Patent Law

- Module H
- Enforcing Patent Rights

Literal Infringement – Markman v. Westview Instruments (SCT 1996)

- System that is
  - “capable of monitoring and reporting upon the status, location and throughput of inventory in an establishment”
  - Clothing sorted and grouped for processing, later “desorted” for return to customer

- Cash inventory or physical inventory or both?
Markman

Section II

- No 7th Amendment right for claims to be construed by a jury
- History a bit fuzzy, but courts traditionally construed specifications and claims
- **Query:** Then when and how did juries start doing it?

Section III

- If 7th Amendment does not decide it, then just pick the one with the best “interpretative skills”
- This issue is neither one of pure law nor pure fact
  - A “mongrel”

Markman

Section III (cont.)

- “The claims of patents have become highly technical in many respects as the result of special doctrines relating to the proper form and scope of claims that been developed by the courts and the Patent Office.”
  - How does this square with Phillips requirement that claims be interpreted as a PHOSITA would?
  - Would a PHOSITA be familiar with these special doctrines?
- Judges will be more accurate and uniform than juries
Cybor v. FAS Technologies (Fed. Cir. 1998)

- “We conclude that the Supreme Court’s unanimous affirmance in Markman … of our in banc judgment … fully supports our conclusion that claim construction, as a purely legal issue, is subject to de novo review on appeal.”
- Didn’t the Supreme Court say the issue was a mixed one of law and fact?
- Uniformity is an important principle
  - Do not want patents interpreted differently in different courts

Claim Interpretation – Sources / Canons / Procedure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>Canons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plain meaning</td>
<td>Dictionaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Claim / Specification relationship</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Don’t read a limitation into a claim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- One may look to the written description to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>define a term already in a claim limitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specification</td>
<td>The specification can be used to enlighten the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>court as to the meaning of a claim term</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Presumptive breadth</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Claim should be interpreted so as to preserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>validity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- If a claim is subject to two viable interpretations, the narrower one should apply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecution history</td>
<td>Effect on claim construction?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- considered if in evidence</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Inventor’s interpretations after issuance are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>given no weight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Claim differentiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsic Evidence</td>
<td>Proper to resort to extrinsic evidence?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>**Patentee can’t construe narrowly before the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PTO and broadly in court</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Procedure
  - **Markman** – the meaning of the claims is a question of law, and thus subject to de novo review and a matter for the judge, not the jury
**Claim construction canons**

- Ordinarily, each claim in a patent has a different scope; ordinarily, a dependent claim has a narrower scope than the claim from which it depends; and, ordinarily, an independent claim has a broader scope than a claim that depends from it. (these generalizations are referred to as the doctrine of claim differentiation);
- Ordinarily, claims are not limited to the preferred embodiment disclosed in the specification;
- Ordinarily, different words in a patent have different meanings;
- Ordinarily, the same word in a patent has the same meaning;
- Ordinarily, the meaning should align with the purpose of the patented invention;
- Ordinarily, general descriptive terms are given their full meaning;
- If possible, claims should be construed so as to preserve their validity;
- Ordinarily, absent broadening language, numerical ranges are construed exactly as written;
- Ordinarily, absent recitation of order, steps of a method are not construed to have a particular order; and
- Absent highly persuasive evidentiary support, a construction should literally read on the preferred embodiment.

**Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2005)**

- Degree of influence on meaning for the claim term “baffle” from:
  - The dictionary
  - The disclosure (“specification”)
  - Function intended for structure recited in the claim
- Internal versus External sources of meaning and context
### Larami v. Amron – claim 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Claim 1</th>
<th>Id.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[a] toy comprising</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>an elongated housing [case] having</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a <strong>chamber therein</strong> for a liquid [tank],</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a pump including a piston having an exposed rod [piston rod] and</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extending rearwardly of said toy facilitating manual operation for</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>building up an appreciable amount of pressure in said chamber for</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ejecting a stream of liquid therefrom an appreciable distance</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>substantially forwardly of said toy, and means for controlling the</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ejection.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Larami v. Amron - embodiment

![Diagram of toy](image-url)
Larami v. Amron – accused device(s)

Graver Tank v. Linde Air Products (US 1950)

- Idea underlying DOE
  - Pirates of an invention “may be expected to introduce minor variations to conceal and shelter the piracy”
    - But not limited to circumstances of copying.
  - We don't want to put the inventor “at the mercy of verbalism”
  - Does DOE conflict with the “notice” function of claims? If so, should it be scaled back or eliminated?

