get Closer Study, supra note 6; Nazareth Memorandum, supra note 12, at A-4 (in effect, the “delay in investment is an interest-free loan from investors” to the state).

34 For example, Rhode Island imposes $50 fee on transfers to another state’s 529 plan. Rhode Island Program Description at 12 (Oct. 27, 2003) link available at http://www.collegeboundfund.com/ (site last visited May 31, 2004).

35 The Plan Disclosure Document for the Alaska’s Manulife College Savings Plan provides that the Trust, “in its sole discretion, will establish or change Fees as it determines to be appropriate. Such Fees may include a program fee, a sales load, an annual Account fee, fees associated with SFAs and other fees and charges to support the purposes and administration of the Trust.” Plan Disclosure Document, supra note 15, at 45 – 46. In contrast, Texas state law prohibits the Board from collecting administrative fees in excess of the costs of administering the 529 plan. See Plan Description, supra note 15.

36 See Nazareth Memorandum, supra note 12, at n. 25 (citing examples of limitations on states’ ability to fire 529 plan managers). Whereas Oregon and Utah terminated Strong Capital Management from their 529 plans because of the CEO’s wrongful conduct, Wisconsin’s plan was bound by an exclusive contract with Strong until 2006. See Avrum D. Lank, EdVest Overseers Add Options to Strong Funds, Milwaukee
Finally, federal law gives mutual fund shareholders legal recourse against a fund’s directors and manager with respect to excessive fees charged by the manager, which may provide some restraint on fees. Participants in 529 plans, however, have no such rights absent a violation of the antifraud rules under the federal securities laws. Although participants have political recourse against state officials, it is uncertain whether this provides an effective restraint on fund fees.

Restrictions on 529 plan investment options, participants’ limited control over fees and fee increases, the costs and burdens of transferring from one plan to another, states’ monopoly on state tax benefits, limited legal recourse against plan sponsors, and the divergence of state and participant interests are some of the special factors that make it especially critical that 529 plan fees be fully disclosed in an understandable, standardized, accessible format.

In addition, permitting states to offer a financial product has effectively added 50 new regulators for tax-deferred mutual fund wrappers, which are subject to too many different regulators and sets of rules as it is. The Commission is responsible for fee disclosure for variable annuities, the Department of Labor is responsible for fee disclosure for employee benefit plans, and banking regulators and the Internal Revenue Service are responsible for fee disclosure for IRAs. Multiple disclosure regimes confuse investors and increase the costs of offering investment products, as each provider must tailor its program to the particular state’s requirements. Congress should explore ways of

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37 The Commission also has the authority to sue a fund’s directors and manager with respect to fees paid to the manager, but it has never exercised that authority, and that authority therefore cannot be considered to restrain mutual fund fees to any degree. For examples of excessive mutual fund fees, see supra note 6.

38 A substantial percentage of mutual fund assets are invested through these tax deferred wrappers. At the end of 2003, about one-third of mutual fund assets (about $2.7 trillion) were held in retirement plans, primarily in 401(k) accounts and IRAs. See Mutual Fund Fact Book, Investment Company Institute at 86 (May 2004) available at http://www.ici.org/stats/mf/2004_factbook.pdf (site last visited May 31, 2004).
rationalizing fee disclosure and other regulatory aspects of various tax-deferred mutual fund wrappers.\textsuperscript{39}

Additional regulation of 529 plans probably can mitigate many of the disadvantages of state-sponsored investment products, but Congress should also consider reforms that might more directly address fee disclosure and other problems. The need for additional 529 plan regulation is due, in part, to the fact that they are exempt from the federal securities laws. The municipal exemption under which 529 plans operate was not intended for the offering of retail financial services, and Congress should consider amending the exemption to exclude 529 plans or permitting private firms to offer 529 plans outside of state sponsorship.\textsuperscript{40}

IV. Guidelines for the Regulation of 529 Plan Fees

The inadequacy of 529 plan fee disclosure necessitates prompt Congressional or agency action to ensure that investors in 529 plans can make fully informed investment decisions. Before choosing a particular course of action, however, it is important to (1) establish guidelines regarding the nature of the government’s interest in 529 plan fees, and (2) collect and analyze information about fees that are currently charged by 529 plans.