- “reverse” DOE
  - “The wholesome realism of this doctrine is not always applied in favor of a patentee but is sometimes used against him. Thus, where a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim, the [reverse] doctrine of equivalents may be used to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee’s action for infringement.”
  - Essentially dead
Graver Tank

- DOE
  - Even if accused device, method, etc. does not fall in the literal meaning of the claims, infringement can still be found if the device, method, etc. meets the “function-way-result” rest
    - Does the accused device, composition, method, etc. perform “substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain [substantially] the same result”
  - “Area” of equivalence varies with the circumstances
    - What factors cause the variance?
    - The context of the patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case.
    - “Pioneering” equivalents will usually receive broader scope than mere incremental inventions.


- Hilton holds the '746 patent to a process for ultrafiltration of dyes
  - Claim:
    - In a process for the purification of a dye . . . the improvement which comprises: subjecting an aqueous solution . . . to ultrafiltration through a membrane having a nominal pore diameter of 5-15 Angstroms under a hydrostatic pressure of approximately 200 to 400 psig, at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0, to thereby cause separation of said impurities from said dye . . .
    - The Claim was amended
      - to distinguish a prior art patent, to Booth, that disclosed an ultrafiltration process operating above 9.0
      - But, disagreement as to why the lower limit is included
        - Warner says lower limit added because “foaming” below 6.0 pH
        - Hilton says process tested to 2.2 pH w/ no foaming, but gives no other reason as to why 6.0 selected
- Jury found patent infringed under DOE
- Federal Circuit affirms in fractured opinion
  - Dispute is over scope of DOE – i.e., scope of equivalents
- Supreme Court reverses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Hilton (claim)</th>
<th>Warner (allegedly infringing)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pore Diameter (Angstroms)</td>
<td>5-15</td>
<td>5-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure (p.s.i.g.)</td>
<td>200-400</td>
<td>200-500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pH</td>
<td>6.0 – 9.0</td>
<td>5.0 pH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- DOE, broadly applied, conflicts with the definitional and public notice function of the claims
- To resolve that tension, apply DOE on an “element by element” basis
**Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis (US 1997)**

- Concepts are later modified by *Festo*.
  - Where the reason for the change was not related to avoiding the prior art, the change may introduce a new element, but it does not necessarily preclude infringement by equivalents of that element.
  - *Festo* expands this to other reasons that can trigger PHE.
  - *Warner-Jenkinson* implements a presumption against the patentee in cases where the reason for the amendment is not revealed on the record.
    - Place the burden on the patentee to establish the reason for the amendment.
    - If not established, rebuttably presume that it is for a RRtoPat – in which case PHE applies to exclude what the patentee surrendered.
- In the present case, no reason given for 6.0 limitation, so presumption should be evaluated on remand.

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**Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis (US 1997)**

- Infringement, including DOE infringement, is intent neutral and an objective inquiry.
- Proper time to evaluate DOE and interchangeability for DOE purposes is at the time of infringement.
  - Not at time of patent issuance.
  - As a result, after-arising technology can be equivalent.

• Linguistic framework of the DOE test
  • SSF-SSW-SSR or
  • Insubstantial Differences?
    • An analysis of the role played by each element in the context of the specific patent claim will thus inform the inquiry as to whether a substitute element matches the function, way, and result of the claimed element, or whether the substitute element plays a role substantially different from the claimed element

Infringement – comparison of “equivalence” types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal</th>
<th>§112¶6 Equiv. (“Literal”)</th>
<th>DOE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§112¶6: Find the structure in the specification that implements the function</td>
<td>Identical Function</td>
<td>Substantially Similar Function (SSF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: claim construction and comparison to the accused device, method, etc.</td>
<td>SS Way</td>
<td>SS Way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS Result</td>
<td>SS Result</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identical Function</td>
<td>SSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insubstantial Differences approach or test</td>
<td>Insubstantial Differences</td>
<td>Insub. Diff.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SMC’s cylinder, rather than using two one-way sealing rings, employs a single sealing ring with a two-way lip.

SMC’s sleeve is made of a nonmagnetizable alloy.

Thus, no literal infringement.

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**Festo (US 2002)**

- Should PHE
  - Apply to every type of amendment made?
    - In other words, what qualifies as an amendment for a “Reason Related to Patentability” (RRtoPat) for purposes of applying PHE to limit the DOE?
  - Bar all equivalents (complete bar)
    - Or, bar only some, i.e., the equivalents “surrendered” (flexible bar)

- Limits of language to describe technology versus policy reasons to “distinctly claim”
- The Fed. Cir. had said the flexible bar was “unworkable”
  - “the clearest rule of patent interpretation, literalism, may conserve judicial resources but is not necessarily the most efficient rule”
**Festo (US 2002)**

- Implications of the “indescribable” theory underlying the Supreme Court’s opinion
  - The court assumes that, under the limits of language, there is an inference that “a thing not described was indescribable”
  - Meaning that we should allow DOE to “expand” the claim element’s coverage because language does not reasonably allow for effective description of the asserted equivalent
  - In the court’s view, PHE acts to rebut this inference of “indescribability” that “authorizes” equivalents under DOE
  - When there is an amendment, the rationale for not applying the complete bar is that
    - Even though an amendment was made, that does not mean that the claim is “so perfect in its description that no one could devise an equivalent”

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**Festo (US 2002)**

- What qualifies as a RRtoPat?
  - Traditionally, amendments triggering PHE were in response to PA
  - But, amendments related to the form of the patent, primarily §112 amendments, should also qualify as RRtoPat
    - Patentee has either
      - Conceded an inability to claim the broader subject matter or
      - At least has abandoned his right to appeal a rejection
  - Once an amendment occurs for a RRtoPat – what effect does this have on the scope of equivalents?
    - The complete bar implemented the very same literalism that the DOE exists to resist
    - Once amended, there is no more reason to treat the claim literally than there is to treat the original claim literally, except for the surrendered material
    - Courts must be cautious before disrupting the settled expectations of the inventing community
**Festo (US 2002)**

- Presumption when there is an amendment:
  - surrender of all subject matter between broad earlier claim and narrow amended claim
  - Patentee bears burden of rebutting the presumption

- General principle to rebut:
  - show at time of amendment POSITA could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent

- Three ways to implement the general principle to rebut:
  - equivalent unforeseeable at time of application [*foreseeability*]
  - rationale underlying the amendment may bear no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question [*tangentialness*]
  - some other reason that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question [*reasonable expectations of those skilled in the art*]

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**Festo (US 2002)**

- Present case
  - The amendment was made to add the sealing rings and composition of the sleeve
  - These amendments were made in response to a §112 rejection, and may also have been made for reasons having to do with PA
  - Thus, these are RRtoPat triggering the presumption
**Festo (US 2002)**

- From the press files . . .
  - Robert Bork attacked the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (CAFC) ruling saying that it “radically undermines the patent system” with a rule that would not reduce patent litigation. Mr. Bork also stated “one thing this rule does not do is eliminate uncertainty.”
  - Bork’s second argument rested on Constitutional grounds. In essence, Mr. Bork asserted that the CAFC in *Festo* went outside the judiciary power by making sweeping changes to the patent prosecution system. Mr. Bork accused the CAFC of making legislative decisions; he argued that only Congress or the Patent Office, not the circuit court, has authority under the Constitution to make such changes in the patent system.