\textsuperscript{39} This problem extends beyond tax-deferred investment pools to all types of investment pools, including bank collective investment trusts, funds of funds, folios, mini-accounts, exchange-traded funds, separate accounts, hedge funds, etc., and will worsen as the proliferation of similar investment vehicles subject to different regulations increases the opportunity for and transaction costs of regulatory arbitrage.

\textsuperscript{40} As suggested by Professor Goolsbee: “The federal government will forgo billions of dollars in tax revenue to subsidize 529s. The goal of this subsidy was to encourage education, not to have the federal government provide a windfall to states and financial firms in the form of high fees. An easy way to fix the 529 problem would be to bestow the benefits of the 529s on other savings plans. Congress could raise the limit on contributions to Coverdell/Education IRAs or allow penalty-free withdrawals from 401(k) accounts for educational expenses. In these other accounts, people can choose any investment from any provider, without paying extra management fees. It would cost the federal government the same amount as the current 529 system, but the benefits would go to the parents, not the providers.” “529” Ripoff, supra note 4.
A. The Governmental Interest in 529 Plans

The most important step in developing a framework for 529 plan regulation is to identify the nature of the government’s interest in these plans. The government’s interest in 529 plans reflects, to a large extent, its interests in financial services and products generally. The government interest in brokerage services, investment advice, mutual funds and other financial services and products is generally based on four principles: (1) promoting the operation of free markets unfettered by government interference, (2) mandating full disclosure to facilitate informed decisionmaking and the efficient allocation of capital, (3) protecting investors against fraud, and (4) imposing targeted, substantive regulation.

These government interests are generally applicable to all financial services and products, with some tailoring in individual circumstances. For example, the regulation of securities issuers has generally focused on the first three principles of free markets: full disclosure, and investor protection, with limited substantive regulation. The regulation of brokers and investment advisers has generally followed the same principles, with some additional substantive regulation. In contrast, mutual fund regulation is characterized by extensive substantive regulation in many areas, including, in a number of respects, the level and disclosure of fees.\footnote{See supra, discussion at pages 9 - 10 (regulation of disclosure of mutual fund fees) and infra, discussion at page 27 (regulation of level of mutual fund fees).} Congress has regulated mutual funds more intrusively than in other areas primarily because mutual funds involve the discretionary control over a liquid pool of cash and securities where the potential for abuse is greater than in other securities-related contexts.

The structure of 529 plans is similar to that of mutual funds, and, not coincidentally, states generally have opted for mutual funds as the underlying investment vehicles for plan assets. The regulation of the level and disclosure of 529 plan fees, however, falls well below the standards applicable to mutual funds.\footnote{Id.} Assuming that the
governmental interest in 529 plans parallels its interest in mutual funds, Congress should take steps to subject 529 plans to the same level of regulation, and not only with respect to the level and disclosure of fees, but also with respect to governance, affiliated transactions, leverage, and other areas in which mutual funds have been successfully regulated for decades.

But one might argue that the governmental interest in 529 plans is actually quite different. On the one hand, Congress authorized 529 plans to promote a specific “investment objective,” that is, to increase or facilitate investment in higher education. Congress therefore may have a greater regulatory interest in ensuring that 529 plans achieve that investment objective. This special government interest is implicit, for example, in Chairman Oxley’s question to Chairman Donaldson regarding whether 529 plan fees could outstrip the tax benefits of the plan.43

In the context of fees, for example, this perspective might argue for more intrusive regulation of the level and disclosure of 529 plan fees for the purpose of maximizing the additional funds available for higher education.44 Another way of looking at this question would be to consider Congress as having an interest in obtaining the greatest possible return on its investment -- its investment being the amount of foregone tax revenues -- and accordingly having a greater interest in 529 plans’ achieving the best possible performance at the lowest possible cost.


44 This holds for many characteristics of 529 plans. For example, Congress could reasonably decide that the purpose of 529 plans would not be served if a participant could bet his entire investment on a single stock, and accordingly require that 529 plan assets be invested exclusively in diversified pools. This issue echoes the recent debate regarding a proposal by Senator Corzine and others to limit the percentage of an employee’s account in a tax-deferred employee benefit plan that may be allocated to his employer’s stock. See Ellen Schultz, Should Pension Law Do More to Protect Retirement Savings? Wall Street Journal (Jan. 14, 2002) (proposal by Senators Corzine and Boxer to limit employer’s stock to 20% of employee’s retirement plan).
On the other hand, 529 plans already are, in a sense, the most intrusively regulated financial product offered in America. The structure and operation of 529 plans are set by their state sponsors. Congress could take the view that the role of the states supports a reduced regulatory role on the assumption that the states generally will set or negotiate fees that are lower than for similar investment products. There is evidence, however, that a number of states offer 529 plans with extremely high expenses, which suggests that some states may provide less effective mechanisms for efficient pricing than the mutual fund marketplace.