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**Festo (US 2002)**

- From the press files . . .
  - Lastly, Mr. Bork argued that the retroactive application of the rule would render millions of patents “virtually worthless.” Mr. Bork was referring to the millions of patent holders that are now holding on to essentially less valuable patents because prior to the decision in *Festo*, patent attorneys and inventors freely and frequently amended the claims during the examination process, often at the request of examiners seeking clarification. Mr. Bork also said that patent attorneys, fearful of triggering any claim amendments during prosecution, would seek patents that are too narrow to start with, and therefore would be of “little value” to the inventor, thereby discouraging innovation in the future. Furthermore, Mr. Bork added that “if this were done by anything other than a court, it would be a taking” in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
**Festo on remand** – order for additional briefing (9/20/02) – Opinion on 9/26/03

1. Whether rebuttal of the presumption of surrender, including issues of foreseeability, tangentialness, or reasonable expectations of those skilled in the art, is a question of law or one of fact; and what role a jury should play in determining whether a patent owner can rebut the presumption.

2. What factors are encompassed by the criteria set forth by the Supreme Court.

3. [omitted]

4. [omitted]

**Festo on remand** – Opinion on 9/26/03

- Foreseeability
  - Objective
  - Evaluated at the time of the amendment
    - “Usually, if the alleged equivalent represents later-developed technology (e.g., transistors in relation to vacuum tubes, or Velcro® in relation to fasteners) or technology that was not known in the relevant art, then it would not have been foreseeable.
    - In contrast, old technology, while not always foreseeable, would more likely have been foreseeable.
    - Indeed, if the alleged equivalent were known in the prior art in the field of the invention, it certainly should have been foreseeable at the time of the amendment.”

- Tangentialness
  - Objective
  - Discernible from the prosecution history record
  - “whether the reason for the narrowing amendment was peripheral, or not directly relevant, to the alleged equivalent”
  - an amendment made to avoid prior art that contains the equivalent in question is not tangential

- Reasonable expectations of those skilled in the art
  - Narrow, linguistic limitations, probably objective
  - “When possible, it should be evaluated from the prosecution history”
### Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>claim 1 - laminate</th>
<th>AID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A – sheet of aluminum</td>
<td>? – sheet of steel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B – copper foil</td>
<td>B – copper foil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C – band of adhesive</td>
<td>? – gapped band</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does the zone of “equivalents” under the DOE reach to a steel substrate sheet?

### Johnson & Johnston v. R.E. Service (Fed. Circ. 2002)

- J&J won DOE jury verdict against RES
- Federal Circuit reversed
- Specification
  - While aluminum is currently the preferred material for the substrate, other metals, such as stainless steel or nickel alloys, may be used. In some instances ... polypropylene [sic] can be used.
Johnson & Johnston v. R.E. Service (Fed. Cir. 2002)

- Claim 1. A component for use in manufacturing articles such as printed circuit boards comprising:
  - a laminate constructed of a sheet of copper foil which, in a finished printed circuit board, constitutes a functional element and a sheet of \textit{aluminum} which constitutes a discardable element;
  - one surface of each of the copper sheet and the \textit{aluminum} sheet being essentially uncontaminated and engageable with each other at an interface,
  - a band of flexible adhesive joining the uncontaminated surfaces of the sheets together at their borders and defining a substantially uncontaminated central zone inwardly of the edges of the sheets and unjoined at the interface.
- RES products use sheet of steel as a substrate rather than aluminum

Johnson & Johnston v. R.E. Service (Fed. Cir. 2002)

- Maxwell (Fed. Cir. 1996)
- Claiming fastening tabs between inner and outer soles
  - Disclosed, did not claim, fastening the tabs into the lining seam of the shoes
- So, Dedicated it!
- Policy
  - Avoided examination
  - POSITA would think its public domain

- YBM (Fed. Cir. 1998)
- Claim magnet alloy
  - 6k to 35k ppm oxygen
  - Specification allegedly disclosed a range below 6k
  - AID used 5.45k to 6k
- Cabined Maxwell to situations where the unclaimed alternative was “distinct”
**Johnson & Johnston v. R.E. Service (Fed. Cir. 2002)**

- How does the patentee protect herself?
  - Claim everything?
  - What happens if the claim is later invalidated?
  - It is in the patentee’s hands to “get it right” during prosecution

**Scimed v. Advanced Cardiovascular (Fed. Cir. 2001)**

- Balloon dilation catheters
- Claim construction and DOE assertion
- Vitiate
- All elements/limitations
- Specific exclusion
  - Most relevant to this fact pattern
Corning Glass v. Sumitomo (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Nies)

- Court affirms DOE infringement judgment against Sumitomo
- Claimed technology is glass-clad / glass-core fiber
  - Outer cladding layer has lower RI
  - Fiber used for optical communications needs to limit the fiber-transmitted light to preselected “modes”
    - Optimum is a single “mode”
- Corning Inventors – developed first 20db/km fiber – single or low number of modes
  - Properties due to
    - pure fused silica cladding
    - a fused silica core containing approximately three percent by weight of titania as the dopant in the core
    - careful selection of the core diameter and the RI differential between the core and the cladding

Corning Glass v. Sumitomo (Fed. Cir. 1989)

- Claim 1 ['915 patent]
  - An optical waveguide comprising
  - (a) a cladding layer formed of a material selected from the group consisting of
    - pure fused silica and
    - fused silica to which a dopant material on at least an elemental basis has been added, and
  - (b) a core formed of fused silica to which a dopant material on at least an elemental basis has been added
    - to a degree in excess of that of the cladding layer so that the index of refraction thereof is of a value greater than the index of refraction of said cladding layer,
    - said core being formed of at least 85 percent by weight of fused silica and an effective amount up to 15 percent by weight of said dopant material.
**Corning Glass v. Sumitomo (Fed. Cir. 1989)**

- **Follow up invention – ‘550 patent**
  - Use germania dopant in order to eliminate strength-reducing heat treatment step

- **Sumitomo’s S-3 fiber – the Accused Infringing Device (AID)**
  - Under SSF-SSW-SSR test
    - SSF & SSR are met
    - SSW is at issue
      - The “Way” part of the tripartite test is usually the crux of the issue

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### Claim 1 ['915 patent]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application to AID</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(a) a cladding layer formed of a material selected from the group consisting of</strong></td>
<td>This claim language literally reads on the AID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pure fused silica and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fused silica to which a dopant material on at least an elemental basis has been added, and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(b) a core formed of fused silica to which a dopant material on at least an elemental basis has been added</strong></td>
<td>Claim limitation calling for addition of dopant to the core was not literally met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to a degree in excess of that of the cladding layer so that the index of refraction thereof is of a value greater than the index of refraction of said cladding layer,</td>
<td>District court found that addition of fluorine dopant to the cladding (reducing its RI) equivalently met the limitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>said core being formed of at least 85 percent by weight of fused silica and an effective amount up to 15 percent by weight of said dopant material.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Corning Glass v. Sumitomo (Fed. Cir. 1989)
- An aside to discuss the preamble
  - An optical waveguide comprising
- Sumitomo argued that the ‘915 patent was anticipated by a PA reference
- Sumitomo would have won this argument, except that Corning successfully argued that the preamble phrase optical waveguide was limiting
  - “The specification then sets forth in detail the complex equation for the structural dimensions and refractive index differential necessary, in accordance with the invention, for an optical waveguide fiber comprising a fused silica core and cladding to transmit preselected modes of light.”
  - “To read the claim in light of the specification indiscriminately to cover all types of optical fibers would be divorced from reality.”