The purpose of the foregoing discussion is to frame ways of thinking about the regulation of 529 plan fees and encourage Congress and regulators to resolve the issue of the governmental interest in 529 plans before developing new 529 plan regulations.

The following discussion is based on my view that Congress does have a greater regulatory interest in 529 plan fees than it has in mutual fund fees. In this case, if one also assumes that the regulation of mutual fund fees has generally been successful, then the regulation of 529 plan fees needs a substantial overhaul. At a minimum, Congress should authorize and direct the Commission to establish standardized formats for the prominent disclosure of 529 plan fees, as discussed further in Part V of this paper, that are comparable or superior to the fee disclosure provided by mutual funds.

Indeed, Congress should consider regulation of 529 plan fees that exceeds similar rules for mutual funds. Congress should exercise greater caution here, however, for we lack the historical experience that 16 years of standardized mutual fund fee disclosure has provided. Congress should be particularly careful about addressing concerns that are truly 529 plan concerns, as opposed to concerns that simply reflect problems with the securities products generally.

45 There is strong, indirect evidence that mutual fund fee disclosure has been fairly successful (although it could be substantially improved). Over the last decade or so, mutual fund investors generally have migrated toward lower cost fund complexes, thereby suggesting that cost is a factor they consider when making investment decisions.
For example, it may be unprofitable to evaluate the need for regulation based on whether there is a causal relationship between the amount of fees charged by a 529 plan and the amount of additional funds made available for higher education as a result of the plan’s tax benefits. It may seem intuitively obvious that, because every dollar that a participant spends on fees is one less dollar that he could spend his child’s education, fees directly reduce, and can exceed, the tax benefits provided by 529 plans. But this tradeoff between fees and tax benefits may be illusory if the participant would otherwise have invested in a taxable mutual fund that had similar expenses.

In response to Chairman Oxley’s question about whether fees could outstrip the tax benefit provided by 529 plans, for example, the Commission showed that an investment in a high-cost, load 529 plan that invests in a actively managed fund would leave the participant with a much smaller end-of-period balance than if he had invested in no-load, low-cost index fund in a taxable account.46 This is not, as the Commission concedes, an “apples-to-apples’ comparison,” however, because the participant who buys an actively managed option in a high-cost, load 529 plan probably would not otherwise invest in a low-cost, no-load, index mutual fund in a taxable account, but in a high-cost, load, actively managed mutual fund in a taxable account. Fees charged by high-cost 529 plans, based on a cursory review, simply do not bear out the argument made by some that they exceed what an investor might otherwise pay outside of the plan.47 While excessive 529 plan fees clearly raise policy concerns, they are not truly 529 plan concerns.

A more relevant question may be whether a 529 plan, after taking into account any additional services it provides (e.g., asset allocation), is more expensive than a

46 Nazareth Memorandum, supra note 12, at A-13. This assumes that the investment option for the model 529 plan used by the Commission, which has annual fees of 2.0%, is an actively managed fund.

47 Professor Goolsbee uses the example of a 529 plan option that imposes annual fees equal to 1.83% and a 5.75% front-end load (or, without the front-end load, annual fees of 2.54%) to support the statement that “these fees are unbelievably high, vastly more than you would pay for a normal investment.” See “529” Ripoff, supra note 4. In fact, even higher fees are charged by mutual funds outside of 529 plans. See, e.g., supra note 6.
similar tax-deferred account. If the answer is “no,” then arguably 100% of the tax benefit that Congress intended to bestow on 529 plan participants has been preserved, even where the plan’s expenses are very high. In the absence of evidence that participants in 529 plans routinely incur higher expenses than they would otherwise incur in similar non-529 plan accounts, it is unlikely that 529 plans’ tax benefits are reduced or eliminated by fees in any meaningful sense.

B. Current 529 Plans Fees and Fee Disclosure

Once the nature of the governmental interest in 529 plans has been identified, information about 529 plan fees should be collected and analyzed. Legislators and regulators will not be able to formulate effective fee disclosure policies and procedures without a thorough understanding of the amount and kinds of fees charged by 529 plans. Congress should task the Commission, if the Commission does not take on this job on its

48 It is also possible that participants in 529 plans might not otherwise invest those assets at all. This might be particularly likely where the interests in the plan have been sold by an intermediary who has convinced the participant that the tax benefits are worth foregoing the benefits of immediate consumption. Even in this case, however, it is difficult to show that fees directly reduce the tax benefits realized from 529 plans. And in any case, it is likely that most 529 plan assets would have been invested in taxable (or other nontaxable) accounts if 529 plans had not been available.

49 One reason that fees may be increased is that participants may pay commissions and other distribution fees to intermediaries. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that the use of intermediaries in the 529 plan context is no higher than in other contexts. See Nazareth Memorandum, supra note 12 (broker-sold 529 plans account for approximately 75% of all sales of interests in 529 plans) (citing J. Kim, Assets in 529 Plans Jumped 83% to $35B in 2003, Dow Jones Newswire (Feb. 4, 2004) (quoting Whitney Dow, director of education-savings research at Financial Research Corporation)); Mutual Fund Fact Book, supra note 38, at 48 (87% of new sales of mutual fund shares were made through third parties in 2003).

50 It should be noted that this analysis implicitly rejects the oft-stated view that sales charges are a dead weight expense that by their very nature are excessive. See, e.g., Penelope Wang, The Trouble with 529 Plans: More and More States Are Messing Up a Good Thing with Fees, Commissions and Bum Funds, Money (Oct. 7, 2003). This position confuses what we might like to be true about investors with what we might like to be true about 529 plans. It makes sense to wish that all 529 plans were no-load only in the sense that we might wish that all investors were sufficiently self-directed and informed so as not to need (or have to pay for) investment advice. If one assumes that some investors do need advice, however, then we should wish that all states provided 529 plans that could be used by such investors. The argument that intermediaries should simply recommend no-load 529 plans is a contradiction of terms, for an intermediary is, by definition, a person who is in the business of providing investor services for compensation. In a world in which intermediaries recommended no-load investments, intermediaries would not exist. Thus, the criticism of 529 plans for imposing distribution fees is not so much a criticism of 529 plans as it is of the situation of investors who decide to invest through intermediaries or the practice of tying intermediaries’ compensation the product being sold. See Bullard Testimony, supra note 19, at 22.
own, with collecting and analyzing information regarding 529 plan fees. The Commission has the greatest expertise in this area, and Chairman Donaldson’s Task Force on College Savings Plans already has a head start on this work. In the past, the Commission has not been as effective as it should have been in anticipating broad developments in the financial services industry.\textsuperscript{51} The Task Force should help remedy this problem by developing not just the empirical basis for further evaluation (and, as appropriate, regulation) of 529 plans, but also an analysis of the role of 529 plans and similar products in the financial services marketplace within the framework of the governmental interests such plans are intended to serve.

Toward this end, I recommend that Congress provide specific guidance to the Commission regarding the scope of the work of the Task Force to ensure that it does not merely collect data, but also places that data in its broader policy context and defines core principles on the basis of which it believes products such as 529 plans should be regulated – even where those products are outside of the SEC’s jurisdiction. The Commission often has a tendency to limit its role to that of an interpreter of what the law is and to avoid its equally important role in proposing answers to the hard questions of what the law should be. The Commission’s unparalleled expertise and background necessitates that it become more engaged in the process of developing the foundational principles according to which markets should be regulated. Congress should encourage Chairman Donaldson to steer the Commission’s new focus on risk assessment in this direction.

More specifically, the Task Force should not confine its role to identifying and categorizing 529 plan fees and describing the quality and scope of the disclosure of those fees. The Task Force should also consider how 529 plan fees and fee disclosure compare to fees charged by comparable investment vehicles, including mutual funds, Individual Retirement Accounts (“IRAs”), 401(k) plans, variable annuities, and similar investment vehicles. The Commission has expended substantial resources analyzing mutual fund

disclosure, for example, but few resources analyzing the actual disclosure provided to end-users of mutual funds where the mutual funds are sold in a tax-deferred wrapper that may or may not be within the SEC’s jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{52} The Task Force should also consider how the structure of 529 plans affects their operation and fees. The next part of this paper discusses a number of ways in which the structure of 529 plans raises particular concerns, and the debate about how to regulate 529 plans would benefit from the SEC’s analysis of those concerns. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Task Force should specifically articulate the general government policy or policies that the Commission and the Task Force understand the regulation of 529 plans should serve.