Corning Glass v. Sumitomo (Fed. Cir. 1989)
- Is fluorine dopant in the cladding of the AID a SSW to obtain the SSF & SSR compared to
  - The claim’s requirement of dopant in the core?
  - If the answer given is “yes” – does that mean the “all elements” rule has been broken?
- The Federal Circuit says the “all elements” rule has not been broken
  - “Sumitomo's analysis is faulty in that it would require equivalency in components, that is, the substitution of something in the core for the absent dopant.”
  - The application of DOE was not allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate that element in its entirety
Corning Glass v. Sumitomo (Fed. Cir. 1989)

- The Federal Circuit also says that the “don’t encompass the prior art” restriction on DOE is not triggered here as well
  - Why?
  - The answer relates to whether the “known interchangable” negative cladding dopant is itself in the PA, or
  - appears in the PA in a combination that would read on the full claim

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Corning Glass v. Sumitomo (Fed. Cir. 1989)

- Terminology on relationships among claims
  - But, not all claims related in other ways or that share elements have one of these types of relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More broad</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Less broad</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-combination</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Combination</td>
<td>ABCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Subservient</td>
<td>ABCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genus</td>
<td>ABR(_1) where R(_1) is . . . X . .</td>
<td>Species</td>
<td>ABX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. A golf ball having
   - a spherical surface with a plurality of dimples formed therein and
   - six great circle paths which do not intersect any dimples,
   - the dimples being arranged by dividing the spherical surface into twenty spherical triangles corresponding to the faces of a regular icosahedron,
   - each of the twenty triangles being sub-divided into four smaller triangles consisting of a central triangle and three apical triangles by connecting the midpoints of the sides of each of said twenty triangles along great circle paths,
   - said dimples being arranged so that the dimples do not intersect the sides of any of the central triangles.

[Bracketed insertions ours.]


- Suit against Dunlop (Maxifli ball) and its distributor DGA (Slazenger ball)
- Law invoked
  - DOE limited by that which would “improperly ensnare the prior art”
  - Methodology is important
    - Claims are not expanded
    - As an analysis tool – conceive of a hypothetical claim which covers the AID
      - Alternative approach is to compare the AID directly to the PA
    - Determine whether this hypothetical claim would have been allowed by the PTO
      - Can be “not allowable” for issues of both novelty/anticipation and/or obviousness
  - Notes: Express some concern with the “hypothetical claim” approach
  - Takeaway is that literal claim scope cannot be expanded to cover territory that would make the claim invalid
### Functional Claiming

#### §112

| [preAIA ¶6] An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof | “means plus function” or “step plus function” (step-plus-result) claims |

### §112 ¶6 - Means + Function Claims

- Cover structure disclosed in the specification
- Are they narrower or broader than “regular” claim elements/limitations?
- Differences between PTO versus courts?
  - PTO – allowed broadest reasonable interpretation (for claims generally, including §112 ¶ 6 elements in claims)
  - BUT, PTO is required to apply the §112 ¶6 approach to determining the meaning of means plus function elements
§112 ¶6 - Means + Function Claims

Interpret claims to assess validity using the §112 ¶6 approach to determine:
(i) the literal meaning of means plus function claim elements;
(ii) to evaluate §112 ¶6 equivalents as necessary against any asserted PA

To assert claims for infringement:
(i) interpret them using the §112 ¶6 approach to determine the literal meaning of means plus function claim elements;
(ii) evaluate §112 ¶6 equivalents as necessary against any asserted PA (art prior to issuance); and
(iii) evaluate DOE equivalents as necessary against the AID (for AAT only)

§112 ¶6 - Means + Function Claims

- How is a §112 ¶6 equivalent different from a DOE equivalent?
  - Function
    - Function-Way-Result
      - DOE – substantially similar function, way and result
      - §112 ¶6 – identical function, substantially similar way and result
    - Insubstantial Differences
      - DOE – substantially similar function, insubstantial structural differences
      - §112 ¶6 – identical function, insubstantial structural differences
  - “After arising” technology
    - DOE covers “after arising” technology
    - §112 ¶6 equivalents cover technology arising prior to issuance
§112 ¶6 - Means + Function Claims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>§112 ¶6 Equiv.</th>
<th>DOE §112 ¶6</th>
<th>DOE Non-112.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explain:
- Invent
- Apply
- Issue
- Exclude Others – Infringement (Literal and/or DOE)
- Expire

Odetics v. Storage Tech (Fed. Cir. 1999)