V. Recommendations for Reform

With respect to the issue of 529 plan fee disclosure, there appears to be widespread agreement that current standards are inadequate, and that 529 plans should be subject to uniform standards for fee disclosure. As noted above, the Commission already has proposed point-of-sale and confirmation disclosure requirements for 529 plans.\textsuperscript{53} Even the College Savings Plan Network, an affiliate of the National Association of State Treasurers, reportedly has recognized the need for such standards and plans to promulgate them in the near future.\textsuperscript{54} This leaves the questions of what form such standards should take and who should develop and enforce them?

A. Uniform Standards for 529 Plan Fee Disclosure

Fee disclosure rules for 529 plans should follow certain basic principles. Fees should be prominently disclosed to reflect their importance, and be easy to compare

\textsuperscript{52} For example, in a 1992 study, the SEC staff published an extensive analysis of mutual fund regulatory issues that cut across a variety of investment products, some of which were outside of the SEC’s jurisdiction. Protecting Investors: A Half Century of Investment Company Regulation, Division of Investment Management, Securities and Exchange Commission (May 1992).

\textsuperscript{53} See supra note 17.

across different plans. This necessitates standardization and disclosure of fees charged by competitors. Fees should be provided as a percentage of assets and in dollars. The former approach permits comparability\textsuperscript{55} and prevents high-percentage fees to be hidden in the form of apparently low fixed charges.\textsuperscript{56} The latter approach conveys a more tangible sense of the actual cost of the services provided.\textsuperscript{57} Fees should be divided into categories, in order that investors may evaluate the uses to which their payments are being put. Finally, 529 plans should provide separate disclosure of the fees received by intermediaries in connection with the purchase and sell of plan interests in order to direct participants’ attention to intermediaries’ conflicts of interest.

Based on these principles, uniform standards for 529 plan fee disclosure should meet the following minimum standards. Fee disclosure for 529 plans, at a minimum, should be:

- Standardized, both in the way in which the fees are calculated and the terms used to describe the fees;
- Prominently disclosed relative to other information about the plan;
- Presented both as a percentage of assets and a dollar amount, and on an illustrative and individualized basis;
- Inclusive of a total expense ratio for each investment option that includes all fees incurred in connection with an investment in the plan, to include, among other things, portfolio transaction costs, distribution costs, operating costs and administrative fees, whether charged by the state, plan manager, investment manager, or other person;

\textsuperscript{55} See Opening Statement of Chairman Oxley, supra note 7 (affirming importance of investors’ being able to engage in “comparison shopping”).

\textsuperscript{56} For example, the Maryland College Investment Plan charges a one-time $90 enrollment fee and a $30 account fee, which for a minimum account of $250 would equal 48% of assets in the first year and 12% each year thereafter, not including other expenses. Disclosure Statement at 5 & 13 – 14 (November 2003) link available at http://www.collegesavingsmd.org/GT2gettingstarted.cfm (site last visited May 30, 2004).

\textsuperscript{57} See Opening Statement of Congressman Gillmor, supra note 19 ("Disclosure of expenses as a percentage of assets allows for better comparison among funds but it does not effectively communicate real costs.")
• Inclusive of a pie chart that illustrates the components of the total expense ratio according to standardized categories of fees, such as investment management, administrative services, and marketing and distribution;

• Inclusive of information on fees charged by other 529 plans both in a disclosure document and in an easily accessible format on the Internet; and

• Inclusive of separate disclosure of all payments received by intermediaries for executing the transactions in plan interests, both as a dollar amount and percentage of assets, whether or not the payment is made directly by the participant.

B. Responsibility for Promulgating and Enforcing 529 Plan Fee Disclosure

Congress should assign exclusive responsibility for the regulation of 529 plan fee disclosure to the Commission. The Commission has more experience and expertise regulating fee disclosure than any other governmental entity, and it has more objectivity and independence than the states. Although the states should play a central role in developing uniform fee disclosure standards, they should not have final decisionmaking authority over the form and content of such disclosure. Nor should states be left to enforce such standards themselves.

The states will not provide the objectivity and independence necessary to develop uniform disclosure standards. For example, the brokerage industry already has expressed its unconditional opposition to the SEC’s proposal to require delivery of point-of-sale and confirmation fee disclosure, and it is likely to oppose any similar disclosure standards promulgated by the states.58 This same industry acts as a partner with the states in the offering of 529 plans. It is unrealistic to believe that, in view of their partnership with the brokerage industry, the states will be as independent and objective as an entity that had no such relationship.

The states’ objectivity and independence will also be compromised by the fact that their interests are not necessarily always aligned with the interests of all 529 plan participants.59 States have incentives to benefit elected officials, state institutions and non-participant state residents to the detriment of plan participants, and to benefit in-state plan participants to the detriment of out-of-state plan participants. The states, as public actors in the private sector, have a conflict of interest that will inevitably color their judgment regarding fee disclosure and other aspects of 529 plan operations.

Regulation of 529 plans by the states has an additional disadvantage of requiring agreement by 50 different entities,60 and probably a large percentage of their financial services partners. There is also the risk that one or more states may refuse to cooperate, thereby undermining the important goal of uniformity, and there is no clear enforcement mechanism to address this potential problem. In contrast, the Commission has a single, five-member decisionmaking authority that can more efficiently develop rules, issue them for public comment, and move to final adoption in a timely manner, and the Commission can enforce these standards against the states independent of political considerations.61 To illustrate the limitations of allowing states to regulate their own plans, the states have only recently suggested that they may propose standards for uniform 529 plan fee disclosure, no specific proposal has been made, and even that step has been taken only under the threat of imminent Congressional or regulatory action.

59 See supra discussion at pages 10 - 11.

60 The states were unable to resolve similar problems with state-by-state regulation of mutual fund disclosures, thereby prompting Congress to enact the National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, which effectively assigned exclusive authority over the substantive regulation of mutual funds to the Commission.

The Commission already has taken the initiative in proposing point-of-sale and confirmation disclosure requirements for 529 plans. Interjecting the states into this process risks the promulgation of conflicting standards and ongoing tension between the states and the Commission.

Although agencies other than the Commission have exercised responsibility for developing fee disclosure requirements for products similar to 529 plans, none has comparable experience and expertise, or a comparable record of success, as the Commission. The Commission currently has responsibility for fee disclosure for mutual funds, which are the predominant investment vehicle in which 529 plan assets are invested, and for variable annuities, which, along with certain employee benefit plans, are the investment products that are most similar to 529 plans. In addition, the Commission already has proposed fee disclosure rules that would address a broad range of 529 plan fee disclosure issues. The SEC’s proposed point-of-sale disclosure proposal, with certain key improvements, provides a good starting point for developing a 529 plan disclosure document. Indeed, if Congress grants the Commission jurisdiction over 529 plan fee disclosure, it should consider doing so for other tax-deferred mutual fund wrappers as well.

C. Limits on 529 Plan Fees

Congress also should consider imposing limits on 529 plan fees. Those who might reject this proposal out of hand -- as contrary to the widespread (and wise) view

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62 See Letter from Mercer Bullard, Founder and President, Fund Democracy, Inc. and Assistant Professor of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law, Barbara Roper, Director of Investor Protection, Consumer Federation of America, Kenneth McEldowney, Executive Director, Consumer Action, and Sally Greenberg, Senior Counsel, Consumers Union to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 21, 2004) (recommending, among other things, that point-of-sale document be provided a meaningful amount of time before the investment decision is made and include all investment-related costs).

63 See Protecting Investors, supra note 52, at 151 (recommending that Congress repeal securities law exemption for employee benefit plans in part because “plan participants receive far less information about the investment objectives and policies, performance, investment managers, fees, and expenses of their investment options than do investors who directly purchase securities issued by [mutual funds].”)

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that the government generally should not set fees -- should hold judgment and consider certain factors that militate for considering limits on fees in the 529 plan context.

First, the very concept of a 529 plan depends on the setting of fees by the government because the states set or negotiate all 529 plan fees. The government's role in setting fees is already firmly established in the context of 529 plans.