- Claim limitation
  - “rotary means”
- Analysis and approach for means plus function claim limitations for literal infringement
  - Including the effect of the words “equivalents thereof” in section 112, paragraph 6 (postAIA 112(f))
NTP v. RIM (Fed. Cir. 2005)

- Product / Process / “system” claims
- Control
- Beneficial Use
- Related Issue: Sales and Offers to Sell

Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007)

- “Infringement occurs only when Windows is installed on a computer, thereby rendering it capable of performing as the patented speech processor.”
- “a copy of Windows, not Windows in the abstract, qualifies as a ‘component’ under § 271(f)”
- Does a single master CD sent abroad with copies made abroad equate to "supplied from the U.S."?
- Presumption against extraterritoriality
- Dissent . . .
District court denied preliminary injunction
Is there 271(g) infringement of claim 5 of the '085 patent?
Output of the method of claim 5 is "Compound 6" whereas the accused infringing compound is cefaclor
"materially changed"
"Lilly notes that there are only four steps between compound 6 and cefaclor, and that all four steps involve relatively routine chemical reactions"
Lilly’s approach would look at economic effects
Court looks at degree of difference in the "compound’s structure and properties"

Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent. In an action for infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be granted for infringement on account of the noncommercial use or retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate remedy under this title for infringement on account of the importation or other use, offer to sell, or sale of that product. A product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made after —
(1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.

Indirect Infringement

Inducement – §271(b)
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.

Contributory infringement - §271(c)
(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
271(c) issue

- “special device at the heart of a patented machine”
- Non-staple article
- Staple article of commerce doctrine
  - Claim to: ABCD
  - Selling A (material component), “know” it will be combined with BCD, “know” ABCD patented
  - Is A “staple”?  

271(b) issue

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Lucent Tech. v. Gateway, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2009)

- 19. A method for use in a computer having a display comprising the steps of
  - displaying on said display a plurality of information fields,
  - identifying for each field a kind of information to be inserted therein,
  - indicating a particular one of said information fields into which information is to be inserted and for concurrently displaying a predefined tool associated with said one of said fields, said predefined tool being operable to supply information of the kind identified for said one field, said tool being selected from a group of predefined tools including a tool adapted to supply an individual entry from a menu of alternatives and at least a tool adapted to allow said user to compose said information, and
  - inserting in said one field information that is derived as a result of said user operating said displayed tool.

Global-Tech v. SEB (SCT 2011)

- Inducement under Section 271(b)
  - Key issue: Is knowledge of patent-in-suit required? If so, actual or constructive?
  - Note: Only affects pre-suit/judgment damages.
    - Lack of knowledge does not waive post-suit/judgment liability or potential injunction.

- Compare Aro v. Convertible Top (Aro II) (1964)
  - Held 5-4 that contributory infringement under Section 271(c) requires knowledge (1) that component is especially adapted or infringement; and (2) knowledge of the patent-in-suit
## Global-Tech v. SEB (SCT 2011)

In 1997, Sunbeam Products, Inc., a U.S. competitor of SEB, asked petitioner Pentalpha Enterprises, Ltd., to supply it with deep fryers meeting certain specifications. Pentalpha is a Hong Kong maker of home appliances and a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner Global-Tech Appliances, Inc.

In order to develop a deep fryer for Sunbeam, Pentalpha purchased an SEB fryer in Hong Kong and copied all but its cosmetic features. Because the SEB fryer bought in Hong Kong was made for sale in a foreign market, it bore no U.S. patent markings. After copying SEB’s design, Pentalpha retained an attorney to conduct a right-to-use study, but Pentalpha refrained from telling the attorney that its design was copied directly from SEB’s.

The attorney failed to locate SEB’s patent, and in August 1997 he issued an opinion letter stating that Pentalpha’s deep fryer did not infringe any of the patents that he had found. That same month, Pentalpha started selling its deep fryers to Sunbeam, which resold them in the United States under its trademarks. By obtaining its product from a manufacturer with lower production costs, Sunbeam was able to undercut SEB in the U.S. market.

After SEB’s customers started defecting to Sunbeam, SEB sued Sunbeam in March 1998, alleging that Sunbeam’s sales infringed SEB’s patent. Sunbeam notified Pentalpha of the lawsuit the following month. Undeterred, Pentalpha went on to sell deep fryers to Fingerhut Corp. and Montgomery Ward & Co., both of which resold them in the United States under their respective trademarks.

SEB settled the lawsuit with Sunbeam, and then sued Pentalpha, asserting two theories of recovery: First, SEB claimed that Pentalpha had directly infringed SEB’s patent in violation of 35 U.S.C. §271(a), by selling or offering to sell its deep fryers; and second, SEB claimed that Pentalpha had contravened §271(b) by actively inducing Sunbeam, Fingerhut, and Montgomery Ward to sell or to offer to sell Pentalpha’s deep fryers in violation of SEB’s patent rights.

Following a 5-day trial, the jury found for SEB on both theories and also found that Pentalpha’s infringement had been willful.

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### Global-Tech Historical Cases

- **America Cotton Tie (SCT 1882)**
  - “the defendants prepare and sell the [component] . . . intending to have it used . . . to produce the results set forth in the [asserted] patents . . . .”

- **Morgan Envelope (SCT 1894)**
  - Proper reading is specific intent as to acts; not knowledge of patent

- **A.B. Dick (SCT 1912)**
  - Dicta stating that knowledge of the patent was required
Global-Tech (2011)

- Supreme Court argues that pre-1952 case law was unclear on scienter requirement
- Although “there is much to be said” for the majority and dissent’s views in Aro II, in light of the “special force” of stare decisis, Court reaffirms that 271(c) requires knowledge of patent
- Based on this premise, 271(b) requires same knowledge as 271(c)
- Court rejects “deliberate indifference” test and adopts “willful blindness”
  - Of course, “actual knowledge” will always suffice

Two-Step Test for 271(b) and 271(c)

- (1) “Defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that” an infringement exists; and
- (2) “Defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact”
- These requirements “surpass[] recklessness and negligence”
  - Recklessness is where defendant “merely knows of a substantial and unjustified risk” of infringement
  - Rejects CAFC test on this basis plus fact that CAFC test does not require active efforts to avoid knowledge
### Scienter Levels for Patent Infringement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scienter Level</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Infringement [271(a)]</td>
<td>None (Note: vicarious liability for corporate officers generally requires scienter) Even accidental of inadvertent infringement counts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Inducement [271(b)]</td>
<td>Specific Intent Must have (1) specific intent to induce direct infringement; and (2) must have knowledge of the patent or meet willfull blindness requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributory Infringement [271(c)]</td>
<td>Specific Knowledge &quot;knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent&quot; means (1) knowledge that the component was especially made or adapted for a particular use; and (2) must have knowledge of the patent or meet willful blindness requirement [Intent to do (1) is required but inferred from knowledge]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exporting components (inducement prong) [271(f)(1)]</td>
<td>Specific Intent Same as active inducement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exporting components (contributory prong) [271(f)(2)]</td>
<td>Specific Intent? &quot;knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willful Infringement</td>
<td>Objective Recklessness &quot;Accordingly, to establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Akamai v. Limelight (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc)

- The problem of “divided infringement”
- “redefining” direct infringement?
  - All steps of the method must be performed by someone
  - But no longer by some one single actor or its agents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Inducer</th>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Inducer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Sally</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Tom</td>
<td>Jim</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Henry</td>
<td>Carol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the McKesson case, Epic can be held liable for inducing infringement if it can be shown that (1) it knew of McKesson’s patent, (2) it induced the performance of the steps of the method claimed in the patent, and (3) those steps were performed.

In the Akamai case, Limelight would be liable for inducing infringement if the patentee could show that (1) Limelight knew of Akamai’s patent, (2) it performed all but one of the steps of the method claimed in the patent, (3) it induced the content providers to perform the final step of the claimed method, and (4) the content providers in fact performed that final step.