Second, many do not appreciate that the government already sets fees for investment services and products in a number of contexts. For example, the NASD imposes absolute limits on sales charges on sales of mutual funds and on 12b-1 fees that can be charged by those funds. The Commission effectively prohibits funds from charging redemption fees in excess of 2%. Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act requires that fund shares be sold only at the price set forth in the prospectus, which effectively fixes the sales charge for any particular fund.

In addition, as discussed above, Congress created 529 plans to achieve a specific social goal: to promote investment in higher education. Congress should consider a more intrusive regulatory approach when an investment product is intended to serve a particular social goal, especially when this purpose is funded by taxpayers in the form of foregone tax revenues. As discussed above, it therefore would be appropriate for Congress to consider limiting 529 plan fees to help achieve this purpose.

There are at least three areas where Congress should consider specific limits on 529 plan fees, as discussed immediately below.

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64 It appears that these limits may effectively apply to intermediaries selling interests in 529 plans, as the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board takes the position that sales charges on sales of 529 plan interests that exceed NASD limits on mutual fund sales charges presumptively do not meet the fair and reasonable standard under MSRB rule G-30(b). Rule G-30(b) prohibits dealers from selling municipal securities to a customer for a commission or service charge in excess of a fair and reasonable amount. See Interpretive Notice On Commissions and Other Charges, Advertisements and Official Statements Relating To Municipal Fund Securities, MSRB (Dec. 19, 2001) available at http://www.msrb.org/msrb1/archive/MFSDecNotice.htm#_fmref1 (site last visited May 31, 2004); Workshop, supra note 26, at 28 – 29.
Limits on Distribution Fees. As noted above, the NASD currently limits sales charges and 12b-1 fees. Some 529 plans, within NASD limits, impose front-end sales loads in excess of 5%. This payment reduces an initial $10,000 contribution by $500 or more, thereby substantially reducing the participant’s short-term performance. In the 529 plan context, where the investment period as a practical matter is limited to 18 years and is often substantially shorter (depending on the age of the child), participants may have less time over which to spread the impact of a front-end load.

Furthermore, the larger the commission and/or 12b-1 fee, the greater the distortion of the intermediaries’ and participants’ incentives may be. The greater the distribution payment, the greater the intermediary’s incentive to seek a plan with a higher payout and not to recommend a plan that might be better suited for the participant, particularly when the participant’s plan offers a state tax deduction only for the in-state plan. The greater the distribution payments, the less freedom the participant has to sell the investment. Locking participants into 529 plans reduces competition and increases costs.

Congress should consider imposing lower limits on 529 plans, such as a 3.00% limit on commissions and a 0.50% limit on 12b-1 and other asset-based distribution fees, that would apply to intermediaries and states alike.

Limits on Purchase and Transfer Fees. For similar reasons, Congress should consider limiting fees charged by 529 plans in connection with

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65 For example, participants in Arizona’s Waddell & Reed InvestEd 529 Plan who buy Class A shares pay a 5.75% front-end load. A $10,000 investment in Class A shares of the highest cost investment option in the Texas Tomorrow’s College Investment Plan would incur 7.05% in expenses the first year. See Plan Description, supra note 15, at 18. The expenses include a 4.75% front-end sales charge, a $30 annual account fee, a 0.20% plan manager administrative fee, a 0.25% marketing fee, and up to a 1.75% fee for the underlying investment option. Fees on the investment options range from 0.00% to 1.75%. After May 1, 2005, the plan manager may charge a state administrative fee of 0.10%, thereby increasing the first year’s fees to 7.15%.
initial purchases and transfers. These fees can inhibit competition by making it prohibitively costly for a participant to change plans. For example, if a plan raises its fees, participants should be able to reject the increase by voting with their feet without having to incur a material fee for doing so. Limits on such fees should be based on the actual administrative cost of process the purchase or sale.

Mandatory Low-Cost Option. Congress should also consider requiring states that sell 529 plans to offer at least one low-cost option, the fees of which do not exceed a certain amount. For example, Congress could require that each state offer at least one option the annual, total cost of which does not exceed 0.60% of a participant’s account in any year. As long as the maximum fee does not exceed the cost of readily available programs, this should not distort the marketplace, while ensuring that every in-state resident has the ability to take advantage of the tax benefits that Congress intended 529 plans to provide without having to pay high fees to enjoy any in-state tax deduction.